

Symposium

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


LESS ERRONEOUS PICTURES. 299

Of the Right Whale, the best outline pictures are in Scoresby ; but they are drawn on too small a scale to convey a desirable impression. He has but one picture of whaling scenes, and this is a sad deficiency, because it is by such pictures only, when at all well done, that you can derive anything like a truthful idea of the living whale as seen by his living hunters.

But, taken for all in all, by far the finest, though in some details not the most correct, presentations of whales and whaling scenes to be anywhere found, are two large French engravings, well executed, and taken from paintings by one Gavery. Respectively, they represent attacks on the Sperm and Right Whale. In the first engraving, a Sperm Whale is depicted in full majesty of might, leaping from the profundities of the ocean, and striking the boat upon his back, the terrific wreck of the vessel is seen, the prow of the boat is partially unbroken, and is still hanging upon the monster's spine; and standing upon the deck, that one single incomprehensible flash of time, a man, half shrouded by the incensed boiling spray, and in the act of leaping, as if from a precipice, the whole thing is wonderfully good and true. The emptied line-tub floats on the whitened sea; the whaling crew of the spilled harpoons obliquely bob in it; the swimming crew are scattered about the whale in various expressions of affright; while in the black stormy distance, a ship is bearing down upon the scene. Serious faults might be found with the anatomical details of this whale, but let that pass; since, for the life of me, I could not draw so good a one.

In the second engraving, the boat is in the act of drawing alongside the barnacled flank of a large running Right Whale, that rolls his black weedy bulk in the sea like some mossy rock-slide from the Patagonian cliffs. His jets are erect, full, and black like soot; so that from so abounding a smoke in the chimney, you would think there must be a brave supper cooking



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“Moby Dick is that unknowable, unreachable force that lurks beneath the words of every text and under the surface of everyone we meet.” —Alora Cholette

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***Moby Dick*: Three Views of Nature**

Melissa Rubin

Herman Melville's *Moby Dick* explores a wide range of philosophical thought through the nineteenth-century world of whaling. One of the text's central concerns is how humanity chooses to find meaning in the unknown. Melville presents an exploration of this question in the sequence of chapters entitled "Sunset," "Dusk," and "First Night-Watch" which are written as three distinct soliloquies spoken by Ahab, captain of the Pequod, Starbuck, his chief mate, and Stubb, Ahab's second mate, respectively. These three perspectives emerge from these characters' interactions with nature and other crew members, and through Melville's literary techniques. The alignment of their differing world views using the time of day as a context distinguishes the varying and often opposing ways in which humanity comes to terms with the inexplicable nature of life.

Melville employs metaphorical images to represent principles of life including God, nature, and death. Through the crew's interactions in the whaling industry and life at sea, the characters express views that humanity may hold in relation to such matters. The captain of the Pequod, Ahab, exhibits a disconnect with nature which eventually devolves into a state of mania. His inability to comprehend nature is objectified through his obsession with killing the elusive white sperm whale, Moby Dick. The sperm whale as agent also embodies the principle of the unknown that Ahab loathes. Ahab's chief mate Starbuck differs from this negative outlook greatly. Starbuck marries the natural workings of life with reason.

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Additionally, his identity as a Quaker brings with it the belief in a higher power. Starbuck is paradigmatic of a religious individual who rationalizes unknown principles through religion and order. The final perspective is illustrated through the second mate of the Pequod, Stubb, who denies any ontological order or inclinations. He accepts the unknown and is not hindered by cultural traditions and belief. He approaches the unfamiliarity of life with a comfortable and relaxed demeanor. Although the three shipmates offer differing viewpoints, they are united in their consideration of the uncertainty of life.

The triad is united through the notion of time and the movement of the sun. Weather is a central aspect throughout *Moby Dick*. Each of the three chapters is assigned a particular moment of the day with its corresponding sensuous features. Ahab delivers his monologue during sunset, Starbuck at dusk, and finally Stubb at night. This common thread unifies the passages while also distinguishing the separate perspectives.

Ahab's alignment with the image of a sunset is fitting for his outlook on nature and the unknown. A sunset typically provides solace to viewers and is aesthetically pleasing. In this passage, Melville utilizes poetic language to illustrate this natural phenomenon. He writes, "Yonder, by the ever-brimming goblet's rim, the warm waves blush like wine. The gold brow plumbs the blue. The diver sun – slow dived from noon – goes down; my soul mounts up!" (182). This metaphorical language is indicative of one of nature's most alluring sights. Nevertheless, this passage denotes how Ahab's unwavering passion for revenge fails to allow him to appreciate this moment which commences with a serene outlook of the sea but

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which ends with the harsh consciousness of Ahab. These contraries are prevalent in Melville's literary style. By marrying two separate entities, Melville heightens the contrast. In this instance, the conflict between the two demonstrates how Ahab's ailing mentality annihilates the purest of moments. Ahab cannot experience any portion of life while the unknown remains unconquered. He alienates himself from his environment, and fails to acknowledge any aspect of life outside of his quest for Moby Dick. By doing so, Ahab essentially places himself outside of nature. The image of the sunset works to demonstrate Ahab's madness and disconnect from nature.

"Dusk" is an appropriate temporal frame for Starbuck's state of mind. Dusk is that time of day when darkness overshadows the remnants of light at the conclusion of day. This, in turn, makes vision a difficult task. "Dusk" correspondingly reflects the grasp Ahab has over his first-mate, Starbuck. Starbuck reflects, "My soul is more than matched; she's overmanned; and by a madman! Insufferable sting, that sanity should ground arms on such a field! But he drilled deep down, and blasted all reason out of me!" (Melville 184). Starbuck is overpowered by the oppressive force of his manic captain. His hope is dwindling, like the last of the sun's rays. He recognizes the impending doom but cannot evade the destruction. Here, Starbuck's compliant nature and ability to succumb to a higher power is evident. He fulfills his culturally defined role as Ahab's inferior and does not stray from his position. "Dusk" corroborates Starbuck's orderly and obedient nature.

Night provides an accurate backdrop for Stubb's beliefs. Stubb plainly views the world as it exists and accepts it at face value. For his soliloquy, he is depicted at the top of the masthead manning the first night-watch. Night on the open ocean

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consists of a black, shapeless environment with no definitive boundaries. This environment mirrors Stubb's outlook on the dynamics of life. He is not limited by order or classifications. The infinite nature of his mentality allows for his imaginative perception, which is a concept prevalent throughout the work. While night represents Stubb's boundless perspective, it also classifies his fatalistic view of life. Stubb believes that his actions do not carry any significance in the larger scheme of things. In essence, he concludes that his actions and presence are meaningless. He simply goes with the flow rather than acknowledge his place in the world. Overall, night encompasses the lackadaisical yet dark aspects of Stubb's outlook.

While these soliloquys depict the three seamen alone, their relations to others provide another basis of comparison. Their individual moments allow time for reflections on their shipmates. As noted earlier, Ahab operates outside the nature of his surroundings. He is similarly isolated from his peers. He disregards nature in all senses and operates on an individual basis. He truly embodies what Melville classifies as an "isolato". Of this made-up term, he writes, "They were nearly all Islanders in the Pequod, *Isolato*es too, I call such, not acknowledging the common continent of men, but each *Isolato* living on a separate continent of his own" (Melville 131). Ahab is the epitome of this identification as he operates with no personal relation to his crew. His dealings with his crew members grow to be machinelike. In "Sunset," Ahab reflects, "'Twas not so hard a task. I thought to find one stubborn, at the least; but my one cogged circle fits into all their various wheels, and they revolve. Or, if you will, like so many ant-hills of powder, they all stand

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before me; and I their match' (Melville 182-183). By the end of the expedition, the crew succumbs to Ahab's control. In the chapter "The Hat," Melville writes, "Alike, joy and sorry, hope and fear, seemed ground to finest dust, and powdered, for the first time, in the clamped mortar of Ahab's iron soul. Like machines, they dumbly moved about the deck, ever conscious that the old man's despot eye was on them" (582). Ahab obliterates any personal connection in the relationships with his peers. The captain lacks any relation with nature whether it be with the environment or other members of society.

Starbuck embodies an individual whose relations with others are rooted in order. For Starbuck, this order is a product of his religious beliefs. He is characterized by his ability to act on what is considered morally right and of good nature. In his soliloquy, Starbuck ponders, "Oh, God! to sail with such a heathen crew that have small touch of human mothers in them! Whelped somewhere by the sharkish sea." (Melville 184). His reflection reveals a greater awareness of his shipmates and a higher sense of morality. However, he has no intentions to alter the system. He abides by his limits and does not force his views onto others. This is especially true of his relationship with his captain as he is fearful of Ahab's actions and reactions. This demonstrates Starbuck's recognition of limits. His humble sense correlates with the concept of measure that is evident throughout *Moby Dick*. He is able to check his actions, a quality that contrasts with the uncontrollable wrath of Ahab. Starbuck's interactions with others reveal a true sense of order and measure based on his values.

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Alternatively, Stubb consciously chooses to assume a less defined role in societal interactions. He accepts how others choose to see him. In "First Night-Watch" Stubb reflects, "...who calls? Mr. Starbuck? Aye, aye, sir – (*Aside*) he's my superior, he has his too, if I'm not mistaken. – Aye, aye, sir, just through with this job – coming" (Melville 186). His identity is constructed through the views of others as he simply chooses to exist. This connects back to his concept of the little impact he believes he has in life. His indifference to society also comes across as reckless. Stubb's careless character becomes especially apparent when Ahab's alternative crew headed by Fedallah is revealed during the first lowering. Stubb proclaims, "What is it you stare at? Those chaps in yonder boat? Tut! They are only five more hands come to help us – never mind from where – the more the merrier. Pull, then, do pull; never mind the brimstone – devils are good fellows enough" (Melville 237). The dark nature of Ahab's secretive crew is apparent, yet Stubb fails to be alarmed. Rather than be fearful, he accepts the situation for what it is. Stubb lacks Starbuck's values and sense of universal order. In general, Stubb's dealings with others reflect his lackadaisical approach to life.

"Sunset," "Dusk," and "First Night-Watch" also examine the interplay of chance, free will, and fate. These interwoven abstracted entities of life are prominent features of the narrative throughout *Moby Dick*. These soliloquys allude to these forces as the three men reflect on the workings of life. Ahab's fixation on the controlling destiny of fate is exemplified through this passage. He reflects, "The path to my fixed purpose is laid with iron rails, whereon my soul is grooved to run" (Melville 183). Ahab's idea of fate leads to his demise in the end. The unification of

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the soul and the mind are also evident in Ahab's ailing being. His tormented soul is the product of his iron-willed mind.

While Ahab is consumed with the prospects of fate, Starbuck fails to exercise free will. He is confined by the nature of his religion and his inferior position to his captain. When faced with the possibility of overpowering his captain, he declines to break his valued codes. Starbuck reflects, "What, then, remains? The land is hundreds of leagues away, and locked Japan the nearest. I stand alone here on an open sea, with two oceans and a whole continent between me and law...Is heaven a murderer when lightning strikes a would-be murderer in his bed, tinding sheets and skin together?" (Melville 559). Starbuck is unable to deviate from his values and remains a prisoner to Ahab's murderous ways. His decision is in part due to his forever hopeful outlook that all will turn out well in the end.

A last view on the three dynamics of life demonstrates Stubb's view on chance. He confirms his outlook saying, "Because a laugh's the wisest, easiest answer to all that's queer; and come what will, one comfort's always left – that unfailing comfort is, it's all predestinated" (Melville 186). Stubb grows to be detached from the perils of the whaling industry. He accepts life to be predestined and does not give a second thought to what may happen. His inability to account for chance detracts from his sense of free will. The interconnectedness of fate, free will, and chance are integral aspects of the characters' soliloquies and their corresponding views.

"Sunset," "Dusk," and "First Night-Watch" are also unified by the stage direction that precedes each soliloquy. The minute details of these directions help

frame the dramatic element of each narrative. The reader is reminded that each chapter is a performance in some ways similar to a Shakespearean soliloquy. Besides the contextual resonance, the stage directions further the mental states of the characters through their physicality. For example, Ahab is described as positioned in “the cabin; by the stern windows; Ahab sitting alone, and gazing out” (Melville 183). This exemplifies Ahab’s isolated state that is both physical and mental. He is separated from the crew, the rest of the ship, and ultimately, the world. His description contrasts Starbuck’s stage direction which reads, “By the Mainmast; Starbuck leaning against it” (Melville 184). Starbuck fulfills his duty at the post and finds comfort in what he knows. This is similar to the orderly nature he draws from his religious perspective and his position as Ahab’s first mate. For Stubb’s stage direction, Melville writes, “Stubb solus, and mending a brace” (186). The added detail that Stubb is mending a brace can be related to a unique mannerism his character exhibits. He occupies his time in a nonchalant manner with a mundane job. Stubb accepts reality by means of laughter and good spirits. By masking the perils of the unknown with humor and acceptance, Stubb is relieved from immediate worries. All of these characters are presented in a context where they are alone, but their physicality provided through these cues suggests how they accept or compensate for reality.

The sequence of these outlooks heightens the various outlooks employed to cope with the “phantoms” of life. The Pequod proves to be a microcosm of humanity and especially resonates as an American work. *Moby Dick* depicts three American shipmates unified in their journey; however, each has a drastically different

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approach to his reconciliation with the unknown. In many ways, this is paradigmatic of the nation as a whole. The various perspectives on religion, beliefs, and scientific knowledge that exist within the community allow for a multiplicity of outlooks. *Moby Dick* ultimately invites readers to extract their own meaning of nature and of life. Ultimately, the true nature of the unknown proves to be subjective to the individual.

“Sunset,” “Dusk,” and “First Night-Watch” present a progression of world views in the unifying context of time. Their alignment in terms of thematic principles and literary composition offer the opportunity for a rich comparison of Melville’s ideas and characters. Together, the three soliloquys are paradigmatic of *Moby Dick’s* entire narrative. Ultimately, Melville constructs a number of ways to interpret the unknown as he invites the reader to reflect on the underlying notion of the unknown that humanity forever struggles to understand.

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On Value Systems and Cultural Homogenization in *The Cancer Stage of Capitalism* and *The Great Transformation*

Sebastian Souchet

I. Introduction

As human civilization steadily approaches the first quarter of the 21st century, it seems increasingly appropriate to categorize the contemporary global economic landscape as predominated (if not dominated) by capitalist political economy, its respective multifaceted mechanisms, and its indubitable international expansion. Indeed, with the increasing institutionalization and pervasive influence of the existing neoliberal international economic infrastructure, and the continuous governmental establishment of regional free trade agreements that enhance and promote the globalization of neoliberal capitalism, one must question whether the conceptualization and actualization of a substantive vision of an *alternative* system of economic activity, founded upon fundamentally distinct principles of economic organization and relations, is even possible. Such a critical question is necessary, *prima facie*, because of the vast and exponentially growing disparities in relative income inequality and poverty within both advanced and developing countries throughout the world, and the seemingly perpetual processes of ecological destruction inducing climate change, all of which cause one to call into question the justice, fairness, and ultimate sustainability of such an economic.¹

¹ The term “developing countries” is utilized here as it is within the systematic conceptual

However, such a question is also necessary because, as some influential social philosophers and economic theorists have intuitively discerned, there exists within capitalism an underlying and fundamental ideology and systematized conceptual framework that is characterized by a seemingly ubiquitous pervasiveness, and that has been largely adopted and internalized by the populaces of the capitalist countries (and an ever-increasing number of the non-capitalist countries) of the world. Although capitalist *ideology* is not often remarked upon in the conventional economics literature focused on growth and the functioning of the capitalist system, the work and ideas of two critical authors, John McMurtry and Karl Polanyi, give testament to the dynamic ideology and internal logic of neoliberal capitalism through their elaborate and intuitive analyses. Indeed, a comprehensive comparative analysis of John McMurtry's perceptive work *The Cancer Stage of Capitalism*, and Karl Polanyi's classic and seminal work *The Great Transformation*, lucidly illustrates that the ideological force and fundamental values framework embedded within the political-economic system of capitalism (and its respective set of institutionalized social relations) establish a seemingly totalizing system, and thus hegemonic control over the cultural realm of society, and perpetuate themselves as a capitalist cultural logic, or market rationality, which serves to increasingly further the commoditization, commercialization, and financialization of that which exists within the spatial and temporal realms of contemporary reality.

framework of contemporary capitalism. Thus, when employed, it refers to countries in which there continues to be an internal expansion and adoption of *neoliberal* capitalist modalities and systems where formerly their economic systems were either seemingly founded upon fundamentally different principles or structured distinctly (such as communist countries), or were of a socialist or social democratic hue (and thus were mixed economies).

II. An Analysis of John McMurtry's "Cancer Stage" of Capitalism

To begin to discuss the homogenizing ideological force of capitalism and the cultural hegemony it has seemingly achieved, it is both useful and perhaps necessary to begin with the fundamental conceptual context, ideas, and analysis of contemporary capitalism conducted by social philosopher John McMurtry in his work *The Cancer Stage of Capitalism*. McMurtry begins his discussion of the nature of contemporary neoliberal capitalism by identifying that capitalism (in McMurtry's view) has reached its "cancer stage." In elaborating his "diagnosis," McMurtry argues that the contemporary condition of global economic affairs has "all the hallmark characteristics of this disease... [as] ever more indicators show the life-system collapse at the social level of life organization, from vast new lifeless lands and waters to wastes without end and [the spread of] false foods and toxins" (McMurtry 2013: pg. 22). Utilizing cancer as a metaphor, McMurtry conveys the intuition that just as cancer systematically replicates itself, eventually causing the destruction of its life-host that it feeds on, the cancer stage of capitalism aggressively and exponentially replicates its processes and its internal logic, ultimately resulting in the social, political, and economic elimination of those societies within which it has taken root, and the simultaneous extermination of Earth's ecology altogether. Indeed, as McMurtry explicitly notes, "*there is now no known domain of human life or social and ecological life-support systems not in macro decline in life-carrying capacity*" (McMurtry 2013: pg. 76, McMurtry's emphasis). Thus, it seems clear that the cancer system and its internal logic have established a

totalizing system that conceptually and materially overrides the life-requirements of society and the individual at all levels.

At this point in the analysis one may appropriately ask: What precisely does McMurtry mean when he uses the phrase “the cancer stage of capitalism,” and what are the conceptual nuances and implications of the cancer structure? For McMurtry, the cancer stage of capitalism signifies the contemporary neoliberal processes, functions, and overall structure of capitalism embodied, perpetuated, and exponentially increased by “deregulated transnational money-sequences which multiply with no life-function and attack the productive life of societies at every level” (McMurtry 2013: pg. 24). McMurtry argues that it is such aggressively self-multiplying private money sequences that, in the simple and sole aim of turning private money into more private money, penetrate the societies of the globe and are responsible for their social, political, economic, and ecological destruction, and hence the destruction of the lives of the individuals within such societies. Through a series of reversals of centuries of social reforms for “democratic accountability and the life security of peoples,” transnational private money sequences have been enabled to fundamentally take root in the global economy and effect a massive attack on public sectors and social services that are the life-protective social “immune” defenses of individuals and society as a whole (McMurtry 2013: pg. 45). Moreover, such private money sequences have destroyed trade unions that have historically protected workers and labor rights, privatized public functions and facilities such as prisons and social welfare programs, and dismantled the productive capacities and institutions of societies through large-scale firings of

workforces, militant deregulation of transnational corporations and their processes of extraction, and the destruction of environmental protections. As McMurtry insightfully notes, it is no longer “only *surplus* value being extracted,” as was the case with industrial capitalism throughout the 19th century and up to the late 20th century, but a “degeneration and wasting of productive capital and goods themselves” (McMurtry 2013: pg. 46). With the cancer system, such degeneration and waste is unending, as public funds are “made the means to grow private transnational money sequences” (McMurtry 2013: pg. 46). Thus, the existence of *society* itself is fundamentally denied by the cancer system as public accountability is eviscerated and only the *market*, acknowledged as the “free market,” rules. Indeed, the fundamental principle of the cancer system and its trends is codified by McMurtry in a formula: “\$ * AasM * \$¹⁻²⁻³ * n; where AasM = All as Means” (McMurtry 2013: pg. 48). That is, all life-hosts are fodder for the cancer system to extract money and wealth from in order to exponentially grow its private money-sequences and perpetuate itself.

The cancer system manifests itself in a multiplicity of trends and manners all of which play a role in systematically dismantling and destroying the life-needs, social protections, and support systems of society and the individual. First and foremost, McMurtry argues that what is identified as “economic growth” by the political and economic leadership in the national discourse is in fact the exponentially multiplying money-sequences. However, as McMurtry notes, such “economic growth” is a reversal of the fundamental reality that “the multiplying money-sequences *cumulatively destroy the conditions of real and future economic*

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growth” (McMurtry 2013: pg. 64). Indeed, the productive capacities of the economies of numerous countries have been depleted as money-sequences have overthrown the regime of life-serving economic growth and replaced it with categorical social, economic, and ecological depletion. Furthermore, even if such “noxious growth” is recognized rather than misunderstood or denied (as in the contemporary understanding of climate change being caused by environmental degradation), “the problem is not resolved,” and the underlying structural cause is not acknowledged (McMurtry 2013: pg. 64). Simultaneously, what promotes and perpetuates the cancer system is the continual construction and establishment of “free trade” systems which codify corporate money-sequence rights while protecting such money-sequences from democratic accountability and the authority of elected legislatures. Through such free trade packages, the transnational corporate money-sequencing is permeated throughout the world, ultimately taking firm hold of the global financial and economic systems with the assistance of the neoliberal international economic infrastructure—institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization—and Wall Street and London private investment banking procedures such as “compound-interest debt-loans to governments” and “speculative money-sequencing” (McMurtry 2013: pg. 65). In order to ensure that such money-sequences authoritatively and comprehensively encapsulate the global financial and economic systems, and to “suppress resistance to the mutating global corporate system of cumulative life-system degradation, rapine, and destruction,” McMurtry argues that a “transcontinental police-state system” has been globalized in the aftermath of the

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September 11th, 2001 attacks on the United States (McMurtry 2013: pg. 69). Hence, the money-sequencing system is composed of elements not only of financial extremism, but also of material militarism.

The trinity of transnational corporate money-sequencing power is completed with the changes the transnational corporate processes effect within the domain of the internal structures of countries. For McMurtry, the proliferation of corporate mass commodities; the ubiquity of the “degenerate” ideology of consumerism; the corporate restructuring of higher education and university research programs; the near-complete corporate control over mass media; and the reconceptualizing of democracy itself in the form of corporate donor-funded elections and privatization of public funds and functions, together exemplify the reification of a cancer totality. Indeed, the reversal and evisceration of social protections, and thus of the democratic cultural and political way of life and approach to life needs, signifies that transnational corporate money-sequences have counter-revolutionized the structure of society, its fundamental intuitions regarding individuals, and the promotion of a substantive, sustainable life. That democracy itself—the cultural, social, and political epitome of the recognition and protection of the life-needs of a people—now signifies transnational corporate money-sequencing power, is representative of the hegemony of the cancer system.

As one now understands the nature of the cancer system and its conceptual and actual implications for society and the individual, and one can identify the trends and processes of the cancer system, one may appropriately ask: Why is it that there exists a fundamental disconnect between recognition of the symptoms of the

cancer system, and recognition of the cancer system itself? That is, why has the self-destructive cancer system not been comprehensively conceptualized and systematically combatted by those who critically recognize its deleterious effects and its degradation of society overall? Indeed, while the symptoms of the cancer are recognized, and even explicitly acknowledged by intellectuals, critics, and the overall societies which have been affected by the cancerous form of capitalism, the underlying disease remains unacknowledged. McMurtry argues that “cancer is *unspeakable* even when the disease becomes undeniable” (McMurtry 2013: pg. 24, my emphasis). For McMurtry, the issue here is not only that the fundamental problem of the cancer system is not recognized and articulated in public discourse, but that the cancer system is not even mentally conceptualized as the problem to be solved. Such inability to acknowledge the fundamentals of the cancer system and its procedures when they have effected, over the last 15 years, severe and extensive economic collapses, as well as large-scale environmental degradation in the countries of North America, Latin America, Asia, and Europe, is astonishing to McMurtry. Furthermore, not only is there an inability to recognize the structural cause of such collapses, but there is simultaneously a conceptual reversal in analytically identifying the cause. Rather than identifying the cancer system and its ever-increasing perpetuation as the culprit, the victims of the symptoms of the cancer system are themselves acknowledged as the problem, and hence the reality is essentially reversed, and inverted.

For McMurtry, the fundamental answer to such questions lies in the relationship between the totalizing cultural hegemony of the cancer system and the

mentality of those individuals who exist within the cancer system's conceptualized socio-structural construction. McMurtry begins to answer such questions by perceptively noting what he calls the "ancient taboo." In analyzing the fundamentals of historical societies, McMurtry evinces a seemingly universal principle: "when people come to examine any way of life in the world, they are conditioned *not* to expose their own social order to the same critical eye with which they view a different or opposed social order" (McMurtry 2013: pg. 87). Indeed, to conduct such a critical analysis of one's own society and its fundamental principles and values would be "taboo." McMurtry asserts that such inability to conceptualize their own social order in a critical theoretical manner derives from the fact that their social order, and hence their way of life, is representative of "normality," and thus other social orders are viewed as "abnormal." Hence, McMurtry discerns that fundamentally, in thinking about and perceiving one's own social order there exists a "mind-bias at work," as "there is not only a rule against recognizing the monstrous in one's own social system, but a rule against recognizing that there is such a rule" (McMurtry 2013: pg.87). It is upon this understanding of the mentality of societies that McMurtry finds his answer to why individuals existing within the cancer system are incapable of conceiving of the cancer system itself as a totality. For McMurtry, critical conceptualization of the cancer system itself is disabled due to the "law-like tendency of [the] reigning social system to select against the reproduction of those views which expose and criticize it" (McMurtry 2013: pg. 97). Thus, the internalization of the cancer system's worldview and of the cancer system's norms, values, and sociocultural relations, by those within the system as a

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normalcy, establishes hegemony over the cultural and mental facets of society. McMurtry argues that the public and private discourses that manifest within the cancer system are impregnated with the values of the cancer system, and thus such discourses uphold, promulgate, and perpetuate its fundamental principle: “transnational corporate control of all that exists for self-maximizing returns to shareholders”. Only that which supports the cancer system and is representative of its values will be reproduced in the mass media, in the national political dialogue, and within the research conducted at higher education institutions. McMurtry argues that “humanity has come without notice to a totalitarian moment of the ancient taboo which works by what is *not* said, reported or debated in any official source or media of record,” and hence “the causal mechanism behind all of the degenerate trends [of the cancer system] identified ...is taboo to question” (McMurtry 2013: pg. 97).

In comprehensively analyzing the fundamentals of the cancer system and its totalizing, hegemonic control over the culture, social relations, economic relations, political activity, and mental conceptualizations of the society in which it takes root, McMurtry notes that it is the ideology of the cancer system that masks “the ruling value-program without recognizing it—as in the ideological assumptions that money capital ‘creates goods’ when *most profits are by property in land and knowledge it does not create, and its manufactures are increasingly bads rather than goods*” (McMurtry 2013: pg. 109). Thus, in order to fully convey the workings of the cancer system, McMurtry establishes what he calls the “basic value-program,” that systematically describes, in five principles, the procedures which establish the

cancer totality.² The first and fundamental principle of the cancer totality is that “transnational money-sequencing corporations control investment, production, and distribution so as to maximize private money returns without limit or required life-function” (McMurtry 2013: pg. 109). Everything that is officially conceptualized, communicated, planned, implemented, and enforced within the cancer system is founded upon this single principle. Indeed, it is this principle which “regulates” the system itself, as it “sets the limits of what can be publicly stated” (McMurtry 2013: pg. 109). However, the principle is never explicitly acknowledged. It exists as an intuition and worldview which establishes the cancer system lens through which the world is conceived and perceived. In addition, any thought or action which contradicts the value and necessity of the fundamental principle is essentially condemned and excluded from the official discourse within the cancer society. Exclusion itself can come in a number of forms including, but not limited to, the explicit ruling out of contradictory arguments, the omission of the connection between the destructive symptoms of the cancer system and the cancer system itself, the selecting out of conceptualizations and successes of alternative orders and values, and the marginalization of critics who explicitly identify the cancer system. Consequently, all that is included within the official discourse of the cancer system is

² Although McMurtry explicitly acknowledges that the “basic value-program” is not specific to the cancer system, and can be applied to any hegemonic, or totalizing ruling order, he notes that the cancer system’s basic value-program is “unprecedented in its nature and effects.” This is due to three primary facts of the cancer system: 1. “It is a global rule with no other military force in the world capable of overthrowing it”; 2. It constructs a system which *appears* to be free unless the fundamental principle of the cancer system is contradicted; and 3. The cancer system itself is inherently destructive of society, ecology, and the individual. Hence, McMurtry notes that the hegemony of ideological cancer capitalism in effect is an ahistorical force. (McMurtry 2013: pg.109)

that which “validates the [basic value-program, and hence the fundamental principle of the cancer system] as necessary/moral *and* what invalidates opposition to BVP [the basic value-program] as impractical/immoral is selected for publication” (McMurtry 2013: pg. 110).

What results is a discursive conceptualization of the cancer system as fundamentally moral and legitimate as it furthers “freedom,” is anti-tyrannical, promotes democracy and the democratic way of life, and serves as the foundation for a more prosperous and substantive future for individuals and society as a whole. Thus, one can clearly witness the hegemony of the cancer stage of capitalism over the very hermeneutics and understanding of society as a whole. Indeed, the cancer system does not merely discard reality, but fundamentally reshapes reality and reconceptualizes terms such as “freedom,” “democracy,” and “growth,” to fit within its own conceptual worldview.

III. An Analysis of Karl Polanyi, Capitalism’s “Fictitious Commodities” and the “Liberal Creed”

Writing nearly seventy years before McMurtry, Karl Polanyi identifies quite similar characteristics of the capitalist socioeconomic system and its actualized structural order in his analysis of the ideological force of capitalism. Polanyi establishes his conception of the nature of capitalist, or the “self-regulating” market economy, early in his work *The Great Transformation*. Polanyi states that in comparison to the behaviors of pre-capitalist economies that were “embedded” in the mutual obligations and social norms and principles of their contemporaneous societies, the capitalist economic system functions on the idea of a “self-regulating

mechanism” as it is an “economic system controlled, regulated and directed [solely] by market prices” as the system of prices guides production, consumption, and ultimately the societal distribution of goods (Polanyi 1944: pg. 71). Thus, such a conception of a market economy is, for Polanyi, entirely discontinuous with the history of economics and economic systems. Indeed, he argues that pre-capitalist economies were incapable of producing the ideological conception of self-regulation that for him serves as the bedrock upon which capitalist political economy is established. Seemingly inherent in such a conception of a self-regulating economic system is the assumption that market behavior is guided by “human beings [consistently behaving] in such a way as to achieve maximum money gains [profits],” a direct contradiction to the pre-capitalist economic principles (Polanyi 1944: pg. 71). Hence, Polanyi discerns that the capitalist market economy is necessarily founded upon what he terms the existence of “fictitious commodities,” or labor, land, and money. For if the self-regulating market is to properly function upon the principles of self-interest and is to be guided by the price system, “*all* production [must be] for sale on the market and...all incomes [must] derive from such sales” (Polanyi 1944: pg. 72, my emphasis).

The very existence of the notion of “fictitious commodities” such as labor, land, and money and the fact that such “commodities” only became conceived of and acted upon as commodities—defined as “objects *produced* for *sale* on the market”—as a result of the cultural and ideological transformation of the structures and principles of society effected by the capitalist creed, serves as an excellent example of the ideological force of capitalism and its capacity for ideological homogenization

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(Polanyi 1944: pg. 75, my emphasis). Indeed, the reconceptualization of such fundamental elements of economy and society as commodities that are produced in the market—rather than labor just being noted as “another name for a human activity which goes with life itself,” land being noted as “another name for nature,” and money being determined as “a token of purchasing power, which, as a rule is not produced at all, but comes into being through the mechanism of banking or state finance”—and the use of the vocabulary of the capitalist conceptual framework in defining labor, land, and money as commodities, exemplifies the restructuring of the spectrum of societal thought that is established by the set of ideas inherent within capitalism.

Yet, it is upon such conceptual fictions that capitalist market organization is able to function, as no other way of organizing production in the self-regulating market is possible in a commercial society since “the commodity fiction...[affects] almost all its institutions in the most varied way, namely, [through] the principle that arrangement or behavior should be allowed to exist that might prevent the actual functioning of the market mechanism on the lines of the commodity fiction” (Polanyi 1944: pg. 76). Hence, capitalist ideology reconstitutes the economic mindset of individuals in society as socially related to each other merely through seemingly nothing more or less than their dual identities as buyers and sellers. The elimination of the notion of mutual economic obligations deriving from the cultural principles of society itself is thus eliminated by the logic and dictates of capitalist markets.

Polanyi further develops his analysis of the capitalist conceptual framework and its cultural hegemonic influence through his examination of what he terms the “liberal creed.” By the early 19th century, the nascent capitalist ideology that existed within and among the middle and elite classes of English society conceived of the preexisting socioeconomic system in a critical manner. Thus, in 1834 the preexisting Speenhamland allowance system and its principle of a “right to live” was abolished and replaced with the establishment of a competitive labor market and its capitalist principles all of which were instituted by the Poor Law Reform legislation.³ The importance of the repeal of the Speenhamland system does not merely lie within the fact that the social hermeneutical approach to the criticism of the preexisting system was itself of a capitalist nature and logic, but that the founding principle of the allowance system—the “right to live”—was resoundingly rejected by what was essentially the totality of society. Indeed, even as Polanyi states—regarding the Poor Law Reform Act—that “never perhaps in all modern history has a more ruthless act of social reform been perpetuated,” and notes that the creation of the competitive labor and the resultant destruction of the social protection “crushed the multitudes of lives [of workers and the poor] while merely pretending to provide a criterion of

³ The Speenhamland allowance system was established in 1795 in order to provide subsidies as supplements to the wages of laborers. The size of such subsidies was to “be granted in accordance with a scale dependent upon the price of bread, so that a minimum income should be assured to the poor *irrespective of their earnings*” (Polanyi, 1944: pg. 82). Although the law itself was never legally enacted, it was in fact adopted across the English countryside, and its establishment illustrated the socioeconomic, conceptual innovation of what Polanyi terms the “right to live” (Polanyi, 1944: pg. 82). Speenhamland established a fundamentally new system of social protection by guaranteeing a minimum wage for the entirety of society since “a man was relieved even if he was in employment, as long as his wages amounted to less than the family income granted to him by the scale [itself dependent upon the contemporaneous price of bread]” (Polanyi 1944: pg. 83).

genuine destitution in the workhouse,” he argues that “the bulk of the complaints were really due to the *abruptness* with which an institution of old standing was uprooted and a radical transformation rushed into effect” (Polanyi 1944: pg. 86).

The repeal of the Speenhamland system is indicative of the cultural hegemonic control which capitalist principles had already begun to institute by the time of the repeal. The “social consciousness” of society itself was cast in the mold of the *criticism* of the Speenhamland system, and as Polanyi states, the seemingly naturalistic economic laws of capitalism became embedded in the conceptual framework of society itself, inducing the individual to “respect [capitalist] economic law even if it happened to destroy him,” and causing society to constitute itself in the image of such laws (Polanyi 1944: pg. 89). The demise of the Speenhamland allowance system, for Polanyi, marks the birth and full actualization of the principles of the “liberal creed” and its pervasive influence in contemporary society, evidenced by the rise of a labor market. It is a fundamental shift in the culture of society itself from one in which mutual social obligations were an essential component in the social consciousness of the society, to one in which societal support and responsibility for the poor and destitute is not merely avoided, but essentially erased as a conventional and established idea itself by the “liberal creed,” or economic liberalism.

Economic liberalism, or the “liberal creed,” is the guiding ideology of capitalism that Polanyi insightfully discerns. The *laissez-faire* principles of economic liberalism are those which have been instituted in the social consciousness of capitalist society to such an extent that they serve as the default logic and rationality

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from which seemingly all economic and social thought evolves. Indeed, Polanyi notes that the organizing principles of market society are in fact derived from the doctrine of economic liberalism as it fundamentally consists of three tenets: “that labor should find its price on the market [the labor market]; that the creation of money should be subject to an automatic mechanism [the gold standard]; [and] that goods should be free to flow from country to country without hindrance or preference [the institution of free trade]” (Polanyi 1944: pg. 141). It is quite clear that two of the three principles of economic liberalism have been enacted and institutionalized to a formidable extent in the contemporary global economy with a seemingly indomitable vehemence, and the third—namely, the gold standard—has been replaced with fiat currency which enables capitalist markets to expand even further without being subject to the limiting economics of the gold standard and its respective price system. Polanyi argues that the ideology of economic liberalism, or laissez-faire capitalism, was originally interpreted quite narrowly vis-à-vis the contemporary era. Indeed, in England, laissez-faire originally implied “freedom from regulation in production; trade was not comprised” (Polanyi 1944: pg. 142). Furthermore, the institution of a competitive labor market was seemingly enacted only with the repeal of the Speenhamland system in 1834.

Yet, the influence of economic liberalism expanded throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and by the 1830s it had become a dynamic “militant creed.” Such militancy is exemplified by both the aggressive promotion of the abolition of the allowance system by the prominent classical political-economist David Ricardo in his *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, and the extremely quick

enactment of the Poor Law Amendment Bill in England in 1832. As Polanyi himself states, “laissez-faire had been catalyzed into a drive of uncompromising ferocity” (Polanyi 1944: pg. 143). Indeed, Polanyi notes that the economic liberal activism of academics and the manufacturing class combined to enforce the adoption of economic liberal principles in the fields of both currency and trade. The early adoption of a belief in the gold standard became “unshakable,” and its establishment was vital to the extension of the laissez-faire market system which expanded throughout the 18th century, even though it “meant the danger of deadly deflation and, maybe, of fatal monetary stringency in a panic” (Polanyi 1944: pg. 144). Together, the three tenets of economic liberalism that formed the “self-regulating” market economy were essential components that necessitated the existence of each other, and hence economic liberal ideology underwent a metamorphosis into an even more zealous form of economic doctrine whose authority, legitimacy, and conceptual coherence was self-referential to the internal logic of the capitalist system.

For Polanyi, the example, *par excellence*, of the homogenizing force of ideological capitalism is the very belief in the natural actualization of laissez-faire capitalism as a *fundamental reality*. The reification of such an idea is principally what enables capitalist ideology to establish its hegemony over the consciousness of society. As Polanyi insightfully notes, “there was nothing *natural* about laissez-faire [contrary to the claims of the economic liberal activists and academics]” (Polanyi 1944: pg. 145, my emphasis). Indeed, the notion of a “free market” could never have been actualized without the utilization of the tools of administration provided by

the state itself. The principles of laissez-faire in fact came into being as a result of the “enormous increase in the administrative functions of the state which was [contemporaneously] endowed with a central bureaucracy able to fulfill the tasks set by the adherents of liberalism” and the numerous pieces of legislation that repealed “restrictive regulations” that inhibited the institutionalization of the ideology of capitalism (Polanyi 1944: pg. 145). Laissez-faire, as Polanyi accurately noted, was “the thing to be achieved” (Polanyi 1944: pg. 145).

Yet, the ideological fiction of naturally occurring free markets remains pervasive and dominant throughout contemporary society and is espoused as the conventional wisdom of economists, politicians, and a significant portion of the public itself which John McMurtry notes as well in his analysis. Even with the “partial eclipse” in laissez-faire social organization that history witnessed in the early and mid-20th century due to the rise of the welfare state, laissez-faire capitalist ideology has retained its fervor and activism as its advocates have continually claimed that the *incomplete* actualization of such economically liberal principles were the cause of the Great Depression that itself caused the legislation of policies of societal protectionism and the resurgence of trade unionism. As Polanyi intuitively notes, “the liberal insists [that it was] precisely [the] interference with the freedom of employment, trade, and currencies practiced by the various schools of social, national, and monopolistic protectionism since the third quarter of the 19th century,” and not the fervent ideological extremism of the liberal creed and its followers, that serves as the cause of economic impropriety and economic catastrophe. Thus, the homogenizing hegemony of economic liberal ideology over

social consciousness is evidenced by the ideology's conceptually manufactured version of an agonistic economic dialectic and mythos in which anti-liberal collectivism acts constantly through covert action to combat the "pious" forces of liberalism resulting in anti-liberal prejudice.

IV. Concluding Remarks

Before concluding this comparative analysis, some of the similarities and differences in the conceptualization of ideological capitalism in the analyses of McMurtry and Polanyi must be explicitly noted. The fundamental difference between the analyses of McMurtry and Polanyi is that while McMurtry's analysis is focused on the 21st century form, functions, and implications of financialized neoliberal capitalism embodied in the deregulated, private, transnational money-sequences, upheld and promoted by transnational corporate power, that have ubiquitously penetrated the realms of investment, production, and distribution, Polanyi's discussion of capitalism is centered on its form, functions, and implications in the 19th and 20th centuries—that is, its production and commodity-centered, or industrial form. While in some minds this may sound the death knell for a comparative analysis that seeks to discern the ideological force and principles of capitalism, as capitalism has chronologically changed and hence is ostensibly conceptually distinct in such forms, such a perspective fails to understand the relationship between economic liberalism (which predominantly undergirds 19th and 20th century capitalism) and neoliberalism (which predominantly undergirds late 20th to contemporary 21st century capitalism). Fundamentally, the internal logic

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and rationality of economic liberalism and neoliberalism are, if not the same, very similar. The difference between such ideologies seems to be only a matter of chronology and extensiveness vis-à-vis capitalist structural hegemony and activity. Hence, while economic liberalism perhaps only accounts for the production and commodity-centered form of capitalism, neoliberalism reflects such a form to the extent that it promotes such transnational private money-sequences without regard for life-needs, and adds onto the “old” form the aspects of financialization and digitalization that are indicative of the contemporary era of capitalism and capitalist economic activity. Indeed, economic neoliberalism is reflective of a highly deregulated, laissez-faire capitalism that utilizes a number of channels in order to infiltrate societies and their individuals and governments. It is this ideological continuity that enables one to understand the similarities in the analyses and understandings of both McMurtry and Polanyi.

Although discussing and examining the nature of capitalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries, Polanyi’s discernments of the nature of capitalism and its ideology are conceptually similar in some key manners to McMurtry’s understandings, even though McMurtry is discussing the structure and processes of contemporary neoliberal capitalism. Not only do both Polanyi and McMurtry identify the militancy and extremism of the ideologies of economic liberalism and neoliberalism, but they also demonstrate the same understanding that such ideologies effect a reformulation in the minds of individuals and the cultures of societies that they have ubiquitously penetrated. Indeed, the understanding of the basic principles of capitalism, and their implications, reflected by Polanyi’s term “the

liberal creed,” and the substance and implications of McMurtry’s “basic value program” vis-à-vis the cancer system are conceptually similar, and McMurtry’s program is perhaps the liberal creed in its 21st century neoliberal, or cancer form. Hence, both Polanyi and McMurtry conclude that ideological capitalism transforms society in its own image, and initiates and institutionalizes its conception of society in order to perpetuate its influence and ubiquity.

Ultimately, taken together, the analyses of John McMurtry and Karl Polanyi lucidly evince the fundamental principles of the ideology of capitalism and its ability to establish a totalizing structural system that effects the internalization of capitalism’s basic values by the individual and the society as a whole. Indeed, the hegemony of the capitalist ideology and structure is so extensive and complex that it has essentially constructed its own market rationality, and thus an internal logic that serves as the foundation for a capitalist semiotics, hermeneutics, and linguistics. From such a nuanced understanding of capitalism, one can discern that in order to conceptualize alternatives to the structure of capitalism, its organization, and its construction of social, political, cultural, and economic relations, one must fundamentally be able to both acknowledge and interpret the basic values program of capitalism and its implications, and either reconceptualize the essential principles of capitalism or construct an alternative framework of values. Indeed, one must be able to critically examine not only the symptoms of capitalism, but also how capitalism understands the world. Such examination requires the capacity to look beyond the capitalist *Weltanschauung* and in the process deconstruct and dismantle the internalization of its ideology.

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The Experience of Community: Aesthetics and Revolution

Joseph Taglienti

That human beings exist and find themselves in the world is indisputable. But this word “world” is a dubious one, especially when given a singular quality: “the world.” Conversationally, “the world” encompasses either a domain of supposedly “universal truth” where every person thinks and speaks as if everyone were situated in the same place and employed the same language, or, it can be read as a partitioning of two realities: the outside “world” of human interaction and the inside “world” of personal thought.

The first meaning, which is the world in its metaphorical sense, finds in its presupposition its problem: the uncontested universality of “truth” in the world, or the suggestion that everyone everywhere upholds the same values and accepts the same things. Against this, Martin Heidegger writes,

Dasein is never proximally an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a “relationship” towards the world. Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only *because* Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is. This state of Being does not arise just because some entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can “meet up with” Dasein only in so far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a *world*.¹

¹ Martin Heidegger, §12 *Being and Time*, John Macquarrie, trans., (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962) (Heidegger’s italics).

Humans are “never free” from “being-in;” that is to say, individuals are not only ineluctably situated in the world (as an ontological starting point), but they are positioned *there* (*dasein*, being-there)—they are placed in a certain place in a particular way where they adopt a specific method of representing the world. This specificity manifests itself as a “relationship,” as an attitude or conceptualization toward the world conditioned by the use of a socially, politically, and culturally determined language. These relationships, the nexuses between an individual and his situation or an individual and others, are never universal in the sense of being unthinkingly accepted everywhere, but as specific as the particular grouping of *dasein*—the particular *there* they find themselves in: “Taking up relationships toward the world is only possible *because* [note Heidegger’s emphasis] *Dasein*, as Being-in-the-world, is at it is [specific to its place in the world].” It is then no surprise that Heidegger deftly navigates the singularity of “the world” and ultimately lands on its de-centered, potentially pluralistic form: “a *world*.” Because the individual is situated and layered with a particular sequence of cultural, historical, or even national baggage, he inhabits a world among worlds, where his meaning is determined by his dwelling. Human dwellings, understood not only spatially, but as residences where familiarity and ideas are cultivated, erode the project of “universal truth” because they supplant grand narratives and “world histories” with situated, culturally specific accounts of a world that they are enclosed within.

Seen this way, the logic of militarized globalization, which perceives a so-called unifying thread invisibly linking each continent, and which wishes to take one

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particular set of beliefs and elevate them to the realm of a singular, universalized system of ideas through forceful conquests or “civilizing missions,” (as if those very ideas were always present in abeyance, just waiting to be released), not only misunderstands the plurality of the world, but also seeks to justify its homogenizing thrusts on the strength of “superior cultures” which erase the presence of minor ones. Addressing the world on these terms allows for the production of sensationalist media (part and parcel of the ideology of global domination and terror) which apotheosizes, for example, a tragedy in the United States to the nearly divine awareness of world-crisis, so that a viewer in China may see, feel, and articulate *in the same way* the pity or terror or outrage expressed by an American audience.

The images we have of the world are filtered through this same universal logic, and seek to coerce our ideas about the world into strict uniformity. Since we cannot experience the entirety of the world at once, we are forced to project an image of it, eventually associating it completely with that image. Heidegger, in the above passage, stresses this point, articulating placement in the world in terms of “showing”—of portraying a world to ourselves and to others who surround us. We appear, we show ourselves, in a certain way based on our specific, sometimes traditional, situation in a world. Accepting the world in its metaphorical sense also means accepting uncritically that no cultural, social, economic, or even national context can disturb the way people visualize and think about images. If a picture of the world is rendered as if it were universal, the viewer becomes confronted with a world-view in which no matter the situation or the circumstances, images will

always “speak the same language” or compel individuals to reveal in a world-wide truth about a certain event.

Thus, images and the singular world come to embody a certain kind of tyranny, which, Hannah Arendt argues, reverses the logic of human interpretation,² and superimposes a monopoly onto it: “Total domination [the images and regimes of totalitarianism] strives to organize infinite plurality and human differentiation of human beings as if all of humanity were just one individual.”³ Any image will inevitably be shown to a particular person, (“human differentiation”), or to a particular group of people, occupying a specific space or enveloped by a specific socio-cultural situation (even if images are disseminated simultaneously, as in the case of mass forms of communication like television). Language, which is never the universal (the truth of all truths articulate with uniform concepts), though it may be shared, is unavoidably as particular as the persons who speak it, who give it nuance, and who, importantly, determine it based on their location or dwelling in a *certain* world. Interpretation of “the world” and its images, *mutatis mutandis*, means the interpretation of *an* image of *a* world, when conceptualized within a certain structure of language, and it is required to bear the weight of that language’s history, culture, idioms (often untranslatable), and politics.⁴ Ultimately, when this

² Heidegger too speaks of interpretation as a means of knowing a world, insofar as it makes perception determinate and structures the appearance of a shared language: “Perception is consummated when one addresses oneself to something and *discusses* it as such. This is interpretation in the broadest sense of *making determinate*. This perception-retention of an assertion is a way of Being-in-the-world.” *Ibid.*, §13 (his italics). This language of determination is mirrored in the Kantian community, which determines worlds by the co-determination of individuals.

³ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (San Diego: Harcourt, 1973), p. 438.

⁴ When Homer invokes his muse to sing of Achilles’ wrath at the outset of *The Iliad*, he brings the reader to *a* world (the battlefield surrounding ancient Troy) while employing a

metaphorical category of “the world” is deployed, one can only comprehend its signification either geologically, in terms of the earth as a “world” which features the promise of human life, or cosmologically, in terms of a planet sutured within an infinitely larger universe. The world is first and foremost a series of worlds.

That the world contains, fundamentally, a binary division between the outer and the inner worlds elides the shared aspect of it, making worlds not common but private: “The common world is what we enter when we are born and what we leave behind when we die.”⁵ By separating the world into two realms, one for acting and one for thinking, the possibility of exclusion takes shape; action and thought become activities reserved for few individuals in even fewer realms, and the democratic equality of “birth” and “death” seem to vary in authenticity from person to person. To imagine this in spatial dimensions: if the outside world of affairs is the space for action and the inside world of the home is the space for thinking and “being oneself,” then the homeless woman does not get to think while the housewife never gets to act.

It is Plato who, in rescuing the philosopher from the common world of the cave and transporting him to the solitary, at times completely private, world of pure thought and contemplation, separated these two arenas of world-experience. This

particular language (ancient Greek, whose tradition and modified use specifically for epic verse speaks for itself). Even when translated into English, the language of invocation would, regardless of being different, remain particular, bearing, in this case, all of the historical baggage of the English language instead of the Greek. Literature itself, bound-up with its Latin root, will, despite itself and the calls for a “world literature” or a “Western canon,” always be specific to the culture its born out of and the language it is written in. For more on this see, Jacques Derrida, *Demeure: Fiction and Testimony*, Elizabeth Rottenberg, trans., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

⁵ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 55.

opposition between the *oikos* (the home or familial sphere of knowledge) and the *polis* (the political, public sphere reserved for male camaraderie) sets into motion, notwithstanding all of the gendered or broadly sociopolitical complications associated with this type of divisional discourse, the idea that a world may be possessed, rescued from its situated-ness, and handed out to a select group. But action, which implies the ability to think, write, and work together, is not restricted to the capability of a few; rather, following Arendt, it is an intrinsic dis-position (fragmented based on each world) of human being: “Action corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, inhabit the world. While all aspects of the human condition are somehow related to politics, this plurality is specifically *the* condition of political life.”⁶ Because action is concomitant with human plurality (“the human condition of political life”), it exists in common, and is shared among individuals within a collectively defined space. If a wedge is driven between each world, separating action and those who may act, not only is meaning given over to a majority who may lay claim to its “universal status,” but also human life loses its irreducibly coexistent status. Worlds start to lose their specified characters, as individuals within the same cultural context begin to break off from each other, and affirm their radical singularities. It is only when individuals immerse themselves in their pluralistic co-existence that they may be-in-a-world. Though it must be admitted that, as a framework, the world, as a regulative principle, is necessary for thinking of human life on earth, it cannot, despite this, serve as an ontological or truth-making narrative arc; man might be-in-*the*-world—physically

⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

exist on the planet from birth until death—but reality or experience of the world is, due to language, being-in-*a*-world. We could be together in common (in the sense of all breathing the oxygen of the earth) without inhabiting the same worlds.

It is Arendt who, in re-configuring and ultimately re-purposing worldhood, accounts for the uncanny experience of being together in the world while being separated into a litany of worlds, explaining that the fundamental human condition (in the sense of both human experience itself and the conditioning factors which determine that experience) is both singular (individual) and plural (communal) at the same time: “The world between [men must] gather them together, to relate them and to separate them . . . Human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings.”⁷ The world is by definition compartmentalized into various worlds, where humans can both be individuals (“unique beings”) while being part of the shared experience of actually existing (“the paradoxical plurality of human plurality”). If we wish to think of this grammatically, we could say that every “I” is preceded and made possible by a “we.” Arendt’s concept of “world” allows for the coexistence of languages and cultures without sweeping discrimination between the two. Like splashing ink on an infinitesimally cracked piece of glass, each line of every particular world is highlighted and reified while existing within the completely together body of the entire shard.⁸ Human experience as the sense of *a* world is a

⁷ Ibid., pp. 52f, 176.

⁸ To extend and perfect the metaphor, Sappho’s poem “To a Maiden,” demonstrates the paradoxical sensation of being both “torn apart” by the wild emotions of love, while being constituted and made-whole by the body of the poem itself. The sublimity of the poetry is placed under arrest by our world-reading, which wants to say that every world, though separate, is contained within the whole of coexistence. See Sappho, “To a Maiden,” in Longinus, §10 *On the*

communal experience, where individuals may be with each other while retaining their personhood *de jure*.

Community understood as the archetypical form of being with others, has itself been rarified by a delineation comprised of two competing and inverse types: *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Following Ferdinand Tönnies,⁹ the former denotes an organic, almost nomadic like vision of community, while the latter hovers around a vision of community manufactured by the social contract. Though each one has merit insofar as they both suggest that being with others precedes any claim to being oneself, they both neglect the structure of the experience of community itself. In other words, we already find ourselves placed within either *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft* without first questioning what it means to become aware of a communal state to begin with. If man is to be a communal animal, how does he arrive at and put into language the very idea of community which defines his situation in a world?

Kant is one of the earliest thinkers of this kind of dynamic community where individuals may both share a space of the world together while maintaining their own singular titles (names, personalities, beliefs, etc.). Rather than beginning with communities (*communio* or the typology provoked by talking of *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft*), Kant asserts that radical and unflinching being-in-common or (co)existence must find its genesis in the exchange (*commercium*) of looks, ideas, and creative acts within any given world: "The world 'community' is ambiguous in our language, and can mean either *communio* [membership within a common

Sublime, G.M.A. Grube, trans., (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991) or Anne Carson's translation of "To a Maiden" in the appendix of this essay.

⁹ See Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society*, C.P. Loomis, trans., (New York: Dover, 2002).

whole] or *commercium* [exchange and interaction]. We use it here in the latter sense as a dynamic community without which even the local community (*communio spatii*) cannot be empirically organized.”¹⁰ Note in particular Kant’s rejection of the traditional German words in favor of the Latin: because *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* already produce an organization around which a community may politicize, they fail to account for the structures that make existence in such communities possible. *Commercium* must precede any organized collective space (*communio spatii*) and in fact, must make the presence of that space “empirically” discernible. Further, it is exchange or inter-action which defines the framework of *commercium*; that is to say, it is predicated on the recognition of other individuals who may not only exchange ideas with each other, but channel them into creative and political action, assuming their unconditional plurality by externalizing and embodying the “transcendental” (immaterial) construction of community.

Thus we see that, although the political character of community, for Kant, is its logical conclusion and *raison d’être*, it is preceded by community as a mental structure or “analogy of experience”: “The simultaneity of substances in space cannot be cognized in experience without interaction [which, Kant specifies, in synonymous with community].”¹¹ Essentially, community is not only a way of speaking about how humans organize collective action into creative moments of language, art, or literature, but the way in which they have any knowledge of their own worlds *a priori*. One must see people or objects in community with each other,

¹⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Paul Guyer trans., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 318

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 317.

that is, occupying a certain space, and a certain time, if one is to then form them into an organized demonstration of passion, togetherness, and freedom (themselves mere transcendental ideas until they become embodied). These bodies confirm each other's existence; that is to say, they *recognize* each other in their fundamental worths, so that they may identify with each other and work to realize their potential for a creative power bigger and more profound than anything they would be capable of individually: "those in community determine each other."¹² Using the particular languages and images engendered by their own places in a world, individuals standing in community may enact political or aesthetic transformations and, quite literally, attempt to make a world that resembles more closely "the world" spoken of earlier.

But because this is a political *and* aesthetic phenomenon, these individuals rely not only on reason or language to communicate, but also on feeling (specifically the desire of and for love, the desire for Desire or to be desired). If life were reducible to purely unaffected, dispassionate sentiment, then the capacity for collective human action would be disrupted, as the pain and violence of un-loving social relations would de-create any instances of communal productivity. Even the law, which is an instrument of human freedom when wielded by community, must contain an aesthetic element, otherwise it may be weaponized for the success of the few at the expense and torment of the many. Thus, the individual in the community must extend him or herself toward every other person in a gesture of desire in order to give and receive recognition of his or her inalienable "unique being." It is through

¹² Ibid.

communication, then, not only linguistically but also aesthetically, (that is, through the language of affect where ideas may be *felt*), that individuals may affirm each other's existence and contribution to organized acts of human creation by operating on two registers: the ability to speak to others and the ability to feel with others. This absolute, almost theological sense, of communicating without language, gives each community their own opportunity to create on their terms—to find themselves not limited by a grammar or a sentence structure, but instead, abandoned to the possibility of their own plural, shared potential.

Any idea, however, is only as real as the material which backs it up, or the bodies which internalize it and channel it into actualization. Community, though made concrete in the bodies of the individuals who make it in their own worlds, still must find its first outlet; that is to say, it must start with someone who sets the entire political process in motion. Though Kant would say the analogy of community as a structure of how we experience the world is built into every mind, nowhere in the *Critique of Pure Reason* does he say that this tends toward political action. Thus, it is in the body of leader, of a real individual, where community as a political and creative force takes shape and literally “cuts a figure.” The appearance of community as a creative device is contingent on the appearance of a leader's form whose mere presence may inspire collective action, and the unadulterated awareness of coexistence.

This leader, following the counter-revolutionary writings of Edmund Burke, need not do anything more than appear—to dress himself or herself as an image to be seen, appropriated, and embodied as an example of the unification of community

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itself. He or she must simply speak the language of that particular world, and inspire an aesthetically sensitive devotion, which produces the affects necessary to both identify and recognize others while opening up the possibility of that absolute communication of feeling. He or she must make the idea of being-in-common pleasing, while grounding it in the objective framework of collectivized action with a creative goal: "To make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely."¹³ To make us fathom the concept of country, which, like a world, has a particular system of symbolic meaning (language, culture, history, politics), the country itself has to be embodied in the "lovely" figure of the leader or monarch's body.

What is at stake in the concept of community is not the pedestrian awareness that there are other people in the world; rather, in understanding how community not only posits *a* world as such, but how it unifies the particular elements of a certain worldhood to create meaning through action, language, and feeling. Thus, we are able to become conscious and self-conscious of *a* plural world and our own singular place in it. It is through community that we may put our hands around coexistence—the insistence of communizing with others—and may realize the potential embedded in the word "us."

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¹³ Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 78.

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Appendix: To a Maiden

He seems to me equal to the gods that man
whoever he is who opposite you
sits and listens close
to your sweet speaking

and lovely laughing — oh it
puts the heart in my chest on wings
for when I look at you, even a moment, no speaking
is left in me

no: tongue breaks and thin
fire is racing under skin
and in eyes no sight and drumming
fills ears

and cold sweat holds me and shaking
grips me all, greener than grass
I am and dead — or almost
I seem to me.

But all is to be dared, because even a person of poverty . . .

Translated by Anne Carson (2002)

Work Cited

<http://www.bopsecrets.org/gateway/passages/sappho>

Enforcing Modernity: Spatial Determinism in the Post-War Soviet Union

Catherine Jermolowitz

In *The Structural Transformation of the Private Sphere*, philosopher Jürgen Habermas divides society into two spheres, the public and the private. The public sphere traditionally includes the state, government agencies, the economic sector, media, educational institutions, architects, and designers. The private sphere contains domestic space (traditionally located within the home) and those who inhabit it, whether they be families or single individuals. The degree to which public should be separate from private (or if they should be separated at all), the differing interest of these spheres, and their attempts to exert influence upon, or resist influence from each other often creates conflict. Public sphere actors have tried to exert their influence upon private sphere actors through housing. By designing publicly funded housing and promoting state-approved methods of living in the home, policymakers can attempt to shape certain social ideals among the inhabitants of this housing.

One such attempt at using housing to mold residents into the type of citizens policymakers desired took place in the Soviet Union during the post-World War II period. Once the objective of ending the war was reached and imminent external threats to the Soviet Union's security resolved, the Soviet Union found itself without a clear national goal. The destruction of the war made it necessary for policymakers to look inward; this shift in focus from international to domestic led to the

emergence of a new national goal: the development of a modern society striving for the full realization of the socialist state. The need to rebuild much of the nation's housing stock provided a unique opportunity for policymakers in the Soviet Union to use housing and state-promoted methods of living in the home as a means to shape the nation's citizens into model Soviets who would help bring about the modern socialist state.

In the post-World War II period, Soviet Union policymakers such as Premier Nikita Khrushchev, sought to fully realize the socialist state by eliminating the "petit-bourgeois" ornamentalist tastes of the Stalinist period, and by instilling proper socialist values in the nation's citizens through single family apartments (khrushchevki) with a utilitarian, modernist design aesthetic. However, the inhabitants did not blindly accept Soviet policymakers' definitions of modernity. The inhabitants' acceptance of some state-promoted notions of modernity but adherence to older, petit-bourgeois practices indicates that residents have considerable autonomy over the private sphere, and that their notions of autonomy outweigh policymakers' official notions of progress.

Policymakers' use of housing to promote social ideals was not new to the Soviet Union; the long, chaotic state of the housing stock with most city residents renting part of a room with several other individuals, or a corner of a family's room, had called for reform after World War I (Attwood 23). The regime set out to form "a completely new type of daily life, or *novyi byt*, which would be lived by a completely new type of person. New forms of housing were required which would both reflect these changes and help to bring them about" (26).

Communal housing (*kommunalka*) was the new format. In the words of Lenin's wife Nadezhda Krupskaya, this format developed out of the desire to transform the traditional "domination of the man and suppression of the woman under the burdens of domestic work" into "a partnership of equals" (Attwood 28). Lenin believed that "the emancipation of women" from "petty housework" was necessary in order to achieve full communism, and that the first steps of this emancipation would be to create public dining facilities, day care centers, and kindergartens (29). Liberating women from labor-intensive and time-consuming domestic work by "turning it into a social institution" gave women time to participate in Soviet society as envisioned by the communist regime (27). *Kommunalka* was enforced by nationalizing housing of a certain size and value, as well as homes that had been abandoned (32). A "sanitary norm" of 8.25 square meters of living space was allotted to each person, enabling *kommunalka* to quickly house the millions of people left homeless by the war (32). Residents were allotted the same amount of space (regardless of gender or class) and kitchens, bathrooms, and laundry facilities became shared spaces, in order to "induce collective behavioral patterns corresponding to a new socialist political system" (Bliznakov 86). It should be noted that private space still existed—people had their designated spaces within apartments, which some tried to set apart by hanging up curtains or sheets—but in shifting the activities of domesticity from a private to a communal responsibility, reformers had redefined, if not effectively abolished, the private sphere (Attwood 124).

Unlike the activists and reformers of the early 1920s, Stalin and his ruling

party did not use mass housing as a means to achieve full communism; they were, however, concerned with controlling the dominant modernist architectural style that had developed during the period after the Revolution and had influenced *kommunalka* (Udovički-Selb 468). Stalin re-introduced the single-family apartment “as a ‘cultured’ form of urban housing,” thus “[marginalizing] radical architectural theories on collectivist living” (Harris 12). However, this was not an overhaul of the entire housing system: these single-family apartments were only available to important individuals of the Communist Party, industry sector, and the cultural elite (12). Already by 1930, without explicitly denouncing the utilitarian, modernist style, Stalin’s ruling party had effectively taken control over what had once belonged to “artistic professionals,” resulting in “direct and indirect dictates from the power centers [which defined] everyday reality, ultimately draining intellectual discourse of all substance” (Udovički-Selb 468). Architects and designers of the time were troubled by the nation-wide revival of “reactionary” architecture, a prime example of which is the Lenin Library of Moscow (470). In the late 1920s, the pre-revolutionary architectural society, Moskovskoe Arhitekturnoe Obščestvo, officiated a competition for the design of the Lenin Library. The society chose Vladimir Ščuko’s “pompous and intimidating” design for a building which featured fourteen columns supporting a roof resembling a “Roman sarcophagus” (470-471). Stalinist-era architecture developed along these lines, and came to be characterized by “fussy cornices and turrets” (Attwood 154).

This grandiose architectural style affected all levels of architecture including the domestic. An ornamental, richly decorated style of interior design developed, a

style which did not promote Soviet values for its inhabitants:

Stalinist-era apartments were inwardly focused, mono-functional and spatially discreet rooms, reminiscent of pre-Modernist pre-revolutionary housing. In the 1920s such plans, categorically decried as petit-bourgeois, were designed to accommodate the inwardly focused, segregated, and politically bourgeois nuclear family. (Buchli 166)

These tendencies extended even beyond physical layout; for example, furniture was arranged “centripetally” to focus on the family dining table in the center of the room (Buchli 166). This created an inwardly-focused environment that shifted the focus of residents toward the home and away from participation in Soviet society (166). Reflecting a physical layout unconcerned with efficiency, inhabitants filled their apartments with items that were purely decorative and had no functionality, such as knickknacks, embroidered cloths, hanging decorative rugs, and lace pillows (Reid, “Communist Comfort” 13). An accumulation of such furnishings and “individual items of disparate origin, age, and style,” was what made a home cozy in the eyes of occupants during this era (Reid, “Khrushchev Modern” 257).

The ornamentation of the Stalinist-era apartment ended shortly after Khrushchev became First Secretary and his regime began to focus on housing as a priority again. Despite the fact that *kommunalka* enabled millions more to be housed than the traditional system of private homeownership might have, the housing stock was still “grossly insufficient,” and the collectivization which resulted in a massive influx of peasants to cities in the 1930s only made it more so (Attwood 123). The average number of occupants per room at the start of World War II was 3.91, and the loss of six million homes during the war turned the situation into a humanitarian crisis (Smith 4). An average of 3.3 families resided in each Leningrad apartment in

1951, an average that was actually lower than in most other places in the Soviet Union (Ruble 235). However, it wasn't until the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952 that policymakers began to shift their focus to the housing problem (Reid, "Communist Comfort" 15). The State Construction Administration was created in 1955 to oversee the seven-year building plan announced by Khrushchev in 1958 which aimed to construct 15 million new city apartments "on the principle, one family, one flat" (Buchli 162; Attwood 154). Khrushchev was building upon Stalin's positioning of the single-family apartment as the ideal form of housing despite its rarity and inaccessibility to the average Soviet (Harris 12). The one-room Khrushchev apartment, or *khrushchevka*, ended communal living and reestablished the private sphere. Millions moved into the new *khrushchevki*, giving policymakers the opportunity to promote Soviet principles on a large scale through the redesign of domestic space. Utilitarianism took notable priority in the construction of *khrushchevki*, turning away from the ornamentation and excess of the Stalinist era.

The ornamentation of Stalinist design and architecture came to be referred to as "petit-bourgeois consciousness" during the Khrushchev era, a term originally used in the 1920s to refer to "the vestiges of the capitalist past hindering the development of socialism" (Buchli 164). Petit-bourgeois consciousness came under attack during the Khrushchev era with several decrees against excess, decrees which "rendered all forms of decorative art aesthetically and morally suspect" (Reid, "Communist Comfort" 32). This sudden outlash against Stalinist-era style stemmed from the very nature of the Thaw which was "a search through the roots of the socialist revolution to regain principles forsaken in the pursuit of the Stalinist state.

[...] Hence the oft-quoted slogan, ‘back to Lenin’” (Buchli 162). As mentioned earlier, a major priority during the Leninist period was the development of a new *byt*, or daily life, in line with socialist principles. Khrushchev’s declaration indicated that, under Stalin, the Soviet Union had “retreated from the rationalization of the domestic ‘hearth,’ [...] allowing petit-bourgeois consciousness to flourish,” and that it was of the utmost importance that the nation return to the correct path and advance as a Communist society should (162). Eliminating petit-bourgeois consciousness involved the development of a new style of living bearing the “modernist principles of design by function, materials, and mode of production” (Reid, “Communist Comfort” 20).

It was necessary to develop a strong, socialist rhetoric for the domestic interior because policymakers were not used to letting people disappear behind closed doors, which was a distinct possibility now that the khrushchevki had reestablished the private sphere (Attwood 160). Having one’s own private space to retreat into could result in the development of anti-socialist ideals, a concern of the intelligentsia, such as Boris Brodskii, author of the design journal *Decorative Art of the USSR* (Reid, “Communist Comfort” 26). Brodskii despairingly viewed the private home “as an island where one could build one’s personal life ‘as I like’” (26). To eradicate petit-bourgeois consciousness and prevent individuals from building lives outside acceptable socialist ideals, designers and the intelligentsia needed to instill the correct principles through the promotion of “good taste” in interior design:

To prevent the new one-family apartments from becoming nests of particularist and regressive mentalities, [designers’ and policymakers’] solution was to promote a modernist style known as the ‘contemporary style.’ The contemporary interior must be fitted to

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assist the process of opening up everyday life into the public sphere, to make the boundary between public and private transparent and shift the centre of gravity of everyday life out of the room or flat and into the public sphere. (Reid, "Communist Comfort" 26)

Khrushchevki were designed with the objective to make the private more open to the public, as evidenced by its organization "into rationalized functional zones" (as opposed to the Stalinist-era apartment, which was centered around the family) (Attwood 166). These zones were based on activities such as food preparation, eating, and sleeping, and the corresponding furniture was grouped into these zones (166). As eating was similar to food preparation, the family dining table in the center of the apartment was eliminated altogether and replaced by a table in the kitchen (166). "Exploding the centripetal plan" of the Stalinist apartment and instead organizing the khrushchevki around functional zones eliminated petit-bourgeois consciousness by removing the inwardly focused center from the apartment (170). This "[shifted] the centre of gravity of everyday life out of the room or flat and into the public sphere," and thus the physical space of the khrushchevki encouraged occupants to be active participants in Soviet society (Reid, "Communist Comfort" 26).

Convincing residents to adopt these functional zones and abandon their old methods of using, organizing, and furnishing space was not a simple task, however. The "relegitimation of bourgeois cultural values and aspirations" during Stalin's rule was deep-rooted, as was the belief that an accumulation of items would make a home cozy (Reid, "Communist Comfort" 17). In order to eradicate petit-bourgeois consciousness from inhabitants, government actors developed, and encouraged the development of a massive amount of media—television shows, newspaper and


magazine articles, advice manuals—to educate residents on what constituted “good taste” for interior design.

An apartment with “good taste” was one that was organized and decorated based on “function, hygiene, openness, and stylistic homogeny” (Reid, “Communist Comfort” 27). As discussed in the earlier description of the khrushchevka’s layout, function was achieved by organizing the apartment into functional zones. However, there was no point in structuring khrushchevki by functional zones if the furniture in those zones did not appear to relate to the tasks performed in them. Many khrushchevki were one-room apartments, and even those that had separate bedrooms were not especially large; this limited space sometimes necessitated placement of furniture within spaces that were not appropriate. Transformable furniture helped to solve this problem by enabling one piece of furniture to serve the functions of multiple pieces (Buchli 167). Transformable furniture “[masked] functions that were considered inappropriate and secondary to the primary uses of certain rooms and furniture” (167). For example, the function of a bed did not match up with the function of the common room, the zone in which one received guests; and so, in keeping with the modernist structure of the apartment, the bed would have to be disguised as a couch (168). Transformable furniture also helped to cut down on the clutter characteristic of petit-bourgeois consciousness, later known as “de-artefactualization” which anthropologist Victor Buchli describes as “the intentional and gradual evanescence of physical objects supporting the domestic sphere that, like the state, would wither away with the realization of full Communism” (167). Because of these implications, the use of transformable

furniture was greatly encouraged by interior design media such as the widely popular *Encyclopedia of Household Economy* which often contained diagrams displaying the benefits of transformable furniture and how it could be used (168).



8. Комната с традиционной расстановкой мебели



9. Комната с зонированным пространством

Figure 1: A Stalinist-era interior (above) and a modernist interior (below). Note the sparse decoration and functional zone grouping of furniture in the latter.

Source: Victor Buchli, “Khrushchev, Modernism, and the Fight against ‘Petit-bourgeois Consciousness in the Soviet Home,’” p. 167

De-artefactualization, or austerity, was extremely important in the development of a new socialist mentality; the furnishings that usually characterized a packed and cluttered interior—knickknacks, lace pillows, doilies, decorative wall rugs—were seen as fostering a “home centered mentality, segregated from the

public sphere,” and were therefore in opposition to the objective of opening up the private to the public (Reid, “Communist Comfort” 26). “Packed and cluttered interiors” meant there was more to clean, and so enslaved women “to the unproductive labor of dusting,” giving them less time to participate in Soviet society (26). The value of austerity was championed by writers such as Irina Voeikova of the women’s magazine *Rabotnitsa*, who instructed her readers not to “clutter up the apartment with things. [...] Every item of furnishing you acquire must be essential for you” (29-30). This attitude was also expressed in the arts: in the play *Factory Girl*, the character Zhen’ka’s bed is covered with pillows, her bedside table with little mirrors and decorative boxes (Varga-Harris 572). This aesthetic style is reinforced as anti-Soviet through Zhen’ka’s characterization; she is a superficial person with “no apparent goals,” and uninterested in the Communist Youth League (572).

Keeping within the principle of austerity would allow a home’s inhabitants to easily achieve other desired principles such as openness, hygiene, and “stylistic homogeneity;” less clutter meant a more open and cleaner space, and less furniture meant fewer items in contrasting colors and patterns (Attwood 164). Eliminating clutter would also result in less dust, and therefore homes would be easier to clean (Reid, “Communist Comfort” 26). The extremely popular decorative lace items of petit-bourgeois taste were labeled as unhygienic because of their “dust-catching” qualities (27). *Girlfriend*, a magazine directed at teenage girls, often contained illustrations comparing “bad” and “good” taste, the illustration of the former depicting an apartment covered in lace doilies, none of which were seen in the “good taste” illustration (28). The apartment of “good taste” was one that required little

cleaning, and so allowed the Soviet woman to be outside the home more and participate more regularly in society.

Policymakers, designers, and the intelligentsia were mostly successful in their effort to eliminate petit-bourgeois consciousness from the minds of Soviet citizens through the design and promotion of “good taste.” A 1968 survey conducted by Elena Torshilnova demonstrates this: when asked how coziness is achieved, “81 percent of the 85 informants rehearsed the widely promoted modernist principles: ‘through cleanliness’ and ‘a small number of things,’ ‘convenience,’ ‘unity of style’ and ‘harmony of the whole ensemble of the interior’ (Reid, “Khrushchev Modern” 266). However, these modernist principles were not enough to create the coziness individuals felt was vital to a home; residents negotiated the terms of modernity in order to create a domestic interior that met their desire for this homeyness.

Although many inhabitants seemed to have internalized the modernist principles through which coziness could be achieved such as “a small number of things,” many residents still continued to furnish their homes with nonfunctional decorative items. The ornamentation that Khrushchev had declared a crime included the mass of trinkets, bric-a-brac, and lace doilies, tablecloths, and pillows that had covered every available surface in the Stalinist-era apartment. Although policymakers disseminated and encouraged the creation of vast amounts of media disparaging these decorative items as “dust-collecting ballast,” needlework and handicraft remained popular until the 1980s (Reid, “Communist Comforts” 35). Designers had labeled the nonfunctional items created by these activities as “anti-modern,” but to residents, these textiles were “essential material for creating a

home" (35). Other occupants found items such as silk lampshades as "essential material" and would not exchange them for a chandelier "simply because that was fashionable" (Reid, "Khrushchev Modern" 264). For residents, coziness could not be created through the "contemporary modern style" alone, but required elements of Stalinist ornamentation (Reid, "Communist Comforts" 36). Individuals engaged in negotiations with policymakers in order to create a domestic interior that contained elements of state-approved modernity as well as the cozy, homey element needed to create a home. Through "everyday aesthetics," residents exercised "autonomous agency" in their apartments to create a space that worked for them, but was not completely in line with state-approved notions of progress (Reid, "The Meaning of Home" 158). It was the residents who ultimately decided how the new spaces would be used. The fact that individuals were able to negotiate these terms of modernity demonstrates their autonomy over the private sphere; that inhabitants made the final decision about living and design practices indicates that their autonomy and their ability to exercise it was ultimately more powerful than policymakers' official notions of progress.

Although efforts at modernization in the Soviet Union demonstrate that it was ultimately up to the residents to carry out policymakers' definitions of modernity, this does not mean that these projects were failures. In no instance did inhabitants outright reject all state-promoted notions of modernity. They simply exercised their autonomy over the private sphere, incorporating most state-endorsed modern elements and some older, "anti-modern" living habits in order to create a domestic interior which functioned in a manner useful to them, and not

necessarily in total accordance with policymakers' notions of progress.

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Genetic Applications in Conservation

Megan Ossmann

Since the early 1980s, concepts and technologies in the field of genetics have contributed heavily to the conservation and restoration of different species. This combination ultimately christened a new scientific field called conservation genetics, which draws ideas from population genetics, evolutionary biology, ecology, systematics, and a whole host of specialized fields. Recently, rapidly advancing technologies have transformed the field of conservation genetics into what is now being referred to as conservation genomics. New technology using neutral markers, PCR, DNA fingerprinting, and more has significantly expanded the ability to understand and potentially combat the major factors that contribute to endangerment and extinction of species, such as inbreeding depression and genetic drift. However, as with many other fields that deal with genetic engineering, there are implications that come with the potential extraordinary benefits, and it is important to consider both the benefits and drawbacks of integrating this rapidly advancing technology into the field of conservation.

Both conservation genetics and conservation genomics concern themselves primarily with the relationship between population size and genetic variation, and the subsequent ability of the population to adapt to and survive a changing environment. Conservation genetics analyzes the relationship between population size and genetic sequence variation in the context of genetic drift and inbreeding, and how these factors come together to impact the fitness of a species. Conservation

genomics analyzes the same relationships, but differs in the sense that it analyzes environmental effects as well. The main idea is that population size has an effect on genetic drift and inbreeding (and vice versa), which in turn affects the sequence variation as well as the gene expression, while at the same time environment impacts selection and gene expression. All of these factors come together to impact the fitness of a species (Ouburg, Pertoldi, Loeschcke, Bijlsma, & Hedrick, 2010). By incorporating the effect of environment on sequence variation and gene expression, conservation genomics opens up a whole new area of consideration that conservation genetics simply didn't reach.

Conservation genomics also differs from genetics in the scope of the technology it uses. Recent advances in genomics have made their way into conservation as well, and technologies such as next generation sequencing (NGS), whole genome scans, Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), and especially the use of neutral markers have greatly expanded the ability of scientists to analyze relationships in populations on a much larger scale than previously possible (Ouborg et al., 2010). The use of markers has paved the way for conservation genomics to provide insight into issues regarding demography, gene flow among populations, population size, and the expansion of phylogenetic trees. More in-depth research on these issues will in turn provide potential solutions and ways to combat increasing rates of extinction and endangerment.

The Earth is in the midst of its sixth major mass extinction event, which in the past 500 years alone has resulted in the documented extinction of more than 1000 species, with more dying out every day ("Center for Biological Diversity," n.d.).

Unlike past mass extinction events which occurred due to natural climate change or catastrophic events like asteroids or volcanic eruptions, this rapid extinction is mostly anthropogenic. Human-induced climate change, habitat destruction, poaching, over-harvesting, introduction of exotic species, and other interferences have caused a major biodiversity loss in all parts of the world, and drastic measures need to be taken in an attempt to save the species that remain. Due to this issue, conservation biology has often been referred to as a 'crisis discipline', where major advances are made in order to quickly and efficiently solve a growing problem (DeSalle & Amato, 2004). The major biological issues that contribute to the extinction of populations are inbreeding depression, genetic drift, and outbreeding depression. These occurrences, combined with human interference, lead to rapidly declining populations. Conservation genomics is a major tool in learning how these biological interactions work and in finding potential ways to combat them.

Genetic drift and inbreeding depression are two of the major effects on the decrease of genetic variation and subsequent decrease in population. Through numerous studies, it has been hypothesized that small populations have a direct relationship with low genetic diversity. One major cause of this is genetic drift which is the random fluctuation of allele frequencies over time, and which can be either positive or negative: alleles for beneficial adaptation may be lost and deleterious alleles may become integrated into the population. A second major cause of this relationship is the inbreeding that occurs within small populations, which leads to an increase in homozygous alleles and loss of genetic variation. Combined together, genetic drift and inbreeding cause what is referred to as inbreeding depression, or

the increase in homozygosity and deleterious alleles, which ultimately causes low levels of fitness in individuals specifically and in the population as a whole. Reduced fitness is a major evolutionary disadvantage because it doesn't allow beneficial alleles to be passed on to viable offspring in subsequent generations. This reduces the ability of the species to adapt in a changing environment and can ultimately lead to severely low populations and eventually extinction. In addition, as small isolated populations experience inbreeding depression, any crossing between individuals from distinct populations can lead to outbreeding depression which may also lead to a reduction in fitness (Ouborg et al., 2010).

It has been determined that inbreeding depression varies largely with different genotypes, populations, and environments. It is an undeniable fact that these natural biological interactions are largely influenced by the environmental impacts of human activity, particularly habitat loss, climate change, and alteration of food webs and species interactions. The loss of genetic variability in the context of these environmental changes can be categorized as genotype-by-environment interactions (G x E) (Ouborg et al., 2010). For example, understanding drought tolerance in certain plants or the effect of acidity on corals in a warming ocean can be used in the future for the possible engineering of species to display these traits in a changing environment.

As of now, there are many new technologies that aid scientists in studying the relationship between population size and fitness. In the past, experiments have been lacking due to the inability to study genetic variation across the genome, as well as the inability to pinpoint neutral markers that would best illuminate this

relationship (Ouborg et al., 2010). Genetic markers are observable pieces of DNA that can be used to differentiate between cells, populations, and species. Markers can be tagged and transformed into allele types and frequencies for the sake of comparison (USDA, 2006). A neutral marker is a piece of DNA in which mutations do not impact fitness within a population. This makes it much easier to study the relationship between fitness, genetic variability, and population size because any mutation or environmental influence will not interfere with the relationship (Allendorf, Hohenlohe, & Luikart, 2010). The development of PCR has made it incredibly easy to amplify sections of DNA and apply neutral markers to populations, which has made it possible to study populations on a larger and more genome-wide scale. Comparison of patterns of neutral markers, along with the use of DNA barcodes/fingerprints that is often used for criminal and familial relationship analysis in humans, allows the relationship between genetic drift and selection to be determined, which then paves the way for studies on effect of habitat degradation and climate change on the genome.

An important issue that these new methods can potentially solve is the determination of species boundaries and kin relationships. Species are typically defined as being able to mate and produce viable offspring with one another, but this description is not always the best at differentiating between species. In addition, individuals from different populations may be too genetically distinct to breed successful and viable offspring, even though they are the same species. Genotyping thousands of markers may lead to the ability to identify distinct genetic differences between species, as well as increase the precision and accuracy of

analyzing kinship relationships (Allendorf et al., 2010). Discoveries in relationships among kin will make pedigree reconstruction of wild populations possible, thus making it easier to analyze the effect of inbreeding and outbreeding depression over long periods of time.

Another contribution of genomics is the development of units of conservation which are essential in managing populations. An evolutionarily significant unit (ESU) is a population that is considered distinct for purposes of conservation. Genomics approaches such as markers and fingerprinting allow researchers to analyze the level of divergence and gene flow between populations, and to determine whether or not these populations are too genetically different to interact (Allendorf et al., 2010). This is significant in two ways: first, it can help set controls on population levels in monitoring programs, for example, setting quotas in management programs for fisheries that vary from area to area based on distinct populations (Allendorf et al., 2010); and second, it can help avoid the mixing of genetically distinct populations which creates hybridization and outbreeding depression which can lead to extinction (Allendorf et al., 2010). A useful application of this is in the creation of sanctuaries and marine reserves especially when it involves the introduction of non-native populations or the reintroduction of endemic species (DeSalle & Amato, 2004). Understanding the genetics behind a healthy ecosystem will make it easier to manage conservation in more ways than simply relying on population dynamics. One example of managing populations is the status of the humpback whale, fin whale, and minke whale, which have all been victims of unregulated whaling in the past few centuries. A study involving the

genetic analysis of these populations has determined the number of whales in both pre-whaling populations and the present, and has determined that these populations are still historically low and have not fully recovered. Though whaling records indicate that the population has recovered enough to resume harvesting, this evidence proves the need for the international whaling moratorium to remain (DeSalle & Amato, 2004).

A final example of successful use of genetics in conservation is the management of *ex-situ* populations, or those being raised in captivity. For the past 20 years, zoos and aquariums have incorporated genetic techniques in “species-survival programs” in order to evaluate levels of inbreeding and prevent inbreeding depression, as well as establish minimum population sizes in order to maintain a healthy population. For example, an *ex-situ* population of Amazon parrots endemic to the island of Saint Vincent in the eastern Caribbean was under the care of the forestry department, but little was known about their kin relationships or even their gender. The use of PCR and microsatellites allowed the researchers to determine the gender of each bird and the kin relationships among them, allowing their management to be based on scientific data (DeSalle & Amato, 2004). However, though these scientifically-managed conservation programs are usually successful in restoring populations of threatened species, an ongoing problem is the adaptation of populations to captivity which makes it difficult for the population to ever be reintroduced to the wild. To combat this, the monitoring of several markers throughout the genome is becoming a standard process in identifying instances of adaptation to captivity (Allendorf et al., 2010).

In addition to these very useful and widely-used applications of genetic techniques in conservation, there are several other applications and techniques that are not yet as widespread, and are still largely under debate. One such conservation technique is facilitated adaptation which involves introducing adaptive alleles to a target population. This technique is an alternative to relocating populations to more suitable habitats which could cause an invasive species crisis or an outbreak of disease that could destroy a fragile ecosystem. There are three main ways of introducing beneficial alleles to populations using facilitated adaptation: threatened populations of organisms can be crossed with individuals of the same species with better adaptive genes; specific alleles from the adapted population can be transferred directly into the genome of threatened populations of the same species; and genes from an adapted species can be directly transferred into the genomes of threatened populations of *different* species (Thomas, Roemer, Donlan, Dickinson, Matocq, & Malaney, 2013). Each of these three methods has its own set of benefits and risks which have sparked much debate.

The first method, hybridizing individuals from healthy and threatened populations, has already proved successful in certain case studies. One study focused on the conservation of the Florida panther whose population increased by 100% after the introduction of 8 cats from a different subspecies. This method introduced beneficial alleles to the threatened population and raised heterozygosity from 18 to 25 percent in a little over a decade. Genomics could contribute to this conservation approach by screening genomes for specific alleles that would be the most beneficial to the population. Much of the extrinsic concern of facilitated

adaptation involves risks which include possibly introducing diseases to the population and disrupting the gene balance in the ecosystem which may make the situation worse than it was (Thomas et al., 2013).

The second and third approaches, transferring genes directly among populations and even among species, have not yet been as successful as the first approach because it is much more difficult to isolate genes, especially those that involve complex traits. However, concern over this method starts to become intrinsic, involving the idea of invasiveness. Up to this point, practices in conservation biology have typically been non-invasive in order to reduce as much negative effect upon the populations as possible. This is why most genetic analysis involves samples of “dead” DNA which come from feces, fur, dead skin cells, and museum specimens, among other things (DeSalle & Amato, 2004). Recent advances engineering and transfer of genes into embryos represent much more invasive techniques. This raises the question of whether it is ethically and morally right to change an organism’s genes, an invasiveness that some critics seem to think contradicts the very definition of conservation (Thomas et al., 2013).

Another genetic conservation technique that is on the horizon is the cloning of endangered animals. Currently, it is not a feasible conservation strategy because as of now cloning familiar species only has a success rate of 5%, and it can be estimated that cloning wild, unfamiliar species will have a success rate of less than 1%. Scientists are researching this technique, for example in Brazil, hoping that expanding captive populations of animals will prevent zoos and researchers from taking more wild animals out of their habitats. However, several serious

complications indicate that successful cloning will not be possible anytime soon. The greatest obstacle is legal complications that may prevent species from being subjected to these procedures. For example, scientists can fuse the DNA of an endangered species with eggs from a closely related species that are implanted into the mother of that closely related species. This rarely works because these hybrid embryos simply fail to develop in the uterus due to rejection and nuclear DNA and mitochondrial DNA that doesn't match. Regardless, many scientists still see this technique as a viable option, especially as cloning has recently been more successful in domestic animals such as cattle, sheep, goats, and even coyotes. Scientists claim that clones could stabilize a shrinking population and possibly even increase genetic diversity if multiple individuals could be cloned. However, there are others who do not view cloning as a viable idea because of intrinsic concerns about invasiveness, as well as the idea that cloning to save species is avoiding the real problem, which is the destruction of habitat loss, hunting, and overharvesting (Jabr, 2013).

One final potential application for genetics in conservation is the process of de-extinction, or "genetic rescue." Theoretically, this would involve reviving "extinct alleles" from museum or other extinct specimens and incorporating them into the closest living relative, for example the woolly mammoth and Asian elephant. Fierce advocates of de-extinction argue that these techniques will bring back organisms with important ecological roles, thus undoing the damage that humans have done, and fueling the conservation movement even further by inspiring people to take better care of species when they are alive. However, there appear to be many more opposing arguments than those that are in favor. Much of the public worries about

extrinsic risks: that these species wouldn't survive in a changed world, that they would unbalance the ecosystem or that *Jurassic Park* would become a reality and end the world as we know it. Many conservationists worry that de-extinction is the type of large-scale project that would take monetary resources and public attention from already implemented conservation programs that are crucial to a species' survival, essentially sacrificing one species for the return of another, a trade-off that most would deem pointless. Other criticism involves the technicality of the procedure that would involve bringing an extinct species back to life. Genomes of nine extinct species have been sequenced, which is a successful step, but it is unknown if these genes would be able to successfully transfer to a living species. Of all the techniques discussed so far, de-extinction is the least likely to occur any time soon, simply because the complexity and scale of the project is so large and intricate (Brand, 2014).

The conservation of species has come a long way since the first use of genetics in this field several decades ago. The implementation of neutral markers, PCR, DNA fingerprinting, and more has allowed scientists to study in-depth the relationship between population size and genetic variability, and how inbreeding depression and genetic drift affects populations. The use of these technologies and better understanding of these relationships have resulted in better definitions of a species and kinship relationships, the development of evolutionarily significant units, and better scientifically-managed breeding programs in captive populations. With even more complex projects on the horizon, such as facilitated adaptation, cloning, and de-extinction, it will be essential to fully understand the population

dynamics of a species, and it will also be important to evaluate intrinsic and extrinsic concerns about each approach. Though genomics has brought, and will continue to bring, numerous successes to the field of conservation, as technology continues to improve it will be more important than ever to fully understand both the benefits and implications of each new project, as well as keep in mind that the most effective of way of conserving a species is to protect its way of life in the first place.

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A Voice of the Contraries: Nature and Religion in William Blake's Poetry

Matthew Massaia

"This rounded, wet, weedy, windy earth, with its opposing poles, was born into contraries: Apollo and Dionysus, Talmudist and kabbalist, sober exegete and rapt ecstatic."

— Cynthia Ozick, *The New York Times Sunday Book Review*, 18 May 2015

William Blake's poetry operates out of resistance: he is a rebel opposed to the overarching social and religious power structures of his time, and his verse thrives on the tension that exists between opposing forces. Blake's poems attempt to enter into that liminal space between concepts such as "Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate" in order to understand the broadness of such ideas. Perhaps it is fair to say that, for Blake, Nature is both the force and the ultimate reconciliation of opposition. Furthermore, as emphasized in many of his poems, especially *There is No Natural Religion* and *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, the concepts of divinity and humanity are linked because of their contrary natures rather than their perceived similarities.

We must, however, examine more than these two poems in order to earn a broader understanding of Blake's relationships with Nature and religion. By combining elements of biblical prophecy and apocalyptic aesthetics, and a complex register of oftentimes paradoxical images, Blake's poetry attempts to marry the human with the divine. Or, as he says in "The Proverbs of Hell" from *The Marriage of*

Heaven and Hell, "Thus men forgot that All deities reside in the human breast"

(Blake 153)

There is, of course, a difference between the neoclassical conception of "Nature" and the Romantic incarnation of the idea "nature." Further, we must understand how Blake relates to both of these concepts. For writers such as Alexander Pope, "Nature" signifies the systems established by the divine creator to order the Universe. For the Romantics, the idea of nature is more personal, the true wildness of what the Industrial Revolution and the Age of Enlightenment had mechanized and rationalized. Partially, it refers to nature in the sense of the world that is outside of the urban everyday human involvement, the pastoral world. For Blake, however, human experience with nature appears to be a cruel reminder of our mundane nature. The interaction of the human being in the natural world is an indication of our predicament as beings who had fallen from grace. As he writes in the first two stanzas of the introductory poem to *Songs of Experience*,

Hear the voice of the Bard!
Who Present, Past, & Future Sees;
Whose ears have heard
The Holy Word
That walk'd among the ancient trees;

Calling the lapsèd Soul
And weeping in the evening dew,
That might controll
The starry pole,
And fallen, fallen light renew!
(Blake, *Introduction*, 125 1-10)

Two things are clear from these stanzas: the fallen condition of the "the soul" and the potential for the bard or the poet (or Blake himself) to rekindle that initial, elevated state of the soul. S. Foster Damon, both a poet and an expert William Blake

scholar, attributes this “fallenness” that Blake conveys as the trait which removes human beings from being able to actually live in the so-called “state of nature” (Damon 105). There is inherent corruption in the fabric of human nature that rends the ideal world from the world that exists.

Blake’s concept of humanity being “fallen” resonates with both biblical imagery of the Fall of Man in the Garden of Eden and Milton’s Lucifer falling from grace. An image both compact and abstract, “fallen light” conjures both a divine fall and a human one. It is perhaps the quest of the bard/the role of the poet in society/Blake’s poetic intention, having “heard/The Holy Word” to elevate the spirits of humankind. Blake then takes on the elevated diction of the biblical prophet, because for him it is the bard who is capable of transcending humanity’s fallen condition.

But for Blake it appears that “Nature” is at the very least a somewhat alienating construct. This concept of nature is further explored in one of “The Proverbs of Hell” in *The Marriage*: “Where man is not, nature is barren” (153). We cannot take this line literally as it would then suggest that the world of animals and plants does not thrive and blossom without human beings around to observe it. Sardonicly perhaps, Blake seems to remark that if human beings were not constantly observing the world through an inherently fallen and corrupt perspective, then there would be no distinction between the human world and the natural world. On a theological level, it draws the distinction between the human and the divine.

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Contrary to this desire to transcend the material, Blake's poetry is often grounded firmly in nature and draws heavily upon imagery from the natural world. His frequent use of metaphors related to the plant and animal kingdoms constructs worlds for us that are both idyllic and yet have the strange fervor of biblical prophecy. Possibly the most well-known Blake poem, "The Tyger" from his *Songs of Experience*, uses the image of a tiger as a meditation on the nature of a creator who could give birth to such a destructive force:

What the hammer? what the chain?
In what furnace was thy brain?
What the anvil? what dread grasp
Dare its deadly terrors clasp?

When all the stars threw down their spears
And water'd heaven with their tears,
Did he smile his work to see?
Did he who made the Lamb make thee?

(Blake 130, 13-20)

The apocalyptic urgency, the heightened pace of the verse in these stanzas, and the extension of the metaphor to violent, non-natural images (hammers, chains, furnaces, anvils, spears) all draw towards questioning if the tiger and the Lamb (capitalized to suggest a Christological connection)—the violent and the peaceful, wild and pastoral, active and passive—have the same creator. And, if so, what does that tell us about this creator? The tiger and the lamb suggest polarities, forces that cannot be assigned simple moral qualities as "Good" and "Evil." And again in "A Memorable Fancy" from *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, Blake invokes animals in his closing aphorism: "One Law for the Lion & Ox is Oppression." (Blake 159)

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Not only does this image take us out of the speaker's previous Christological discussion with a Devil who was once an angel and into the natural wilderness of the world, it also has metaphysical resonance. The Ox and the Lion are the traditional symbols associated with two of the writers of the Synoptic Gospels, St Luke and St Mark, respectively.

For Blake, it seems that the charge of the bard is to convey and interpret the nature of the divine into poetry. Blake rejects the deistic idea of a God that is not present in the affairs of humankind, that he has—like a watchmaker winds a clock—set the world in motion so that he might never have to touch it again. Rather, Blake believes that

He who sees the Infinite in all things sees God. He who sees the Ratio only sees himself only. Therefore God becomes as we are, that we may be as he is
(Blake, "There is No Natural Religion [b]," 117)

Thus the seemingly contrary natures of "God" and "man" are not truly as contrary as they appear to be. Rather than God being on the outskirts of human life, the divine is present in all human beings. The poem "All Religions Are One" and the two "There Is No Natural Religion" poems, labeled as "a" and b," are Blake's refutations of both Enlightenment Deism and dogmatic Christianity. One of the most important critics and scholars of the 20th century, Northrop Frye, looks at this poem as Blake attempting to marry his theology with his poetry:

Theology distinguishes between "natural" and "revealed" religion, the former being the vision of God which man develops with his fallen reason, and the latter the vision communicated to him by inspired prophets. To Blake "There Is No Natural Religion." The only reason people believe in it is because they are unwilling to believe in the identity of God and Man.
(Frye, *Fearful Symmetry* 44)

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And for Blake this “identity of God and man” is really a singular identity. There are those who acknowledge that there is a “truth” that is greater than the sensual experiences of the human body. This is then the role of the poet, to be aware of the true nature of things. In the poem, “All Religions Are One,” Blake links this idea of “the true Man” with the “Poetic Genius,” an apparent fusion of the enlightened and the sublime. The Poetic Genius is the part of the human that experiences the power of imagination.

As an epigraph to the poem “All Religions Are One,” a not-quite-prose scripture-like poem, Blake writes, “*The Voice of One crying in the Wilderness.*” Immediately, Blake has drawn a thread between his argument and, beginning with the Book of Isaiah 40:3, the tradition of wild, nature-roaming prophets: “The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the LORD, make straight in the desert a highway for our God” (*King James Bible*). Blake’s concept of the “Poetic Genius,” vaguely defined as that “which by the Ancients was call’d an Angel & Spirit & Demon,” is made to parallel the voice of a prophet, of a John the Baptist-type individual roaming the world and proclaiming some iteration of truth (Blake 116). And, like the biblical prophets, his ideal interaction with nature appears to be *in* the world rather than *of* the world.

It is the “true Man” for Blake who is able to experience this universal truth of Poetic Genius through the powers of the imagination. The poet states:

Principle 5. The Religions of all Nations are derived from each Nation’s different reception of the Poetic Genius, which is everywhere call’d the Spirit of Prophecy.

(Blake 116)

It might be said that the ability to interpret this “Spirit of Prophecy” into a textual, concrete form is the power granted to the poet through imagination. In a 1987 interview on David Cayley’s CBC Radio One program, *Ideas*, Northrop Frye spoke about this link between “natural religion” and “imagination”:

By natural religion, he means the religion that we derive from the sense of design in nature. A sense of design in nature is something we’ve already put there as a mental construct, so we’re really staring in a mirror, like Narcissus. In other words, we get nothing from nature, the passive contemplation of the world. All real knowledge and understanding is created, that is, it’s something that’s an activity in man himself. So all religion is revealed by the imagination.

(*Interviews with Northrop Frye* 810)

At work in Blake’s poetry of contraries are the forces of creation and destruction. But as we learn from Blake’s poetry, the forces of creation and destruction, while seeming opposites of each other, are merely the powers by which energy is transferred. It is the liminal space contained within the contrary nature of things that defines truth.

If, as Blake argues in *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, “without contraries there is no progression,” then it becomes the responsibility of the poet to magnify these polarizing opposites so that we might have some conception of truth that arises from this tension. Robert D. Stock, in his book *The Holy and the Daemonic from Sir Thomas Browne to William Blake*, examines the ways in which both human nature and the pastoral world are consistently presented to us with an apocalyptic aesthetic:

There is religious fear aplenty in Blake, and that vividly evoked in all its primitive intensity. But all orthodox theological scaffolding...has been replaced with something new, something built out of the vestiges of religious heterodoxy and the fresh materials of secular humanism.

(Stock 363)

Although Blake is resistant to being of the natural world, he is able to subvert this by invoking natural images through the realm of the spiritual. To suggest that Blake possessed a singular, univocal conception of Nature or religion that spanned the totality of his oeuvre is to disregard how layered his work truly is. To achieve a nuanced analysis of what Blake intends to say about Nature and religion in his poetry, it is perhaps best to understand how these concepts function overall. There is spiritual tension in Blake's poetry: he reveres some conception of a supreme power and yet is against the idea of the Church as a political body. Using the Devil as a mouthpiece for the poet's anti-dogmatic, rebellious nature, *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell* presents us with a deeply personal, anti-authoritarian mythology.

For Blake, it seems that the broadness of all of life's "big questions" are intrinsically linked together. Questions of the nature of the divine are then the same questions of the nature of humankind. The search for God, for Blake, however, is not the quest for a divinity of pure Goodness and benevolence, but for the place where the creative and destructive urges become one. Perhaps it can be said that, for Blake, "God" is the point at which polarities have merged. None of his poems encapsulate this better than *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*. *The Marriage* is a book-length project of poems and engravings that mirrors the poetic structure of biblical prophecy, telling the narrative of the poet journeying (in an almost Dantesque way) through a vision of Hell. Blake's Hell is, unlike Dante's *Inferno*, not a place where divine retribution is exacted, but rather a place where energy is unrepressed by the reason and rationalization of the heavens. In his book, *Blake's Apocalypse: A Study in*

Poetic Argument, American literary critic and scholar Harold Bloom addresses the tension between extremes that pervades Blake's poetry:

The Argument states the problem of the work's genesis: the breakthrough of the contraries into history. The Memorable Fancies are all on the rhetorical side of the "Devil," though they continually qualify the supposed demonism of that party. The sections between the Fancies carry forward the dialectics of the work; they exist to clarify the role of the contraries. Blake asks of his reader a subtle alternation of moods; to move constantly from a defiant celebration of heretofore repressed energies to a realization that the freed energies must accept a bounding outline, a lessened but still existent world of confining mental forms.

(Bloom 72)

Bloom touches on this balance between the "repressed energies" and the "freed energies," which allows us to consider the Apollonian and Dionysian aspects of Blake's poetry. While definitely an embodiment of Blake's hostility towards organized religion and Church orthodoxy, *The Marriage* also speaks to the ways that Blake constructs poetry. Despite desiring to not be "of" the world, and rather to transcend it, Blake must make use of poetic form and structure in order to convey these ideas. He marries his Dionysian impulse with Apollonian circumscription.

This dynamic for Blake, while one of apparent polarity (creation and destruction as opposites) is unifying because it is contrary. The repressed, authoritarian energies of Heaven are necessary to balance the unrestricted wildness of Hell's creative impulse. Blake's idea of Heaven is Apollonian—methodical, strict, formal. His Hell, Dionysian—excessive, sensual, rebellious. One "proverb of Hell" famously encapsulates this dynamic: "The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom." (Blake 151) As with Dionysian rituals of classical antiquity in which wine-laden bacchants embody the god himself through enthusiastic fervor, so in Blake's Hell, it is through extremes, through the intensity of experience and the raw

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potential of power that one is able to achieve transcendence. Here, we have an idea of what Blake's God might be: the union of opposites. God for Blake is not a representation of moral "goodness," but rather that force which is capable of fusing together the destructive and the creative, the active and the passive, and the restless with the restrained, into a unified creation.

Blake's poetry is poetry that struggles to understand its place. Everything comes with the presence of its mirror. It is often said among poets that all poems contain their opposites, but for Blake this is not enough. He fleshes out the contrary force and gives a voice to that which has been unheard. His images are fierce when they contrast the pastoral and oftentimes idyllic when in conversation with the totality of the cosmos. By emphasizing the contrary elements of all nature, Blake attains a greater semblance of what some might call truth.

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The Paper Umbrella

Rebecca Endres

Ramesh Dubashi took a seat in the darkest corner of the restaurant and opened a notebook. As a force of habit, he penned the date neatly in the upper-right corner of the page, ink bleeding into the thick, elegant paper. The waiter, a man who had more thick black hair on his upper-lip than on his head, came over with a smile.

“Hello, sir, welcome to Tandoori House. Are you ready to order?”

“I’ll need a bit more time to decide on a meal. What beers do you have?” he asked. He could see a flash of disappointment in the waiter’s eyes when he answered in English and not Punjabi.

“We have Kings, Taj, Haywards, Kalyani.”

“Kalyani, please. Thank you.”

He couldn’t help but feel guilty relief when the waiter walked off, leaving him to the sounds of Second Avenue traffic and the dull blare of a commercial break on the radio. The hole in the wall-turned Indian restaurant was dimly illuminated by a few unenthused fluorescent bulbs and some white Christmas lights strewn up on the walls. It was peaceful, boarder-line dingy, and suited Ramesh’s tastes perfectly. Though he was an optometrist by profession, finding quiet ethnic restaurants to sit in and people watch was a passion of his. Particularly if people watching led to inspiration for poems, which he sometimes felt was his true life’s calling.

There were few other people there; it was half past three in the afternoon, so the lunch special had ended, and the dinner rush was well over an hour away. An old

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man with a trench coat chatted to the waiter at the front of the narrow restaurant, and two girls who appeared to be in their mid-twenties spoke animatedly over fishcakes and tamarind sauce across from him.

“Wait till you try the saag paneer from here, it’s *so good!*” The one girl raved. Her hair was dyed platinum blond and cotton candy pink, and her eyes were lined with dark blue. Were she not inherently pretty, she would look ridiculous.

Her friend appeared a bit more reserved, her chestnut brown hair streaked with unnatural blond highlights and her eye make-up similarly heavy, but she too possessed a natural sort of grace that made up for the childish application of eye liner. She took a sip of water and smiled at the pink-haired girl. “Oh my god, I haven’t had Indian food in *so long*. Now I’m gonna go back to school craving dal moth.”

Ramesh’s ears pricked in interest; it wasn’t everyday that two young white girls sat down to discuss Indian snack food.

“We can stop by Curry Hill on the way back to Penn. I’m sure every market on the street will have the kind we like.”

“That’s okay, I really have to catch the 4:45 back to Long Island. I’m seeing Dave tonight.”

“You can see him any time,” the other girl snorted, now dipping the shredded cabbage that served as a garnish into the tamarind sauce, as they had effectively annihilated the fish cakes. “How often do you get into Manhattan to see me? Come *on.*”

Ramesh faded out as their conversation became less interesting. He had hoped they would display more of their cultural depth, but he supposed that it was too much to ask for. In the meantime, the waiter came over with his drink, and Ramesh found himself ordering a forgettable dal dish and getting lost in his thoughts. Unfortunately, the poetry would not come, and after forty minutes, he was prepared to leave.

Just then, a Beatles song came on the radio. Ramesh decided, as Paul McCartney's soothing voice assured him *we can work it out*, to stay just a bit longer.

"Could this day get any better?" the pink-haired girl (Ramesh had ascertained that her name was Crystal, and the other girl was Mona) asked, stretching her arms above her head. "I get to see my bestie, have an awesome meal, and now we get to hear Paul McCartney?"

"I know," Mona responded. "Plus, it's a funny 'shit another fight with Jane Asher!' song."

"Classic *Rubber Soul*," Crystal said, smiling wide.

"This is off *Past Masters*." Mona corrected while texting.

"Oh, shit. Listen to me, I'm such a dipshit," she responded, unnecessarily flustered by her mistake. "I got confused because it's a Jane Asher-blasting song like you said. What song am I thinking of? Uh..."

"I think 'I'm Looking Through You' is what you mean," Ramesh cut in with a soft smile. "That's on *Rubber Soul*." Surprise and shyness battled in his chest; he was generally not one to engage in conversation, happy to dissolve into a corner and just listen to what happened around him. But these girls had endeared themselves to

him with the casual familiarity with which they had discussed Indian cuisine, and now their knowledge of his favorite band displayed another thing that they shared in common. How could he not be so bold as to speak up, just this once?

“Oh my god, *yes!*” Crystal’s head snapped into his direction, and he felt shaken by the intensity of her wide-eyed gaze. “Thank you! That’s what had me confused. See, Mona?” She glanced back at her friend. “I’m not an idiot.”

“Didn’t say you were, dude,” Mona said, reaching for the bill as it was placed down in front of her.

“Oh no, I got!” her friend swiped it from her, paying the bill herself like a chivalrous boyfriend. “I’m Crystal by the way.”

She said it so quickly that it took Ramesh a moment to realize that she was once again speaking to him. “Oh. My name is Ramesh. Ramesh Dubashi.”

“Nice to meet you,” Crystal said brightly, grabbing her wallet and looking over the check (it couldn’t have been that much, Ramesh reflected; it was a cheap restaurant). “Ramesh?”

“Yes, you said it right.”

“I’m Mona, by the way,” the brunette piped in, looking up from her cellphone briefly, her black fingernails dancing over the touchscreen even as she looked away from them.

“It’s nice to meet you,” he said, and then, because it felt so refreshing to be having a conversation, “do you go to school around here?”

Crystal nodded. “I’m getting my master’s in international affairs at the New School.”

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“And I’m getting mine in business marketing at Hofstra,” Mona added.

They were quick to open up, which took some of the effort off of him. There was something amazing, energetic, and border-line schizophrenic in the way the two girls spoke; once they started chatting, they drove him from topic to topic eagerly, weighing his opinions against their own good naturedly. Which was his favorite Beatle? Did he listen to other classic rock bands? How about jazz? Somehow this turned into discussion of other forms of art. Did he like art? Did he go to the Met? Guggenheim? Impressionism or Modernism? Did he like poetry?

“Actually, yes,” he answered the most recent question that they lobbed at him, “I have a book of poetry out that I published a few years ago.” He spoke slowly, trying to collect his thoughts and register their words, still echoing through his skull. It had been a long time since he had spoken to anyone so avid and energetic. He found his fingertips brushing self-consciously over the graying hair near his temples as he wondered whether or not either girl noticed how much older than them he really was. It made him slightly apprehensive.

“That’s so cool!” Mona startled him out of his thoughts. “What kind of poetry?”

“Just little philosophies; things I think of while people watching,” he responded, flattered by their interest. “It’s called *A Single Setting Sun*.”

“Wait, wait, I wanna order this! Can I get it on Amazon? ‘*A Single Setting Sun*?’ Ooh, I found it! Wishlist!” Crystal’s fingers flew over the screen of her smartphone.

“Totes wanna borrow that after you read it,” Mona cut in, grabbing the phone from her friend to look at the cover herself. “That’s awesome. Oh, shit, Crys, it’s getting late. Let’s go!”

“Do we have to?” her friend objected. “Please. Stick around. It could be fun. I never get to see you, Mona.”

“I already told Dave I’d meet him tonight.”

“Well why’d you tell him that if you were already out with a friend?” Crystal snapped, then looked at Ramesh, smiling apologetically. “Mona’s gotta catch a train back to the island. But it was great talking to you. I really will buy your book; I look forward to reading it.”

He held out his hand, and she took it; hers was slender and cool in spite of the warmth of the restaurant. “It was wonderful talking to you. Safe trip home,” he added to Mona, who had turned back to her phone, but looked up to smile at him as she grabbed her coat.

With the same noise with which they had hooked him into conversation, they suddenly bundled up and headed out into the cold streets, now arguing about train schedules. Ramesh shuddered as a blast of arctic air shot into the room, dissipating quickly. He finished his beer and looked down at his empty notebook as he waited for his check to come. It would be fun, he reflected, to be young again. Especially in today’s age, with the cell phones that allowed Crystal to access Amazon.com to order his book with a few taps of the finger. With trains that ran as frequently as they did so friends could meet up for a casual few hours in Manhattan before going their separate ways. Raised in America but born in Ludhiana, India, he had always felt

uncertain of how exactly to enjoy his youth. His mother, determined not to let go of her ways of life, had encouraged him to one day return to India, but he had felt the pull that had inspired his father to move to the United States in the first place. He couldn't picture himself anywhere else.

Still, the death of his mother when he was in college smothered a hopeful flame that had burned in his chest. He had watched his American dream buried with her casket, and suddenly wondered if this country would ever feel like a home without the beautiful contrast his mother drew to it. The gentle lilt when she spoke in Punjabi to his father, the sunflower color of her favorite sari that she wore on special occasions, the smell of spices—fenugreek, asafetida—all of these suddenly became sanctified memories. For the past thirty years, he had felt an unpleasant disconnect from India, which he had visited a few times with his parents. Without his mother to lead him there, he had lost the desire to visit. Yet America had distanced itself from him as well. The way people assumed he was a doctor just by looking at him, the Hindu and Punjabi dialects other Indians addressed him with, automatically assuming that he could speak to them— these little stabs at his authenticity made him feel like an alien in the place he had always felt secure. His foreign childhood memories cast forever behind him, he assumed the identity of *foreigner* alone.

Willing his melancholy thoughts away, he rose, grabbing his pea coat and slapping some bills onto the table. It was high time, he decided as he stepped into the rude January chill outside, to treat himself to something decadent. Heading south a few blocks, he found himself entering St. Mark's Bookshop. The store was a

husk of what it had been decades before when Ramesh had been a young aspiring grad student himself, but he still preferred it over all those big commercial book stores that people had become so enamored with. Gravitating towards the poetry section, he relaxed a bit. It had been far too long since he had treated himself to a paperback copy of something beautiful. He wound up choosing a tiny pocket-sized collection of *Howl and Other Poems by Allen Ginsberg*, (a poet he had been meaning to read) and turned to check out when he froze in place, amusement stealing over his features.

Crystal stood by the checkout desk, purchasing a small stack of novels. As she collected her change and turned to shove everything into an oversized bag, she took notice of him and smiled, instantly recognizing him.

“Holy crap. Fancy seeing you here. How’s it been in the past half hour, Ramesh?”

Incredibly pleased that she had remembered his name, he matched her incorrigibly snarky grin and bowed his head slightly in recognition. “What are the odds?”

“Clearly we were destined to cross paths again,” she said dramatically, finally managing to fit everything somewhat neatly in her bag and throwing it over her shoulder, moving aside so he could buy his book.

“What happened to your friend?” he asked.

“Oh we hopped a subway up to Penn; had to see her off to the island,” she answered, pouting. “I felt sorry for myself since we hardly see each other anymore, so I came here to treat myself.”

“That’s exactly why I came here,” he answered, astounded by the similarities he shared with the colorful young girl. “Well if you aren’t in a rush to return to school, would you like to get something to drink?”

Once the words were out, Ramesh realized with horror that he could not suck them back between his teeth. Feeling comfortable around someone so naturally laid back, he was saying things he shouldn’t, and he realized with embarrassment that she was probably now convinced he was some sort of stalker, trying to get her alone.

“Totally! Anything to keep me out of school,” she laughed. “Know any good bars around here?”

“You’re old enough, right?” he clarified, forcing apprehension to come before relief at her answer.

“I’m twenty-three,” she answered with an eye roll.

Dear god, Ramesh thought as he followed her down the dark streets of the lower east side, *she’s half my age*.

But then, there was something titillating about that fact too.

The bar they settled on lacked any defining features; the usual neon lights buzzed in the windows announcing that they served Coors Light, Budweiser, and Heineken (none of which seemed remotely appealing). He settled on an artisan beer, disappointed by how sweet it was, but too embarrassed to order anything stronger in front of Crystal. He felt as though it was his responsibility to chaperone her to some degree, to compensate for this inappropriate friendliness. As it was, she ordered a fruity drink, Walk on the Beach, Sex on the Beach, Life’s a Beach: he really

didn't know. She told him it had coconut rum and mango juice in it, and that was all he needed to hear to know he would probably find it disgusting. He politely declined her offer to take a sip.

"Mona should be back at Hofstra at this point," she mused, glancing down at her phone, eagerly awaiting a text message while Ramesh tried to gauge how much of his drink he could feasibly leave untouched without coming across as rude or wasting her time.

"If you two are so close, why don't you go to the same school? Or look into getting an apartment together?" he asked. "I'm sure you could find something, maybe in Queens, which wouldn't leave a difficult commute for either of you."

She shrugged. "We needed the space. We met in undergrad and spent all our time together, partied a lot, you know. But by the end of our sophomore year, we started to fight really bad. Senior year, we started talking again. We decided to grow up a bit but remain friends, 'cause we have so much in common. I couldn't imagine life without her, we've gotten really close again."

"So you meet in the city frequently?"

"Like once or twice a semester. We both have real hippie parents, you know? All into being open to different cultures and stuff. We love dipping into little restaurants like Tandoori House for fun 'cuz it's how we were both raised. And that's where we met you!"

He didn't see how being open to different cultures constituted being a hippie, but he bit his tongue. "Yes I'm glad I met you both; it's nice to have someone to talk about the arts with."

“Tell me about it!” she played with a tiny paper umbrella that had come in her drink. It was unbelievably tacky, but she seemed to find it charming. “We should go to the Met together sometime. *Ooh*, or like a poetry slam! They have those at my school sometimes! You could come read from your book of poetry!”

“Why isn’t someone as artistically inclined as yourself majoring in art?” he asked.

She shrugged noncommittally, then gave him an unreadable look. “Why isn’t someone as nice and cultured as yourself wearing a wedding ring?”

He doubted she meant it that way, but he couldn’t help but feel a jab at the question. She had noticed his age, then, and was judging him for being old and single. How could she not? “I’m a very introverted person,” he explained to her. “A committed relationship is something that never really came up.”

“Introverted? You started talking to me and Mona. And you asked me to get a drink with you! You don’t seem that introverted to me.”

It was true, and he had trouble conceiving of any reasons for it. “Maybe I was just feeling lonely today and thought that I had nothing to lose.”

“But hey, you gained a friend,” she offered brightly, holding up her drink as a toast. He did so reluctantly because that meant he had to take another swig of his beer which seemed to become increasingly unappetizing as it warmed in the stuffy room.

Perhaps articulating the fact that he was indeed a bit lonely did it. Or maybe it was the fact that she was polishing off her drink quickly, so he felt that she would judge less harshly when softened by alcohol, but Ramesh found himself opening up

to her. Telling her about his mother and her sunflower-colored sari, about how he had resented the waiter at Tandoori House just a little bit earlier because he had expected him to order in Punjabi.

Crystal listened with fascination and sympathy, nodding her head and occasionally shooting off a text, presumably to Mona. "Why don't you just go to India or find some other second-generation Americans and claim a place where you feel you belong?" she asked.

"How does one go about doing that?" he asked her rhetorically. "I've spent my entire life being a quiet observer of people. You can't just change your way of living out of nowhere."

Crystal opened her mouth to retort, but a boy had risen from a nearby table, and was trying to squeeze past her to get to the bar. She scooted her chair in as best she could to let him pass, but his phone dropped out of his pocket as he brushed past her.

"Smooth, dude," she commented, leaning down to pick it up for him.

"Sorry about that," he offered. "Thanks. Hey, do you come here often? I could swear I've seen your face before."

"Nope," she answered in a clipped voice. "Never been here."

"Oh, ok. Must've mistaken you for someone else." Unlikely, Ramesh thought, given the unusual colors of her hair. He picked his beer up and took another sip nervously as the boy showed no signs of leaving, however. "You try the White Rabbit winter ale here? It's good. I could buy you one."

"No. I don't like ale," her voice sounded like the wind outside felt.

The boy held up his hands, admitting defeat. "Alright. Maybe I'll see you around."

"Doubt it," she muttered, turning away as he walked towards the front of the bar, ignoring his brief wave.

Secretly, Ramesh felt pleased that she had turned the boy down, refused to let him wedge himself between them. Still, he was amazed by this side of her; she had been friendly to him when he had first addressed her. "Why so cold? Was that boy making you uncomfortable?"

"No, I just wasn't interested."

"You already have a boyfriend, then?" It made him feel sick when he realized how much he was dreading the answer.

She shook her head, and relief spread through his chest. "No. Not interested in stupid *dicker* boys. In case I didn't make that clear," she added the last part with a self-deprecating half-smirk, and he nodded.

"You're a girl who says what she has to say; the pink hair and combat boots indicate as much. That boy should have known better," he told her, praised her. What he had tried to repress was becoming all the more apparent to him: he was attracted to her. He wondered if she felt the same way about him. If she didn't like boys, did that imply she liked *men*, people who could respect her, talk about life with her?

"Oh, gee thanks. I appreciate it," she played with the umbrella in her drink, twirling it around.

He watched her indigo-tipped fingers playing with the electric blue umbrella, wondering whether or not he should broach this topic. Crystal was an open-minded, laid-back girl; he didn't see her reacting with much surprise. Still, the risk of looking like a lascivious old man was a big one, especially since he didn't usually make friends easily. He found himself clamming up, hesitant to speak. Fortunately, she drew him back out, just as she had at the restaurant.

"When was the last time you went to India?"

"It's been over a decade. It's painful to go back because it makes me regret all the opportunities I missed when I was young."

"I'm sorry," she frowned empathetically. "But that's still part of who you are, isn't it?"

"I am an American," he answered with certainty. He just didn't always feel that way. But maybe Crystal could help him feel more grounded here. He imagined them leaving the bar together, going back to his apartment and staying up half the night talking, reading poetry together, exchanging secrets and fears. He saw her kicking her combat boots off by the door, shrugging her coat off and leaving it in a messy heap on the arm of his sofa. Ramesh had not had many intimate encounters in years, and now he saw himself taking her hand, kissing it tenderly, saw her eyes softening with understanding. Maybe America existed in people, not in places.

"Oh no, Mona's calling me. I hope she's alright. Give me a minute," she said, forcing him to focus once again on the dingy bar and the lukewarm bottle in his hand.

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Crystal rose, holding the phone to her ear and squeezing through the bar to the bathroom to take the call. He nodded in understanding as she passed.

There alone in the cramped space that was beginning to fill up with people as the evening wore on, he decided that he would ask if she wanted to go anywhere else, or if she would like to come back home with him. Jittery but excited, he realized that he was wasting time holding his drink, and took his beer and Crystal's empty glass up to the bar, passing them to a sullen bartender and paying for both. Before the man could take away Crystal's glass however, he plucked the little blue umbrella out and slipped it into his pocket. It was a silly, impulsive gesture. But then, he thought, wasn't everything he was doing silly and impulsive today? He felt younger than he had in years, and this warmth in his chest—was it hope?—made everything glow just a bit brighter.

As he took a seat, he saw a shock of pink hair weaving its way back towards him and he smiled in fondness. In the dim lighting, it took until she was a mere few feet away to realize that she was crying.

"What's wrong? Is everything okay?" he asked, rising in alarm.

"Everything is fine. Just fucking dandy," she answered, wiping her eyes with the back of her hand; her heavy makeup had already begun to run a bit. "Mona called me, super excited. This guy friend of hers swung by her dorm room tonight. Dave. They've gone on a few dates. He said he's liked her, a lot, for a while. He asked her out, and she said yes."

He nodded, waiting for the bad news, but she just took a few deep breathes, trying to calm herself down. "So what's wrong?" he finally pressed after a few tense moments.

She looked at him strangely, as though the question were a stupid one. "I mean, that's it. I'm happy for her. But of course I'm upset!" He continued to stare blankly, forcing her to elaborate. "Isn't it obvious? I like her. I've had feelings for Mona for years. And she never fucking took any notice of me!" the tears came back, and she grabbed her bag.

"Where are you going?" he mimicked her actions, putting on his coat.

"Back to school. I'm sorry to cut this short, Ramesh. I just need to be alone."

She didn't wait for a response before storming outside, and he followed, grabbing some napkins and catching up with her, offering them to her.

"Thanks. Sorry to be such a kill joy."

"I'm sorry to hear about that. I didn't know you...had feelings for her."

"I was gonna tell her today too!" she exclaimed, waving her hands madly. "I was gonna tell her and ask her out and just, she was all 'oh, gotta head back early for Dave,' and I lost my nerve, and now, bam! Done!" she paused to collect herself as best she could. "I told you we used to party a lot. We used to make out when we were drunk. Then she started pushing me away. I thought our reconnecting was a sign she was ready to embrace her feelings for me."

He gaped at her, replaying the few minutes he had seen her with Mona. Had there been any connection? Anything indicating a relationship beyond simple friendship? He remembered Crystal paying for the meal, not that Mona had taken

notice of it. How naïve, he thought, for her to imagine there had been anything between them when there was nothing to indicate that.

“I’m sorry things didn’t work out,” he said finally. “Do you want to talk about it? We could go somewhere, take a walk.” Night had dropped a bomb of tundralike chill and darkness around them in their time at the bar, and he realized how stupid the notion was. “I live nearby; you could come back to my apartment and talk until you feel better...” as each word formed in his mouth, he heard how stupid they were; his speech slowed like a wind-up toy losing steam.

Crystal gaped at him, scandalized. “Are you asking me back to your place?” she asked, sounding repulsed. “What the hell? I thought you were interested in being my *friend*.”

“I am!” He said quickly, not knowing whether or not it was a lie anymore.

“Unbelievable,” she cut him off, turning and heading towards the nearest subway station.

“Please wait, Crystal!” it was the first time he spoke her name, clear and bright on his tongue, and he felt inward relief as she stopped to give him a scathing look. “It’s not what you think, I’m not...I just didn’t know. But my intentions were never bad. I was just so charmed by you. Of course if you have feelings for someone else, I respect that. You should have someone you can talk to. Don’t go storming away when you’re feeling sad. Let me help—”

“No.” Her voice wasn’t as sharp as it had been in the bar. There was an edge of remorse to it. “I suspected you had ulterior motives at the bookstore—” hurt flared in his chest that she had assumed anything sleazy of him—“but I went along

with it to distract myself from Mona ditching me. I wanted to be a little reckless. Never expected her to call me with *that* though!" she smacked her forehead, a paroxysm of disbelief and despair. "Sorry I used you. You're not a bad guy, Ramesh."

People rushed past them along the sidewalk, desperate to get out of the frigid air. They stood a few feet apart, staring at each other for a few moments.

"It's alright," he told her. "I didn't realize you were already having a rough day."

"The worst days start out so goddamn hopeful, don't they?" she asked bitterly, jamming her hands in her pockets. "I have to go. I need to be alone."

"Are you sure that's what's best—" he started, but she silenced him with a look.

"Yeah. Thanks for a nice evening, Ramesh. It was great meeting you. Maybe I'll see you around St. Marks."

"Perhaps," he answered, knowing he would be avoiding the place for months. Knowing she probably would too. "Thank you for your time, and I hope things get better. Goodbye."

She nodded her thanks and turned from him, descending down into the subway station, leaving him standing in the wake of their words as the sound of her combat boots faded away.

Ramesh turned, wanting to walk more before heading to his own home, to clear his head. They had not exchanged contact information, and he doubted she would ever go ahead and buy his book, given what it would no doubt remind her of. Utterly dejected, he shoved his hands in his pockets. Feeling something in his right-

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side pocket, he pulled out the little umbrella he had taken impulsively out of Crystal's drink. Shaking his head, he dropped it—and all the *might've beens* of the evening, into the nearest trashcan, and headed off into the lonely night.

The Influence of Heteronormative Sexual Politics on Morality in *The Picture of Dorian Gray*

Elizabeth Sam

Within the framework of the Victorian era, the convergence of various sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and religious institutions dictated the way in which morality operated as a force of influence. In *The History of Sexuality*, philosopher Michel Foucault argues that history has been characterized by shifting perceptions on sexual morality, and that sex has operated as a source of political power, leading to the conflation of the private and public spheres. He further argues that sexual practices that did not serve to benefit society as a whole were labeled as immoral actions which deviated from the acceptable social paradigm. For example, homosexuality was deemed a deplorable and sinful practice within the social framework because it did not contribute to procreation, and challenged the heteronormative standard (which held “socially beneficial” procreative power). Writers such as Oscar Wilde, author of *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, challenged how heteronormative sexual morality controlled dominating institutions such as the church and the aristocracy leading ultimately to the conflation of the private and public spheres. In his novel, Wilde incorporated the usage of homoerotic imagery and criticisms of such influential social institutions as a platform to extend his commentary concerning the politicization of morality.

First impressions of Wilde’s only novel would lead the reader to assume that

the tale existed as a forewarning about the consequences of immoral action.

However, Wilde ironically prefaces his novel with a wide variety of claims such as this one:

There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written....The moral life of man forms part of the subject-matter of the artist, but the morality of art consists in the perfect use of an imperfect medium. No artist desires to prove anything. Even things that are true can be proved....Vice and virtue are to the artist materials for an art. From the point of view of form, the type of all the arts is the art of the musician. From the point of view of feeling, the actor's craft is the type. (3)

Wilde immediately eliminates the possibility that the story which he writes is another folktale about morality. This leads the reader to view the novel with this core understanding, despite the fact that the central plotline of the story is concerned with the protagonist's (Dorian Gray's) moral decline. While this literary choice may leave the reader confused about Wilde's intention through his contradiction, he makes a variety of other plot choices within the text to indicate that his story is concerned with matters which deviate from a social fixation on morality. For example, in another instance in the novel, Wilde writes:

Society, civilized society at least, is never very ready to believe anything to the detriment of those who are both rich and fascinating. It feels instinctively that manners are of more importance than morals, and, in its opinion, the highest respectability is of much less value than the possession of a good chef.... For the canons of good society are, or should be, the same as the canons of art. Form is absolutely essential to it. It should have the dignity of a ceremony, as well as its unreality, and should combine the insincere character of a romantic play with the wit and beauty that make such plays delightful to us. (119)

Here Wilde makes the claim that society has become less concerned with upholding what is "right" and instead, fixates on keeping face in order to appease the system

itself. This very criticism serves as an explicit view into Wilde's literary intention. Wilde uses the character of Dorian Gray's moral depravity as a plot element in order to construct a narrative to critique society's emphasis on institutionalized standards of morality. He creates a commentary on the conflation of morality with social expectations regarding social propriety. He draws attention away from the question of morality and instead focuses on social acceptability.

Critic Houston Baker contends that Wilde, in his writing about social hypocrisy, looks to raise an awareness of these issues in his audience. He writes, "In turn, the self-realization of the individual makes for a better society in general, for Wilde believed that the progress of society was dependent upon the progress of the individual (351). Houston's commentary reflects the idea that Wilde's primary intention in exposing these social circumstances to the general public by pointing out apparent social hypocrisies and piquing his audience's sympathies is to promote social progress. As a condemned gay man, Wilde uses his novel and his commentary on morality to extend his own criticisms of heteronormative society and to challenge the way in which social mores were conflated with morality to control the private sphere.

As a homosexual man in the Victorian traditionalist landscape, Wilde was not afforded the freedoms to openly write about sexuality and desire. Instead of overtly discussing homosexual relationships, Wilde makes subtle (and not so subtle) references to homoeroticism and homosexual desire through seemingly homosocial subtexts. He does this particularly through the character developments of Basil, Dorian, and Henry. Literary critic and prominent queer theorist, Eve Sedgwick,

draws attention to what she calls the blurring between the homosocial and the homosexual in her work, *The Epistemology of the Closet*. She argues that male to male relationships, in particular, cannot be strictly separated into an opposing binary, as all relationships are based on different levels of desire. This can be seen particularly within the way Wilde constructs male relationships within *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, and how he challenges his audience's perceptions by blurring the line between the homosocial and the homosexual through various male to male fixations. For example, Basil's fixation leads him to create the painting which lies at the core of the novel. In one instance he states:

He [Dorian] is all my art to me now....What the invention of oil-painting was to the Venetians, the face of Antinous was to late Greek sculpture, and the face of Dorian Gray will someday be to me. It is not merely that I paint from him, draw from him, sketch from him. Of course, I have done all that. But he is much more to me than a model or a sitter. I won't tell you that I am dissatisfied with what I have done of him, or that his beauty is such that art cannot express it. There is nothing that art cannot express, and I know that the work I have done, since I met Dorian Gray, is good work, is the best work of my life... if you only knew what Dorian Gray is to me! (13)

While it is only later in the novel that Basil professes his love for Dorian, Wilde uses such monologues and dialogue to display the various facets of male to male desire. Basil objectifies Dorian and views him as the prime aesthetic to his work. To him, Dorian is the epitome of human perfection, as Dorian was innocent and untainted by the world at this point.

However, while Basil does profess his love for Dorian, there is no explicit indication that Basil and Dorian were involved in a homosexual relationship. In fact, there are no overt suggestions of homosexual activity between any of the characters within this work. Wilde circumvents the explicit use of "homosexual" relationships

in favor of creating relationships that were explained through expressions and testimonies of longing and desire. Although Wilde did avoid the inclusion of “homosexual” relationships as a self-protective measure, his choice still establishes itself in line with Sedgwick’s ideas that all relationships exist on a scale of desire that surpasses the homosexual/homosocial binary. While homosexuality was still treated as sexually immoral within the historical context in which Wilde wrote his novel, Wilde’s own description of male to male relationships serves as a sociopolitical narrative of his disagreement with society’s terms of moral acceptability, as well as ideas concerning the fluidity of same sex relationships.

Although Wilde discusses homoerotic fixations in an almost casual, roundabout way, he makes a point in using homoeroticism as a segue into his commentary concerning the social prejudices apparent within Victorian moral ideals. For example, in a particular dialogue between Basil and Dorian, Basil bemoans Dorian’s various hedonistic pursuits, including his controversial relationships with several members of the Victorian elite. He states, “There was that wretched boy in the Guards who committed suicide. You were his great friend. There was Sir Henry Ashton, who had to leave England, with a tarnished name. You and he were inseparable” (126-127). In another instance, Wilde introduces the character of Alan Campbell, who is also described as being particularly close with Dorian. Wilde writes, “They had been great friends once, five years before—almost inseparable indeed. Then the intimacy had come suddenly to an end. When they met in society now, it was only Dorian Gray who smiled. Alan Campbell never did” (138). Wilde continues to describe Dorian’s pursuits, stating, “It was remarked, however,

that some of those who had been most intimate with him appeared, after a time, to shun him. Women who had wildly adored him, and for his sake had braved all social censure and set convention at defiance, were seen to grow pallid with shame or horror if Dorian Gray entered the room” (119).

Wilde subtly hints at but does not overtly state that Dorian engaged in homosexual relations with members of the Victorian aristocracy. Participation in homosexual behaviors would warrant immediate trial and possible exile (which ironically was also Wilde’s own fate). However, Wilde used “taboo” relationships within his work to discuss morality in terms of sexuality by revealing the shame associated with the exposure of repressed desires. The failure of these individuals to carry out their socially moral role in upholding their own pure (hetero)sexual relationships led to their downfalls. Dorian, who was viewed as the embodiment of what Victorian society repressed, succeeded in breaking these individuals out of their socially bound moral roles and releasing their internalized desires.

While Wilde uses his work to extend criticisms of the social structure that cast an immoral light on homosexual relations, he additionally criticizes the institutions which upheld views concerning morality. In particular, Wilde focuses on the church which operates as the epicenter for matters concerning formal moral teaching and action. He employs the use of particularly sexualized imagery and language to describe the ritualistic services and practices of the Roman Catholic mass, viewed from Dorian’s perspective. Wilde writes:

He [Dorian] loved to kneel down on the cold marble pavement and watch the priest, in his stiff flowered dalmatic, slowly and with white hands moving

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aside the veil of the tabernacle, or raising aloft the jewelled, lantern-shaped monstrance with that pallid wafer that at times, one would fain think, is indeed the “panis caelestis,” the bread of angels, or, robed in the garments of the Passion of Christ, breaking the Host into the chalice and smiting his breast for his sins. The fuming censers that the grave boys, in their lace and scarlet, tossed into the air like great gilt flowers had their subtle fascination for him. (110)

Author Joyce Carol Oates states, “Hell is hardly more than theoretical to Wilde, and heaven is equally notional; when Dorian is attracted to the Catholic church it is primarily for the sake of exotic ritual, ecclesiastical vestments, and other somewhat ludicrous treasures of the church, which Wilde delights in cataloging” (424). Wilde, while including a sequence concerning the church and Dorian’s apparent admiration of it, does not fixate upon the religious element of it in particular, but on the ritualistic elements which intrigue him. Furthermore, his choice of sexualized imagery and language acts as a commentary on his views concerning morality within the church as well as the repression of desire that the church, as an institution, is responsible for. A voice against homosexuality, the church’s teachings and political influence had (and continues to have) a strong influence on the private and public spheres, especially when considering social roles and morality. Wilde’s sexualized mockery of the church is a direct criticism of the power of the church to dictate social roles and of its control over personal desire, which leads to repression.

In addition to his sexualized representation of the church, Wilde focuses on the way in which the church confessional captures Dorian’s attention. Wilde writes,

“As he passed out, he used to look with wonder at the black confessionals and long to sit in the dim shadow of one of them and listen to men and women whispering through the worn grating the true story of their lives” (110). In this instance, Wilde focuses the reader’s attention on the social elements apparent within this very act of confession. The confessional booth, which is a place of repentance, is primarily characterized by the individual’s admittance of sin in order to gain forgiveness. In a sense, the confessional was an equal platform where everyone could go for atonement. Dorian, however, rather than being fixated on the concept of forgiveness, is more intrigued by the individuals who enter the confessionals themselves and the possibilities of sin in their lives. This is reminiscent of Wilde’s own perception of morality and the way true desires have been repressed and hidden within the heterosexual Victorian social framework in which desires (including sexual ones) are systematically repressed.

Wilde’s treatment of morality’s view of sexual desire is primarily rooted in his own personal experiences as a homosexual man in an unforgiving social climate in which his own lifestyle contradicted Victorian ideals of decency. Social institutions led to the direct dictation of social morality and to the repression of the desire of the individual. Furthermore, it misled the individual to participate in an oppressive social environment which claimed to hold the key to moral purity. Wilde’s preface continues, “We can forgive a man for making a useful thing as long as he does not admire it. The only excuse for making a useless thing is that one admires it intensely. All art is quite useless”(4). Wilde’s claim that art is “useless” is, by extension, his claim that personal pleasure, and all things done in the pursuit of

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individual desires in a society which condemned individualism and which placed more emphasis on the preservation of untarnished reputations than promoting social good, are the essence of true art. He challenges readers to reexamine their place within the heteronormative, pseudo-moral social framework, and to question to what extent such a structure determines their fate.

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Black-Capped Chickadee

Shannon Fitzgerald

The objective of scientific illustration is to record the natural world for closer study of structure and detail with the artist in the unique position of emphasizing certain aspects of the image in a way that cannot be accomplished through photography alone. For this illustration I used colored pencils on Bristol board in order to achieve a true to life color reproduction of the black-capped chickadee in its

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environment. The materials used were effective in imitating the appearance of the feathers while also capturing the specific coloration of the specimen. By illustrating the piece I was also able to remove unnecessary background from the final image and focus solely on the bird itself.



Lotus

Allison Adler

Although this drawing of pink lotus flowers is inspired by a scientific illustration by botanical artist Wendy Hollender, I chose to create my own arrangement based on her illustration. I eliminated many of the elements Hollender included in her illustration, such as the stages of the lotus flower's growth, to create a simpler, less scientific image. My illustration is not intended to be a strictly scientific study. Instead, based on the process of creating and viewing this piece, this

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illustration is more of an aesthetic study and an image of healing. In Hinduism and in tantric and yogic traditions, the lotus flower represents the first chakra, or energy point in the body. Located at the base of the spine, this energy point is thought to be the source of stability, comfort, and a feeling of being grounded. This illustration was, in part, a reminder to myself to remain grounded during a difficult time. For this image, as with all my drawings, the process of blending the various colors I see in the subject is truly calming and healing. I especially enjoy the smooth, watercolor-like blend that can be achieved with colored pencil which was the medium I used in this illustration. Now, each time I look at this image I am reminded of the stillness and beauty of the lotus flower.



Ancient Bull

Kyle Morrison

This illustration is of a bronze bull artifact taken from National Geographic and sketched using transfer paper onto bristle board. After tracing the outline with a radiograph, I used stippling in order to capture the curves and dimensions of the piece. Because the sections of the horns are built one upon the other in a natural and subtle curve, I decided that using charcoal was the best way to illustrate this feature.

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The shading allowed for a smooth transition from layer to layer, and effectively portrayed the curvature and smooth surface of each section of the horns. With a blending tool and charcoal dust, I carefully blended each layer into the next in order to capture the color of the artifact as well. For the rest of the illustration, I used pastel dust applied with a brush to create hints of rust that appear in various parts of the face. I particularly worked to capture the concavity of the area around the eyes to give the piece some dimension and depth by using a charcoal pencil to darken certain areas. I also used white color pencil to lighten and highlight particular areas such as the forehead and the circles around the eyes. This piece taught me how to utilize other mediums such as charcoal and pastel in order to achieve depth and perspective in my work as an illustrator.

Portraits of Ink

Shannon Fitzgerald

The following drawings are examples of the work I produced in Drawing III. At the beginning of the semester, I had to choose a theme that would be the focus of my work for the duration of the class. In my personal work, I favor highly detailed and realistic portraits of both people and animals so I knew that I wanted my theme to involve one or the other. I ultimately decided to incorporate my passion for tattoos into my theme, and I created these “portraits.” Instead of focusing on the face of each person, I recreated their tattoos on paper in various mediums.

I wanted the illustration of the tattoos to represent the individual instead of a conventional portrait and so I focused on the ink drawings and never included the full face in any of the illustrations. I concentrated on the art of the tattoos themselves and the way they, being part of the skin, interacted with the shape of the body. Beyond the role that tattoos play in American culture, I wanted to explore the importance of tattoos, both temporary and permanent, in other cultures. I worked with examples of the Tā moko of the Māori people, henna, in particular bridal mehndi, and the Japanese irezumi (which is not featured here).

My main goal working on these images was to make the tattoos appear as part of the skin as opposed to them being added on. Each medium presented a different challenge, and by far the ink wash for the henna was the most difficult to work with as the illustration required layer after layer in order to build to the right shade.

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The first three images, *Shadows I, II, and III*, were all done with graphite pencil. I split the composite picture into three separate ones to better focus on specific areas of the tattoos: the clavicle and shoulders, chest and hand, and left arm, respectively. When the three are reconnected the entire image can be seen in full. *Tā moko* is a charcoal drawing and is a detail of a Maori man's facial tattoo.

Traditionally an uhi or chisel would be used which creates grooves in the skin. In this case the tattoo in the reference image was done with a modern tattoo machine.

Mehndi in Ink is an ink wash painting of hands with henna designs.

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Shadows I




Shadows II

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Shadows III

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The three separate images from above when placed together form the whole image.

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Tā moko

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Migrants from the Maghreb: How the State Defines *Sécurité* through Immigration Policy in France

Alexa Savino

Introduction

France's approach to immigration issues has been punctuated by major administrative, legislative, and attitudinal shifts throughout the course of its development, reflecting the varied perspectives that have dictated and shaped public policy. For much of France's history, the extent to which immigrants should be permitted to fully utilize services and employment opportunities provided by the state has been tempered by conceptions of public security—the notion that *any* immigrant or immigrant group posing a threat *of any kind* to the security of the French public or order of French society could reasonably face expulsion from the state. However, the ways in which security, broadly speaking, has been defined over the course of recent decades has shifted and evolved, and policies have been redefined in telling ways.

In recent years, the question of Maghrebi immigrants' place in French society has become increasingly more salient. This research seeks to understand the evolution of the concept of public security in relation to the immigrant population, specifically that of North African Muslims, addressing the following puzzle: how has France redrawn the lines of the meaning of *sécurité* to deal with shifting perceptions of the Muslim population and its “threat” to the French state? This work will be a

longitudinal intrastate comparison of French immigration policies (and legislation primarily aimed towards immigrants) characterizing several key periods marked by administrative reforms and various key political and economic shifts. It seeks to address the following questions: what contextual factors, historically, politically, and demographically, can explain how France develops policy towards immigrants, and how do Maghrebi Muslims fit into this equation?

Evidence suggests that *sécurité* has taken on a distinct meaning in the 21st century. Given France's economic hardships after the *Trente Glorieuses* of 1945-1975, the term invoked implications of *job* security, and "public order" was sought by maintaining an employment structure favoring French natives. However, over the course of recent decades, a different definition of *sécurité* has been foregrounded much more clearly—the notion of being "secure" from the external influence of social/cultural/religious outsiders (i.e. from Muslim immigrants altering the nature and composition of France's secular state); additionally, the notion of "security" as protection from immigrant-led crime and violence has also become incredibly prominent. This research is interested in finding out if, and how, the evolution of the meaning of *sécurité* over time informs the evolution of policy affecting Muslim immigrants.

Existing Literature

Much scholarly work has been done on the complexities of French immigration policy and the way the state interacts with Muslim immigrants from North Africa. Most cannot address policy without addressing questions of identity

and state perception of identity, which in turn affects the degree to which integration or assimilation is possible. Several different approaches emerge when considering this range of issues. Some scholars focus on the relationship between specific administrations and how they approach policy formation, as each President, along with his Party and Ministers, brings a different angle to the dialogue. Salil Sarkar focuses on the lens through which Sarkozy views the issue and the political climate associated with his leadership in “France: Past, Present and Future”¹; Margo DeLey uses a similar approach several decades prior in “French Immigration Policy Since May 1981,” as she provides a chronological profile for various administrations, highlighting, for example, Mitterand’s attempted immigration reforms and the role of the Socialist Party in the administration’s decision-making processes.²

Other scholars explore the policies, procedures, or political conditions of several states with some overarching commonality and provide contextual comparisons of how they “deal with” minorities within their own borders. James Hollifield compares the French and German approaches to dealing with immigration, particularly with labor and economic issues, and evaluates their relative success compared to one another³; Kristine Ajrouch, focusing more on gender and religious issues, explores the way in which two different national contexts shape the decision among Muslim women to wear the veil in “Global

¹ Salil Sarkar, “France: Past, Present and Future,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 42, no. 20 (2007): 1820-1822.

² Margo DeLey, “French Immigration Policy Since May 1981,” *International Migration Review* 17, no.2 (1983): 196-211.

³ James F. Hollifield, “Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 485 (1986): 113-128.

Contexts and the Veil: Muslim Integration in the United States and France.”⁴

Comparisons such as these provide meaningful ways of allowing different regions to interact with one another in academic conversation.

Scholars generally agree on two points: 1) that policy has been incredibly period-specific and inconsistent from decade to decade, thus necessitating contextual understandings of policies pursued in various time periods, and 2) that the rise of the Right has altered the nature of the dialogue regarding immigrants, particularly those from North Africa.

Historical Context: Trente Glorieuses

When tracking the evolution of French immigration policy, several pivotal moments throughout the last century can be said to have drastically altered the course of the state’s approach. This work focuses on three time frames: 1) the three decades immediately following WWII; 2) the crackdown phase beginning in the 1970s, which can be considered the spark of a new approach to French immigration policy; and 3) the current expression/iteration of French immigration policy in the 21st century.

In order to determine the state’s understanding of *sécurité* in relation to changing immigration policy, and how this understanding has changed over time with regard to Maghrebi Muslims, it is necessary to first address the three decades following WWII. This period is critical because the clear and open policy towards immigrants instituted at this time provides a meaningful contrast to subsequent

⁴ Kristine J. Ajrouch, “Global Contexts and the Veil: Muslim Integration in the United States and France.” *Sociology of Religion* 68, no. 3 (2007): 321-325.

decades which are marked by drastic departures from mid-20th century policies. Known as the *Trente Glorieuses*, the years 1945-1975 were characterized by tremendous economic prosperity and a pervasive sense of overall “well-being” among those in the state.⁵ Kaelble identifies the following as characteristic of the period: growth in state revenues and household incomes; corresponding changes in modes of life associated with mass consumption; the rise of industrial society; the state’s willingness to accept refugees from former colonies in decline; and an unprecedented decrease in unemployment.⁶ The corresponding immigration policy was simple: the state left French borders open, even to undocumented laborers, and invited immigrant workers to participate in boosting France’s GDP as their labor was needed initially to kick-start, and then subsequently to sustain, the rejuvenation of a post-war economy.⁷ During the *Trente Glorieuses*, France’s foreign population doubled from 1.7 million in 1946 to 3.4 million in 1975, Maghrebis being among the most prominent immigrant groups since the 1950s.⁸ Colonial history (or in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia, former protectorates) has compelled the Maghrebis to forge a distinctly close relationship with France, thus explaining patterns of frequent migration. Algeria, in particular, saw many émigrés move to France in the 1950s and 60s, as they sought to pursue opportunities for financial gain in France’s burgeoning

⁵ Hartmut Kaelble, “Vers une histoire sociale et culturelle de l’Europe pendant les années de l’après-prospérité,” *Vingtième Siècle Revue d’histoire*, no.84 (2004) : 170.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Eleonore Kofman, Madalina Rogoz, and Florence Lévy, “Family Migration Policies in France,” *Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research; Node Research; International Centre for Migration Policy Development* (2010), 4-5. Retrieved at: http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl_14977_276188113.pdf

⁸ Marissa Wong, “EU Immigration Trends and Policies: Spain and France as Case Studies,” *Jean Monnet/Robert Schumann Paper Series* (University of Miami) 13, no.10 (2013): 6.

economy after struggling to gain independence in 1962⁹. The influx of Maghrebis cannot be underestimated. Hargreaves writes:

Because Maghrebis dominated migratory inflows from the 1950s onwards, with a clear pattern of family settlement emerging during the 1960s, they and their descendants have been the most dynamic element in the pattern of ethnic relations which has unfolded in France since the mid-1970s.¹⁰

Since labor was in high demand for France during this period, and their injection into the workforce yielded tangible benefits to the state overall—in other words, since they played an integral role in starting and maintaining production and prosperity—foreign workers on the whole, *including* rapidly growing Maghrebi populations, were welcomed as vital contributors to the economy.¹¹

A Major Shift: 1970s and 1980s

However, the portrait of the *Trentes Glorieuses* stands in stark contrast to the decades that follow which are significant for their complete turnaround in politics, policy, and public perceptions, particularly towards North African migrants. Why was the influx of workers *now* being perceived as a threat? France was heading towards an economic downturn that would eventually lead to the desire to expel foreign workers who were preventing French-born citizens from being employed. By the 1970s, troubles accompanying the stagnation of incomes and the uncertainty and/or instability of employment were compounded by inflation and oil price hikes

⁹ Michael Collyer, “Explaining Change in Established Migration Systems: The Movement of Algerians to France and the UK” *Sussex Centre for Migration Research, Working Paper* no.16 (2003): 3.

¹⁰ Alec G. Hargreaves, *Immigration, ‘race’ and Ethnicity in Contemporary France* (Taylor & Francis, 1995), xvi.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 9

after the Middle Eastern crisis.¹² In 1974, France responded to grave challenges with a radical policy shift that colored future approaches of stemming migration: France closed its borders and aggressively combatted undocumented immigrants by sanctioning employers of “clandestine workers,” and increasing their expulsions from the state; this position is in stark contrast to the state’s decision barely a decade prior which “unofficially condone[d] the rapid influx of foreign labor,” since it was “not without usefulness.”¹³ Consider which groups of foreign workers were targeted by these measures. Center-right President Valerie D’Estaing stopped the hiring of new immigrant labor—a measure which lasted for two subsequent decades.¹⁴ As Minister of State for Immigrant Workers, Lionel Stoléru then sought to repatriate “non-European Community” workers—basically North Africans—in 1977, offering financial incentives to send many of the unskilled “Third World” immigrants back to their home countries and reduce their numbers in the French labor market.¹⁵ Other measures were put in place, *grâce à* Chirac, to discourage immigration by providing obstacles to family reunification—a pattern of entry typical of Maghrebis, particularly Algerians and Moroccans—through the denial of visas to family members of those already in France.¹⁶ Though the state eventually overturned these efforts as the “principal right” of “dependents wishing to join

¹² Kaelble, *Vers une histoire sociale et culturelle de l’Europe pendant les années de l’après-prospérité*, 173; Hargreaves, *Immigration, ‘race’ and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, 17

¹³ DeLey, “French Immigration Policy Since May 1981,” 200.

¹⁴ Hargreaves, *Immigration, ‘race’ and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, 17

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 19

¹⁶ Eleonore Kofman, Madalina Rogoz, and Florence Lévy, “Family Migration Policies in France,” *Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research; Node Research; International Centre for Migration Policy Development* (2010). Retrieved at: http://research.icmpd.org/fileadmin/Research-Website/Project_material/NODE/FR_Policy_Report_formatted7May.pdf

family heads in France”¹⁷ was too important to be superseded, the implications behind this policy were significant: they hinted at one of the earliest attempts to posit certain incoming groups as both “the other” and as a threat—this time, an economic one—worthy of expulsion from the state.

Where are we today?

Current immigration policy provisions have been relatively inconsistent: some concessions have been made in certain instances, while roadblocks have been erected in others. In July 2006, for example, legislation was passed by the Minister of the Interior to authorize the use of foreign labor for the first time since its ban in 1974¹⁸. However, there was a caveat of significant purport: only “selective immigration” (*politique immigration choisie*¹⁹) was permitted, as foreign laborers were allowed to accept specific jobs such as tourism, construction and public works, seasonal employment, and the commercial professions. The bill also stressed the importance of “chosen immigration,” implying that the demands of the state supersede any other factors that might motivate foreign workers to come to France.²⁰ Legislation in 2007 on the management of immigration, integration, and asylum reforms led to the current family reunification process, and counteracted

¹⁷ Hargreaves, *Immigration, ‘race’ and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, 17

¹⁸ José Paz and Jay Pinho, “Breaking the Status Quo: Sarkozy’s France, the European Union, and Immigration Reform,” *Humanity In Action*. Retrieved at: <http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/118-breaking-the-status-quo-sarkozy-s-france-the-european-union-and-immigration-reform>

¹⁹ Christophe Bertossi, “France: the State strives to shape ‘chosen’ immigration,” *Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale* (2008) Retrieved at: <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=24&ved=0CE4QFjADOBQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ifri.org%2Fdownloads%2Fcespi08.pdf&ei=wrpxU93KlaL4yQH YmYGAAQ&usg=AFQjCNEmyFf2RoIK47jagb3Ju4tFg64DA>

²⁰ *Ibid.*

some of the original reforms that eased the burden on families in 2006. The 2007 law requires that family members from ages 16 to 64 must demonstrate competency in the French language through an examination, and must prove the possession of “financial resources proportional with the size of the family.”²¹ Therefore, the constant revisions and supplemental clauses of legislation suggest that a consistent, uniform policy is difficult to forge.

Generally, however, it can be said that on the whole, some semblance of a trend in the early 2000s is notable. Between 2002 and 2007, the French government drafted “more-restrictive rules for family reunification and marriage, increased levels of expulsion of illegal immigrants, and set new restrictions on asylum seekers and naturalization.”²² In addition, a new dimension to cultural and religious regulations came into play and impacted immigrant communities: a law banning headscarves for women was passed in 2004²³, drastically altering the day-to-day existence of Muslim Maghrebi women, and in 2011, the burqa was also prohibited, as the full covering of one’s face in public places became banned through legislation.²⁴ Former President Nicolas Sarkozy championed the bans as he competed for popularity against the National Front, which has rapidly been gaining traction since the 1990s. The National Front under Marine Le Pen, who experienced

²¹ Eleonore Kofman, Madalina Rogoz, and Florence Lévy, “Family Migration Policies in France.”

²² Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia, *Frontiers of Fear: Immigration and Insecurity in the United States and Europe*, (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2012): 243.

²³ Elisa T. Beller, “The Headscarf Affair: The Conseil d’État on the Role of Religion and Culture in French

Society,” *Texas International Law Journal* 39, no. 4 (2004): 582.

²⁴ Soeren Kern, *The Islamization of France in 2013*, Gatestone Institute for International Policy (January 6, 2014). Retrieved at: <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4120/islamization-france>

remarkable electoral success in the 2012 presidential race, has continued to be vocal throughout Hollande's presidency, exhibiting traits in line with earlier crusades for "immigration zéro"—ending immigration to France— and vowing to pursue aggressive agendas if the Right should assume power in the coming years.²⁵ D'Appollonia²⁶ summarizes recent occurrences in a direct and comprehensive manner, arguing that the "accelerated securitization of immigration"—the notion that immigrants pose a legitimate concern for state security which should be reflected in new policies—has "[provided] further opportunities to mainstream parties to radicalize their discourse," consequently shaping the way Islam is framed by a country fearful of terrorism and of the loss of solidarity which relies on traditions that define French political culture.

Comparing Notions of Security: Labor and Employment Connotations

The calculus for the shift in immigration policy occurring in the 1970s and early 1980s has an arguably different tone from that which drives more recent legislation (1990s and 2000s) dealing with Maghrebi migrants. This suggests that the notion of *sécurité* with respect to this particular group has been redefined, depending on contextual conditions.

²⁵ Virginie Guiradon, *Immigration Policy in France: U.S.-France Analysis*, The Brookings Institute/National Center for Scientific Research (2002). Retrieved at: http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/francophone/brookings_immig.pdf

²⁶D'Appollonia, *Frontiers of Fear: Immigration and Insecurity in the United States and Europe*, 243

Providing meaningful theoretical analysis for explaining France in the 1970s, Hollifield aptly identifies employers, workers, and the state as the primary, legitimate stakeholders in immigration policy:

Workers...want to protect wages and working conditions. Therefore they will try to control the number of foreign workers and the conditions under which these workers will be employed. Employers may need foreign labor when it becomes difficult or impossible to recruit national workers for menial jobs. The question arises, therefore, to what extent can a government design and implement immigration policies that either incorporate the demands of major economic interest groups, bypass them in favor of some higher national interest, or simply allow the market to solve—or aggravate—the problem?²⁷

Such was the central question posed in the post-*Trente Glorieuses* period as “security” was understood within the context of employment, and the role of Maghrebi immigrants was understood mainly in terms of how they contributed to—or detracted from—the health of this dynamic enjoyed by native French citizens. Due to the economic recession and the oil crisis, foreign workers, (a large proportion of whom were North African), who previously took low-paying, low-skill manufacturing and service jobs²⁸ “came to be seen as a political and economic liability” and “efforts were made to stop further immigration and, wherever

²⁷ Hollifield, “Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes”, 114-115.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 116

possible, to encourage foreigners to return to their countries of origin.”²⁹ In other words, “it was no longer politically acceptable to have high levels of immigration while there was high unemployment among national workers.”³⁰ Hence, the state, when constrained by tight economic circumstances, was pressured to put a premium on the job security of French workers over immigrant labor, an idea that Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder of the National Front, would capitalize on in 1984 when pitching the slogan, “Two million immigrants are the cause of two million French people out of work.”³¹ This rhetoric, coupled with the actual hardships France was facing, provided the appropriate political climate for the resurrection of the Right’s anti-immigrant platform in an economic context: French citizens were entitled to state protection of their employment opportunities at the expense of “outsiders” (particularly “non-European Community” members).

Ironically, once the admission of new foreign workers in 1974 was halted, “the *settlement* of workers” actually increased—particularly among the North African Muslim community—and “the problems of providing housing, education, health care, and recreational facilities for the second and third generations became more acute in the late 1970s and 1980s.”³² Second and third generation Maghrebi Muslims were viewed with antagonism, as they were thought to “absorb” both state resources and potential national wealth. Also, their patterns of family settlement were perceived as more threatening to the state than the arrival of individual workers because of their long-term, rooted presence. As “outsiders” who supported

²⁹ Ibid., 114

³⁰ Ibid., 127

³¹ D’Appollonia, *Frontiers of Fear*, 241

³² Ibid., 120

themselves, they had little incentive to return to their home countries since family collectives established themselves in cultural and/or religious enclaves. As a result, “deeper penetration into the mainstream housing market” and the general visibility of immigrant children in schools and families in neighborhoods increased public awareness of Third World immigrants as an ever-present component of French society.³³ On one level, this raised the question as to what extent immigrants should be permitted to use public resources if they were not “fully French.” On an arguably more complex level, as Maghrebi settlements increased, the type of “security” demanded by actual citizens began to shift, leading to a national “existential crisis”: since repatriation incentives of the past were unsuccessful, the new issue gradually became centered on the notion that Maghrebi Muslims’ *identity* and *entrenchment* in local communities, rather than their presence strictly in the labor market, *threatened* to erode the security of the French state’s identity.

Comparing Notions of Security: State Identity and Safety

The 1990s and 2000s saw an arguably more aggressive tone to the defense of *sécurité*, adding complexity and greater nuance to the way the French state perceives the “threat” of Muslim immigrants. In political discourse and public policy, the notion of security as meaning protection for the identity of a *secular* French state steeped in uniquely French culture and history that is not ideologically compatible with Islam, has become foregrounded. Additionally, the literal meaning of security, as protection from direct, tangible harm of immigrant-led violence and criminality,

³³ Hargreaves, *Immigration, ‘race’ and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, 19

has dominated conversations with respect to North African populations. This understanding of Muslim immigrants as being a direct “threat” hinges on their cultural and religious identities rather than on their economic role as workers flooding the French employment market.

Consider the growing force of the notion that policy must protect and defend the secular French tradition and cultural identity from dilution or alteration. In the 1980s and 1990s, a new goal was taking shape: “the primacy of inculcating ‘Frenchness’ through education”³⁴ as *beurs*, second-generation immigrants from Algeria and Morocco, came of age. After the headscarf affair in 1989 (in which a principal at a middle school in Creil suspended three Muslim students for wearing headscarves in a public school), “widespread anxieties over the compatibility of Islamic culture with French norms” and “doubts over the commitment of young people of immigrant origin to the dominant value of French society”³⁵ transformed directly into policy and thus, this definition of the French identity’s *sécurité* became expressly manifested in legislation. The nationality law of 1993 “requires most immigrant-born children to request French nationality instead of receiving it automatically”³⁶ and many second generation Algerians argue that this law was intended to target them.³⁷ The headscarf controversy suggested that, from the state’s perspective, *sécurité* is compromised when the essence of “being French”—in

³⁴ Beller, “The Headscarf Affair: The Conseil d’État on the Role of Religion and Culture in French Society,” 590.

³⁵ Hargreaves, *Immigration, ‘race’ and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, 31

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 31

³⁷ Thomas Kirszbaum, Yaël Brinbaum, Patrick Simon, and Esin Gezer, “The Children of Immigrants in France: The Emergence of a Second Generation,” *Innocenti Working Papers: Special Series on Children in Immigrant Families in Affluent Societies* (UNICEF 2009), 12

this case, *laïcité*, or the separation of faith-based institutions and the state—is threatened with dilution by an influx of those whose primary loyalty lies with Islam rather than with the state’s founding political principles. France gained momentum in drafting policy that reflected this conception of security by the 21st century, as seen in 2004 and 2011 respectively, with laws banning headscarves and burqas. While state officials did not directly suggest that Islam itself is incompatible with French *laïcité* when explaining their rationale in 2004, reports did specify quite clearly that “*laïcité* is incompatible with a conception of religion that hopes to rule over...the social system or the political order.”³⁸ Thus, the question of security has been recently placed in the context of the degree to which solidarity in political culture can be maintained: a threat exists when divided allegiance to seemingly irreconcilable norms challenges state predominance.

According to Leiken, there is yet *another* iteration of “security” that has come to adopt great importance, particularly in the 21st century: “*insécurité*” is the “French code word for the combination of vandalism, delinquency, and hate crimes stemming from Muslim immigrant enclaves.”³⁹ How has this come about? Consider the context of recent events: the 2004 Madrid train bombings (committed by Moroccan immigrants),⁴⁰ the 2005 riots exacerbating tensions between French police and local Muslim immigrant youth,⁴¹ the attacks on 9/11, which had global ramifications on conceptions of Islam, and, most recently, the Toulouse shootings of

³⁸ Beller, “The Headscarf Affair: The Conseil d’État on the Role of Religion and Culture in French Society,” 582

³⁹ Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no.4 (2005): 123

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 125

⁴¹ Bruce Crumley, “The Problem of Clichy: After 2005 Riots, France’s Suburbs Are Still Miserable,” *Time* (December 7, 2012)

2012, in which radical Islamist Mohamed Merah—of Algerian descent—gunned down French schoolchildren.⁴² According to Leiken, Muslims in France are viewed as a threat because, unlike diffused Muslim populations in the United States that are oftentimes of the middle class and “ethnically fragmented,” they remain isolated in tight cultural and religious enclaves, retaining a strong connection to their home countries that allies them closely with their compatriots.⁴³

The recent resurgence of terrorist threats has sparked public dialogue that has mapped a reputation of violence and criminality onto the Muslim identity, particularly that of youths occupying impoverished corners of society. Major political figures have capitalized on this pervasive sense of fear in their platforms and policy proposals. Sarkozy, who “was forging his reputation as France’s tough law-and-order Interior Minister when the 2005 riots broke out... upped his anti-crime drive by frequently targeting unruly suburban youths he once infamously besmirched as ‘scum’ while hailing French police forces as heroes.”⁴⁴ His approach involved his strategic and “repeated embrace of anti-immigrant and Islamophobic themes.”⁴⁵ Marine Le Pen’s somewhat comparable, though considerably more xenophobic approach, weaves together aspirations of putting the brakes on immigration and of pursuing an aggressive crusade to end criminality in French *banlieues*, implicitly suggesting that there is a correlation between the two.⁴⁶ The National Front’s official agenda, as framed by the Le Pen dynasty, posits *sécurité* as

⁴² Kern, *The Islamization of France in 2013*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 122.

⁴⁴ Crumley, “The Problem of Clichy”

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Marine Le Pen, « Mon Projet, » *Le Site Officiel du Front National*, 2012, available at: http://www.frontnational.com/pdf/projet_mlp2012.pdf

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the “first of all liberties”⁴⁷ and has garnered support from “a significant portion of the electorate with its demagogic demand to expel Muslim immigrants from France.”⁴⁸

Concluding Remarks

Through the construction of parallel policy comparisons and ideological comparisons over time, this research suggests that 1) French immigration policy is dictated largely by contextual factors such as political and economic conditions and 2) the way in which the state defines security likely shapes the way it perceives, and handles, the “threat” espoused by outsiders, particularly North African Muslims.

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⁴⁷« La sécurité, première des libertés, » ,available at : <http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/autorite-de-letat/securite/>

⁴⁸ Guiradon, *Immigration Policy in France*

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The Intruder, Andrew Wyeth, Tempera on Panel, 1971

You call your dog back from the boulder that forks
the river where he has run away from your fishing
in the brown August haze. You call Ozzie to come
back to the shore and like that there is wind

and you push the top button of your flannel
into place. You're without your phone and as the sun
falls somewhere between the trees, again you call Ozzie
to come back because it's time for dinner. But he stares.

All your fear is gathered into this one acre, tail
tucked between its trembling legs. There was a boy
who once said to you that *fear was calling out in a dark
place and not hearing anything back*. Like your dog,

or like that boy, standing shirtless—back to you,
palms pushing against the doorframe. You've never
seen someone try to demand more space
from a room—you sat smoking, leaned

out your window. His name was Gabriel
and his phone buzzed on the nightstand
the entire time you were in bed
was because a hive of relatives

left voicemails, that his sister
had been in an accident. If only sympathy
were a story you know how to tell
when your name crawled off a tongue

to land at your feet. You cross the rocks
to your dog, no longer calling
his name. Ozzie barks—not at you, your hand
slipping beneath his collar to bring him back

to shore—at a squirrel, probably or a cluster
of foxes, invisible to you. You whistle low,
involuntary, your lips tight upon exhalation.
Leaves shift. A thing pulls back and beneath

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the growl of your tremble-ridden dog,
with his forest-bristled back, you hear footsteps,
a congress of colliding twigs cracking. Ozzie
retreats to the car, whimpers for you to follow

and so you follow and then you follow faster.
You never got in touch with Gabriel, that sweet
little tuft of blonde hair and a dead sister. You drive
home slowly with Ozzie still in the passenger seat.

No radio. Just gravel under the tires. Your shoulder
under your shirt. Telephone wires. The dirt
on your knuckles. Your dog. Out on your right, the space
that hides between the trees gets smaller, darker.

~ Matthew Massaia



The Intruder

Andrew Wyeth

1971

The Consequences of Essentializing in *Lilith's Brood*

Allison Adler

Biblical stories of human origins and redemption are some of the main discourses that define what it means to be human in the western world and thus have a significant influence on our goals, perceptions, and behaviors. Octavia Butler's *Lilith's Brood* re-writes aspects of these biblical stories, creating a new version of humanity born outside of innocence and presented with the potential to advance in a post-apocalyptic world through incorporation of the "other." In *Lilith's Brood* the "other" is a tentacled alien species called the Oankali, that desires to breed with humans so that the Oankali species may evolve. In order to achieve this, the Oankali establish a trade in which humans will reproduce with the Oankali, providing the Oankali with new genetic material, and, in return, will receive any advanced abilities the Oankali create through genetic manipulation. The relationship established through this trade challenges the western definition of the authentic or natural self posited by Biblical discourse, and introduces a new conception of self. Further, through the stories of half-human, half-alien constructs and their interactions with "pure" humans, Butler examines the consequences of human and Oankali attempts to essentialize the self and considers the ramifications this may have for life in a post-apocalyptic world.

The Book of Genesis establishes a humanity that has its origins in a perfect state of innocence and wholeness, a state to which we must strive to return. *Lilith's*

Brood, however, automatically begins by introducing the progenitor of a new type of humanity as a contrast to the innocent mother in Genesis. Bearing the name of the mother of demons who was cast out of Eden, Lilith is destined to give birth to children outside of innocence, a condition that is further exacerbated when it is revealed that her children will only be born through reproduction with a species resembling Medusa. The Oankali, with their “nest of snakes” call to mind the image of Satan in Genesis and are thus portrayed as evil or “the other” (Butler, 13). Further, Lilith’s children will not inhabit the innocent and perfect Eden of Genesis, but are born to a re-made Earth that contains poisonous plants and animals. Humans can only survive and reproduce in this environment through collaboration with and incorporation of the “other” just as the poisonous caterpillar “give[s] the tree a better chance to mature and produce food” (Butler, 307).

By establishing a world in which humanity must work with and incorporate the other, Butler challenges the Biblical script in which there must be “enmity” between the snake, the woman, and her offspring and a perpetual battle in which humanity “shall bruise [the snake’s] head, and [the snake] shall bruise [humanity’s] heel” (Genesis 3.15). Butler further translates the word “ooloi,” the name of Oankali who are neither male nor female, as “treasured stranger” and describes the mating combination of an ooloi and two humans as a “threefold unity,” as if creating a new holy trinity (220, 526). In this way, Butler elevates both the “other” and its incorporation with humanity, in effect establishing the “other” as holy. This challenges the human tendency to define the self in terms of the “other” and the tendency to label the “other” as evil or in opposition to the self. These ideas also

create hierarchy, as the effort to essentialize what it means to be human is also an attempt to package individuals neatly into set categories, thereby making it easier to place them in a particular order. These concepts are clearly set out in Genesis, as set categories like “good” and “evil” are established and the category of “evil” is assigned to the snake or the anti-human “other.” However, interactions with the Oankali redefine the Biblical conception of the human self by creating a humanity that is not superior to the other but integrated with it, as reproduction with the Oankali involves blending humans with Oankali and creating offspring that are half-human, half-Oankali.

Butler further challenges Biblical ideas of hierarchy by moving away from the idea that the mind and body are connected to a soul. In the Bible, those who are faithful to God “delight in the law of God in [their] inner being” or their soul, which Paul also refers to as “the law of [the] mind” (Romans 7.22). This “law of [the] mind” is seen as superior to the “law of sin that dwells in [one’s] members,” or the physical body. In fact, throughout *Lilith’s Brood*, several humans revolt at the thought of succumbing to the physical sensations produced by contact with the Oankali, a sentiment in line with Paul’s view that “the law of sin dwells in [one’s] members” (Romans 7.23). The Oankali, however, see the physical as the ultimate seat of morality as it allows them to “share any pain [they] caused” and makes them ethical beings who are careful to avoid causing harm. This contrasts with human morality as defined in the Bible, a morality centered in the mind and the soul. Butler challenges Biblical discourse by moving away from the idea of a soul and portraying the physical as “contain[ing] incredible potential” on its own (Butler, 24). The

Oankali reveal that human cells can be used to regenerate lost limbs, increase longevity, and allow the Oankali to “reshape themselves” (Butler, 41).

The Oankali also demonstrate the possibility contained in the physical through “a language of sensory images and accepted signals that [take] the place of words” (Butler, 238). Akin, Lilith’s son, is described as “converting” the Oankali through these physical sensations that appeal to both body and mind; this is a contrast to the Biblical reliance on the Word of God as the medium of conversion, which is a language that appeals primarily to the soul (Butler, 468). Similar to the Oankali, several humans succumb to this physical “conversion.” When Nikanj shares its feelings with Lilith, the physical sensation “gave her...a new color” and hinted at “a half known mystery beautiful and complex,” revealing the possibility contained in the physical (Butler, 226). By creating a diverse and virtuous physical domain, Butler challenges the view that the authentic human self contains a soul as the highest seat of morality and potential. In this way, interactions with the Oankali re-define the concept of the human self created in Biblical discourse by conceptualizing humans as physical beings with the physical domain as the site of their greatest potential.

However, despite their insistence that the human body is full of potential, the Oankali increasingly begin to limit this possibility through a view of humanity in line with biological determinism. The Oankali claim to understand the human body better than humans and view humanity as inherently flawed and genetically predisposed to place intelligence “at the service of ancient hierarchical tendencies,” what the Oankali refer to as “The Contradiction” (Butler, 378). In this way, the

Oankali essentialize humanity, confining them to a single idea of the authentic or natural human self. In addition to confining humans to a single idea of self, the Oankali also present humans with a single way of living that entails reproducing with the Oankali. Those who do not choose to reproduce with the Oankali are either confined to animated suspension or required to join resister villages. Life in resister villages is further depicted as an empty existence spent mourning the inability to have children and vainly attempting to reproduce human culture.

Just as human tendencies to define the authentic self are used to fit individuals into set categories, thereby making it easier to subjugate those considered less-than-authentic, so the Oankali mistakenly use their definition of the authentic human self to control humans. In the beginning of the novel, Jdaya tells Lilith “We’re not hierarchical...but we are powerfully acquisitive” (Butler, 41). However, in essentializing the human self, the Oankali act in a hierarchical way, preventing humans from capitalizing on the potential the Oankali wish to claim for themselves. Lilith highlights this when she states, “[Oankali] understand [human] feelings, eat [human] food, manipulate [human] genes” but claim they’re “too complex for [humans] to understand” (Butler, 225). Lilith’s commentary reveals how the Oankali conception of humans creates a double standard: while the Oankali view themselves as complex, and while they allow themselves to choose whether or not to reproduce with humans, the Oankali simplify the human self to a single truth and deny humans the same degree of independence. In fact, throughout *Lilith’s Brood*, there is an implication that the need for independence is a dimension of humanity Oankali do not fully understand. When Lilith tells Nikanj “it’s another

thing to [manipulate the genes of] intelligent, self-aware beings," Nikanj simply responds by saying "we do what we do" (Butler, 55).

Butler further explores the effects of essentializing through examining half-human, half-Oankali constructs and their interactions with resister humans. Because they are half-human and half-Oankali, Akin and Jodhas "skirt as close to the Contradiction as anyone has dared to go" (Butler, 475). Both constructs go against the limitations placed on them by the Oankali, humans, or both; these limitations are connected to human and Oankali attempts to essentialize what it means to be human. When it is revealed that Jodhas is a construct ooloi, his people refer to him as a "dangerous mistake" and come to a consensus that he must be brought to a ship (Butler, 545). Jodhas, however, refuses to follow this consensus and responds that, although he'd be able to adapt to life on a ship similar to how humans "adapted to not being able to see or hear or walk," none "of [the humans] chose to be so limited" (Butler, 609). Instead, Jodhas and his family go into exile, a period during which he loses a stable sense of self. Prior to finding human mates, Jodhas loses control of his body and finds it "easier to do as water does: allow [himself] to be contained, and take on the shape of my containers" (Butler, 612). In this way, Jodhas almost loses the framework that once held him together, a sense of self defined by his relationship with human mates. Jodhas' sibling Aaor, a second construct ooloi, also begins to lose its sense of self when it cannot find human mates and allows its body to revert to the brink of self-destruction.

Jodhas attempts to reclaim his sense of self by interacting with resister humans he encounters in the forest. With each human, Jodhas takes the shape of

whatever the individual most desires, defining himself in relation to his mate. However, in his attempt to reclaim his sense of self, Jodhas increasingly begins to essentialize humans. When Jodhas encounters Marina and Joao, he desires that they interact only with him, and he does not want to allow Nikanj to examine them. Additionally, Jodhas' desire for Jesusa and Tomás leads him to follow them through the forest, something Oankali wouldn't normally do. When Jesusa discovers this, she tells him, "I don't think I like your people if you're all compelled to do such things," indicating that, by eavesdropping, Jodhas violated their privacy and independence (Butler, 633). Jesusa points out to Jodhas, that humans "own themselves, they don't belong to you," something Jodhas initially does not understand (Butler, 637). By restricting human independence, Jodhas operates on the essentializing definition of humans adopted by the Oankali. His inability to allow humans to act on their own, a result of his attraction to their genetic contradiction, or a single idea of the human self, initially creates a barrier in his relationship with Jesusa and Tomás.

However, Jodhas begins to see the flaw in the Oankali conception of humanity first-hand when he enters Jesusa and Tomás' village and meets Santos. Jodhas notices that Santos is "free of the genetic disorder that Jesusa, Tomás, and so many other people of the village had" and yet he is "grotesque without it" (Butler, 708). This encounter presents Jodhas with the possibility that a human can act outside of the so-called genetic contradiction and therefore determine his own character and possibilities. Santos "d[oes] not veer from the Human norm in the same way as other people in the village" and Jodhas is surprised that he is able to overcome the so-called "human contradiction" so easily (Butler, 710). Unlike other

members of the village who are hesitant to abandon their teachings that “the devil ha[s] four arms,” Santos is “ready to leave his home with someone he has been taught to think of as a devil,” a decision he made on his own without being physically coaxed by an Oankali (Butler, 711, 713).

In this way, Jodhas realizes the limitations of the Oankali conception of humans, just as he realizes the limitations the Oankali placed on him when they discover that he was ooloi. Jodhas states that “ooloi treat individuals as they treated groups of beings” (Butler, 553). By essentializing humans, the Oankali are basically treating them as a group of beings, not as a group of individuals. Jodhas realizes the limitations of this prior to his exile when he tells Nikanj “I want them to accept me,” expressing his desire to be accepted as an individual, not essentialized as a mistake. In fact, only when Jodhas begins to treat humans as independent beings who can act outside of the so-called contradiction in a responsible, non-destructive way does he earn their love and trust. Rather than physically subduing the elders in Jesusa and Tomás’ village, Jodhas tells them to “examine [their] own memories” and negotiates with them (Butler, 729). When Jodhas tells Lilith at the end of the novel that Francisco only loves him because of his pheromones, Lilith tells him “At first, no doubt. By now, he loves you” (Butler, 740). In this way, Jodhas demonstrates that Oankali will be presented only with the potential to advance and create a new species once they go beyond limiting humans to a so-called genetic predisposition.

Similar to Jodhas, Akin also refuses to accept the limitations the Oankali have placed on him. In Akin’s case, he chooses to help humanity and present them with the opportunity to reproduce on Mars even though the Oankali warn him “it is a

cruelty" (Butler, 475). Similar to Jodhas, Akin recognizes the limitations of essentializing humans, as he also experiences the need to be recognized as an individual by resister humans. When Akin first meets Gabe and Tate, he feels excitement at meeting people who "seemed to care who he was, not just what he was" (Butler, 351). The human desire to maintain a definition of an authentic human self had previously restricted Akin to being viewed as sub-human. The men who kidnapped Akin only saw him for "what he was" and defined "who he was" according to his physical appearance and parentage. This is not dissimilar to Oankali efforts to essentialize what it means to be human. By limiting the human self to a genetic contradiction, the Oankali define humans according to an essentialized physical domain, confining the possibility they recognized in the beginning of the novel. Akin realizes that humans, like him, have a varied physical makeup and are therefore capable of making their own decisions. Like Jodhas, he realizes that humans must be treated as individuals, not essentialized as a group. This is expressed when Akin speaks to the Oankali about his decision to offer humans Mars and tells the Oankali "you should at least know them before you deny them the assurance that Oankali always claim for themselves" (Butler, 468). In this way, Akin reveals that humans must be granted the same rights as Oankali, and that by limiting humans and denying them that right, the Oankali are actually contradicting their non-hierarchical principles.

In a gesture that moves further away from Biblical stories, Butler establishes Akin as a type of savior. Akin's decision to help humanity and present it with the possibility of reproduction on Mars recalls Paul's assertion regarding the coming of

Christ that “the whole creation has been groaning together in the pains of childbirth until now” (Romans 8.22). Akin, like Jesus Christ, presents humanity with a solution to the pains of childbirth, which, in *Lilith’s Brood*, is the inability to produce fully human children. When Akin speaks of his mission to Yori, he says that he must “prepare the way,” a line reminiscent of Isaiah’s prophesy that God will “send [his] messenger before your face, who will prepare your way” (Butler, 498; Isaiah 40.3; Mark 1.2). Akin also describes the first inhabitants of Mars as “witnesses for their people,” just as John “came as a witness, to bear witness about the light” (Butler, 517; John 1.6). However, unlike Christ, Akin offers humanity a choice in which they can either reproduce on Mars or stay on Earth and reproduce with the Oankali. In both cases, however, humans must abandon their idea of the authentic human self. In the case of Mars, humanity must abandon the conception that humans are creatures of Earth, the original site of Eden. Similarly, in order to stay on Earth, they must renounce the need to define the self in terms of the “other.”

In this way, humanity, similar to the Oankali, can only advance once they abandon their idea of the authentic human self. By establishing a humanity born outside of innocence, Butler removes the original state of perfection that, to many, is the site of the authentic self constantly sought by humanity. The effort to reclaim an original state is seen through Lilith’s need to re-create a garden, seen in the efforts of resister humans to excavate pre-war sites, and the re-creation of the Biblical story of human origins. However, Butler portrays all of these efforts as futile when Lilith’s garden is destroyed, resister humans bring back the items that poisoned them in the first place, and Jesusa and Tomás’ village eventually abandons the beliefs held in

their origin story. In fact, only when this origin story and the single conception of the human self it creates are abandoned do humans renounce their conception of the Oankali as the evil “other” and gain the potential to advance.

Through examining the effects of essentializing, Butler implies that advancement can only be achieved by abandoning the tendency to essentialize. Both human and Oankali attempts to essentialize the human self create a barrier to true understanding and advancement. Additionally, by holding a single definition of self, both humans and Oankali confine humanity to a single end. The human conception of self created in Biblical discourse generates a humanity born of innocence, and thus establishes the end of humanity as the return to a similar Edenic state of innocence. This is seen in Revelations where the New Jerusalem contains the river of life “and on either side of the river, the tree of life...[with] leaves...for the healing of the nations” (Revelations 22.2). Similarly, the initial Oankali tendency to limit humans to a predetermined physical domain confined humanity to a single end that included reproducing with the Oankali. In both cases, the choice to conform to these ends presents humans with the possibility of eternal life. Those who conform to the end set out in the Bible will lead an eternal life in the New Jerusalem, while those who conform to the end set out by the Oankali will live eternally through their children. However, in both the Biblical scenario and the pre-construct Oankali scenario, there is no life for individuals who do not conform to these ends, which leaves no room for the difference and plurality present at the individual level.

In this way, Butler exposes the limitations of essentializing what it means to be human, which partially entails confining humanity to a single end. In *Lilith's*

Brood, the need to define the authentic human self not only confines resisters in a post-apocalyptic world, but also creates the situation that brought them to a post-apocalyptic state in the first place. In this way, Butler portrays the creation of a single authentic self as limiting humans to an endless cycle of self-destruction. Like the phoenix, resister humans seek to re-create themselves from the ashes of the same, thereby restoring the sense of self partially defined by Biblical discourse. Similarly, Oankali efforts to essentialize also confine them to a cycle of destruction. Jodhas points out that “Oankali [initially] make the mistake of treating Humans like children” which leads humans to “react with anger, resentment, and withdrawal” (Butler, 566). Humans who withdraw object to mating with Oankali, a decision that threatens Oanklai chances to reproduce and evolve, which would lead to the destruction of their species. Jodhas and Aaor physically embody this disaster when their inability to find human mates causes them to revert almost to the point of self-destruction.

Therefore, through moving away from Biblical discourse, Butler exposes the limitations of both human and Oankali attempts to create a single definition of the authentic human self. In both cases, the desire to essentialize is portrayed as self-destructive and limiting. While not denying the importance of Biblical discourse in the western world, Butler challenges the reader to examine it in a different way and suggests that eternal life in a post-apocalyptic world can only come through change and the recognition and incorporation of plurality. In this way, Butler implies that a truly linear apocalypse is one that continues to move forward rather than restoring the same and thus can only be achieved through a modification of our present ways

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and cultural paradigms. While it is not certain at the end of the third novel whether humanity will die or evolve, there is still a sense of hope as Jesusa tells the elders “there’s room here for many people” and Jodhas’ seed begins “the tiny positioning movements of independent life” (Butler, 746).

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Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Religion in *Emile*

Rayyan Alam

There is a great deal of controversy surrounding Rousseau's ideas regarding religion in his novel *Emile: Or, On Education*. These ideas are expressed through the character Savoyard Vicar who instructs Emile to discover freely the existence of God and the true nature of religion without the influence of exterior forces, namely the Church. Rousseau's ideas posed a deep threat to the Church which viewed any form of criticism as a challenge to its authority and influence over 18th-century citizens.

The question for the reader then becomes one of authorial intention: how similar are Rousseau's ideas to those professed by the Vicar? Often, scholars who have studied *Emile* correlate the controversial ideas of the "Profession of the Savoyard Vicar," one of the most famous sections of the novel, to Rousseau's personal religious views. Critics such as Ronald Grimsley strongly believe that despite the importance of the role of religion presented by the Vicar in molding a person, his views are simultaneously used as a representation of Rousseau's own personal beliefs (Grimsley, 50-58). On the other hand, scholars such as Jeffrey Macy believe Rousseau was in fact rather skeptical of a variety of the beliefs accepted by the Vicar. According to Macy, Rousseau tactfully uses the Vicar as a platform for conveying a greater, more significant idea of religious tolerance (Macy, 615-616). Both sides of the controversy contain valid arguments, but neither is completely correct in its assertions. A close reading of the novel indicates that Rousseau neither fully agrees nor disagrees with the Vicar's ideas; he did indeed favor many of the

Vicar's ideas without fully adopting them, while effectively "distorting" some of them in order to convey his more important idea of a new civil religion.

The first instance of Rousseau's disagreement with the Vicar's ideas occurs when the Vicar claims a life after death for those who have followed a path of justice. He argues that a life after death must indeed exist in order to compensate for the fact that while a mischievous, corrupt man prospers, an honorable and just man remains oppressed. He states:

...I say that they [good men] will be happy, because their Author, the Author of all justice, having created them as sensitive beings did not create them to suffer; ...Nevertheless, they suffered in this life and therefore they will be compensated in another. I am only supposing these are the laws of order and that God is constant to Himself.

(Emile, 284)

In other words, because it is not the just man's fault for not attaining happiness, it is God's duty to counteract his suffering on earth by presenting him with happiness in an afterlife. According to the Vicar, goodness in man is defined by his ability to love his fellow man, while the goodness of God is His ability to maintain order.

At first glance, Rousseau seems to support the Vicar's proof of the existence of a life after death in the author's quotation of Psalm 115. Yet, according to the scholar William Macy, upon closer analysis of the text, there is a subtlety that expresses Rousseau's uncertainty regarding a form of divine compensation in a life after death (Macy, 622). Psalm 115 is quoted as, "Not for us, not for us, Lord, / But for Your name, but for your own honor, / O God, make us live again!" (*Emile*, 284) In the third verse, Rousseau seemingly claims that God should grant man a life after death for the sake of His name and honor. However, this version of Psalm 115 is not from the authentic text of the Bible, but rather a reference to an ambiguous French

paraphrase of the Psalm (Macy, 620-625). The paraphrase, however, includes an additional line to the Psalm, resulting in a reversal of the initial meaning. The last verse of the Psalm states:

As to the Heavens, the heavens are God's (the Eternal's), but He has given the earth to the children of men./ The dead do not praise the Eternal, nor do those who have descended there, where one does not utter any word.
(Psalm 115, verses 16-17)

Essentially, the French paraphrase suggests that man's life is restricted to an earthly existence. It is difficult to ignore Rousseau's use of such a misleading paraphrase of Psalm 115. Similar to Macy, scholar Allan Bloom agrees that Rousseau was quite aware of the many passages within the Bible that certainly supported the idea of righteous people being rewarded with true happiness in a life after death (Bloom, 1-3). Both Bloom and Macy argue that if Rousseau did indeed agree with the Vicar's profession of faith, then he could have chosen any number of passages within the Bible to undoubtedly support the Vicar's ideas (Macy, 624-625). Yet instead, Rousseau chose to include one of the few Biblical passages that actually discredits the doctrine of a life after death.

Indeed, this evidence is circumstantial; however, it cannot be ignored that Rousseau did choose to include a paraphrase of a Biblical passage rather than to quote it verbatim. Macy and Bloom raise an interesting question: if Rousseau did intentionally twist the meaning of the Psalm, what motivated him to do so? Macy suggests that the Vicar was merely a means for Rousseau to convey his criticism of many Enlightenment philosophers' belief that political life could have been established based solely on human rationality and on the individual morals of

enlightened people (Macy, 615-616). Rousseau strongly opposed the widespread idea among Enlightenment philosophers that irrational and religious beliefs were not necessary to solidify society's ideas of justice and its political values. As Macy suggests, in Rousseau's criticism of Enlightenment philosophers contained in the profession of the Vicar, Rousseau introduces a new civil religion; therefore, Rousseau "distorted" particular elements of the Vicar's creed that he deemed beneficial for society, but that were not necessarily true (Macy, 630-632). This is evidenced by Rousseau's misrepresentation of Psalm 115.

Rousseau strongly believed that religion was instrumental in encouraging social order and stability. He certainly understood the potential consequences of religious fanaticism and religious intolerance; however, the political benefits of religious tolerance and a civil religion in a political dimension outweighed the negatives (Macy, 626). Rousseau expressed his support for a larger, more comprehensive idea of religious tolerance through the Vicar's teachings. For example, near the end of the Vicar's "Profession," Rousseau includes a footnote describing a Persian belief concerning the final Day of Judgment:

The Mohammedans say, according to Chardin, that after the examination which will follow the universal resurrection, all the bodies will pass over a bridge called Poul-Serrho which crosses over the eternal fire. This bridge, they say, can be called...the true final judgment, because it is there that the separation of the good from the wicked will be made.... (*Emile*, 490)

Here Rousseau argues that if a person is wronged or insulted, he/she can take comfort in knowing that on the last Day of Judgment, those who committed any wrongdoings will not pass over Poul-Serrho. The thrust of Rousseau's lesson in this passage is that people will continue to act morally and justly despite having been

wronged, in fear of a divine punishment or conversely, with hope of a divine reward. Therefore, Rousseau suggests that without such a religious belief, those who suffered injustice will grow resentful and bitter at the idea of wrongdoers going unpunished. More importantly, as Macy points out, Rousseau does not argue that Poul-Serrho exists, but advocates that regardless of the specifics of the Persian belief, the existence of a Divine power promotes justice in the minds of Persian citizens (Macy, 627). Similarly, Rousseau does not outwardly reject the Vicar's claim for a life after death because although he does not fully agree with this idea, Rousseau does believe in the benefits of such a faith in society.

Macy and Bloom have a compelling argument in support of Rousseau's intentions to use the Vicar as a mode of highlighting the importance of political pragmatism regarding religion. This is also evidenced in Rousseau's earlier works, such as *Julie*. The story centers around a young woman conflicted about living a life of virtue with a man she does not love, or living a life of vice with a man she loves solely. Interestingly, Rousseau depicts Julie's life of virtue with a man named Wolmar who in turn is an atheist. Rousseau purposefully presents Wolmar as an atheist to show the importance of religious tolerance. He uses Wolmar to make a distinction between public and private uses of reason. Wolmar is privately an atheist, but as a citizen of the State, he attends Church with his wife and family for the sake of encouraging public morality. In this way, Rousseau demonstrates that all people can use reason with free will either to accept or to reject religion, privately; however, to promote social stability and order, a civil religion is needed as a binding force in a community.

Many scholars such as Allan Bloom suggest that the ideas of religion expressed by the Vicar as a character are his alone, and do not reflect Rousseau's very different ideas. However, Lee MacLean argues in favor of quite a different role for the Vicar. Maclean hypothesizes that Rousseau used the Vicar as a shield against any negative feedback concerning his true opinions (Maclean, 50). In a time dominated by the Church and its ideas, it was bold of Rousseau to advocate religion based on self-discovery that did not include the Church's dogma. Thus, as Maclean suggests, with any criticism, Rousseau could easily manipulate the situation by saying that the Vicar was merely a character in his novel.

For example, the Vicar describes his second article of faith based on his observation of order in the world. He recognizes that indeed order exists, but he doesn't know why it does. To prove his point, the Vicar cites an example of a man seeing a watch for the first time. Although this man does not know what a watch is or what it is used for, he is still able to admire the watch's workmanship (Strauss, 470-471). Therefore, the Vicar does not know what the watch as whole is good for, but he does recognize that all of the pieces are made to work together. The Vicar adds to his second article of faith by attributing the order of the world to a higher governing power:

Nevertheless, if someone were to come to me and say that print thrown around at random had produced the *Aeneid* all in order, I would not deign to take a step back to verify the lie...But how many throws must I assume in order to make the combination credible? As for me, seeing only a single throw, I can give odds of infinity to one that what it produced is not the result of chance.

(*Emile*, 275-276)

In other words, a world full of such order cannot be the result of pure randomness and chance. The Vicar believes that there is a higher power, which he refers to as “intelligence” that must exist that is causing the order he sees in the world.

MacLean points to Rousseau’s personal letters as evidence of the similarity between Rousseau’s and the Vicar’s ideas. In his letter to Swiss pastor, Jacon Vernes dated February 1758, Rousseau says:

I have passed my life among unbelievers...whilst they were constructing their universe from a throw of a dice I was looking at that unity of purpose which showed me...a single author.
(Rousseau, *Letter to Beaumont*, 45-46)

Similar to the Vicar, Rousseau is rather skeptical of the view that a number of random occurrences, comparable to the rolling of a dice, could result in the formation of the universe (Maclean, 55). Furthermore, in Rousseau’s “Lettre à Franquières,” he continues to challenge the notion of chance in the creation of “intelligent life.” In the letter, Rousseau attempts to understand the opposing point of view, yet he repeatedly returns to the point that even under a microscope, an organic molecule is simply an organic molecule – it neither moves nor is capable of organizing itself into an intelligent being (Rousseau, *Letters*, 29). In fact, Rousseau continues to criticize advocates of a “material genesis” of intelligent life in his letter, stating:

You note, Monsieur, that the world was fortuitously arranged like the Roman Republic. In order for the parallel to be accurate, the Roman Republic should not have been composed of men but rather of pieces of wood. Show me clearly and sensibly the material generation of the first intelligent being, I will ask you nothing more.
(Rousseau, *Letter to Beaumont*, 30-32)

Therefore, as Maclean argues, the Vicar's ideas are in accordance with Rousseau's personal views on religion.

Furthermore, MacLean points to another letter that Rousseau wrote to his friend Moulto, dated December 1761, in which he admits to agreeing with the Vicar's beliefs as a whole. The letter was written in response to an incident that Rousseau experienced with a catheter that upset his urinary tract, causing Rousseau to believe that death was imminent. In the letter, Rousseau professes:

...you will easily conceive that the profession of faith of the Savoyard Vicar is mine. I desire too much that there be a God not to believe it, and I die with the firm confidence that I will find in His bosom the happiness and peace which I could not enjoy here below.

(MacLean, 100-101)

MacLean raises an interesting point; however, the circumstances of such a statement must be taken into account. When it comes to death, it is only natural for people to look to God for salvation. Therefore, Rousseau seemingly supports the Vicar's idea of a life after death, a life of eternal happiness, but it cannot be fully proven that Rousseau was in his "correct" state of mind while writing this letter. Hence, this letter must be considered with reservation.

Both arguments present valid points regarding the correlation between the Vicar's beliefs and Rousseau's personal views. But, Morris Dickstein offers the most accurate account of Rousseau's religious beliefs. As Dickstein points out, in *Letters Written from the Mountain*, Rousseau comments on Julie's profession at her deathbed scene, and the Vicar's profession in Book IV of *Emile* (Dickstein, 50). Rousseau says that each of the two works can be used to explain the other. As a result, it can be assumed that the author of both works, Rousseau, "...does not adopt

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the one and the other in their entirety, he favors them a lot" (*Letter to Beaumont*, 135). As Dickstein suggests, Rousseau makes an important distinction between adopting and favoring an idea. Essentially, Rousseau favors the Vicar's beliefs and profession but does not entirely adopt them for his personal use (Dickstein, 54). This opens up the possibility for Rousseau to oppose certain portions of the Vicar's teachings, as claimed by Macy and Bloom, while continuing to convey a message that promotes civil religion and tolerance.

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How the Neanderthal Genome Revealed the Human Lineage

Sophia Conti

The questions about our human origins have long held our species captive: Where did we come from? How long ago? Who are our ancestors? With every discovery of a hominid skeleton, these questions reignite impassioned debates which add more and more to our complex understanding of human ancestry. Perhaps the most baffling of these discoveries, and the subsequent debate on its importance, is the Neanderthal. But, with the advent of DNA amplification and sequencing techniques, we can know more than ever before about the genetic relationship between Neanderthals and modern humans.

There has been much discussion about where Neanderthals are located on the human evolutionary tree. The first Neanderthal type specimen was actually discovered several years prior to Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*, causing the widespread ridicule of the first proposal that Neanderthals may have been an early form of human (Kennedy, 1975, p. 3). But as more specimens were unearthed and the theory of evolution took root, that initial thought gained momentum, sparking several hypotheses regarding human evolution: how humans populated the Earth, and the Neanderthals' place in these processes.

The first of the two main hypotheses for human evolution and migration is the out-of-Africa replacement model. This model states that the human lineage evolved in Africa with *Homo erectus* comprising the first wave of migrations to Europe and

Asia. Anatomically modern humans evolved only in Africa and then formed a second wave of migration to other parts of the world gradually replacing earlier human forms (Templeton, 2002). The multiregional model states that *Homo sapiens* evolved from several populations of *Homo erectus* in different regions of the world. While there was geographic isolation between these groups, the gene flow was sufficient to create one continuous lineage of human ancestry (Templeton, 2002). The multiregional model has often been misinterpreted as multiple origins or parallel evolution, which suggest that *Homo sapiens* evolved independently across several regions of the world with little to no gene flow (Wolpoff et al, 2000).

Neanderthals are central to this debate because of their uncertain place on the human evolutionary tree. Their precise geographic location and their age make them a perfect test case for determining which evolutionary model is the most accurate. The extent of the human-Neanderthal admixture and gene flow can establish whether human ancestry follows the replacement model or one consistent human lineage; in other words, it can determine whether Neanderthals are a direct ancestor of modern humans or if they share a common ancestor (Pääbo, 2014, p.72). In order to accomplish this, the Neanderthal genome must be sequenced and compared to the human genome sequence. Through this, we can see whether some percentage of our genetic makeup can be attributed to Neanderthals.

The quest to sequence the Neanderthal genome was initiated by Svante Pääbo, a Swedish geneticist whose first venture into ancient DNA was with Egyptian mummies (Pääbo, 2014, p.23). Pääbo's early work with the ancient DNA of mummies and the quagga (an extinct subspecies of zebra), yielded enormous

advances in the DNA technology that was available at the time. To clone mummy DNA in his first experiments, Pääbo had to create plasmid-mummy DNA molecules which were then mixed with bacteria that grew in culture (Pääbo, 2014, p.32). Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) revolutionized Pääbo's work when it was developed in the late 1980s. The automation of PCR was also integral to Pääbo's work.

PCR is a DNA amplification technique that uses cycles of heating and cooling to separate strands of DNA. Complementary primers are then bonded to the ends of each strand, causing the replication of each strand (OpenStax, 2013, p.458). Each cycle of PCR yields exponentially more DNA strands. The development of PCR (and its subsequent automation) allowed for the much faster amplification of often miniscule DNA fragments that were extracted from ancient bones. While not entirely avoiding contamination, this process certainly caused less contamination than mixing DNA fragments with bacteria (Pääbo, 2014).

To sequence the Neanderthal genome, Pääbo first had to obtain a sample. As Neanderthal bones are few and fragile, this was not a simple task. Scientific and political pressures created several roadblocks to obtaining such a sample, but one was eventually procured. His first sample was 3.5 grams of compact bone from the original Neanderthal type specimen from Neander Valley which is housed at the museum in Bonn, Germany (Pääbo, 2014, p.72).

Once the bone sample was procured, the bigger challenge was isolating actual Neanderthal DNA fragments from the bone. Due to years of handling without sterile conditions, the Neanderthal bones were infiltrated with high levels of modern

human DNA. In one instance, Pääbo actually saw a curator *lick* a bone to determine whether or not it had been treated with varnish (Pääbo, 2014, p.64). Methods for isolating DNA and subsequent PCR amplification often yielded strands of modern human DNA.

These frustrations led to extreme precautions by Pääbo and his laboratory teams. Together, they set up extensive clean rooms in which did not allow anything except ancient DNA to be handled. There were also strict decontamination policies in place for any graduate student or lab worker who wished to enter the clean room. When Pääbo was invited to be a founder of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, he was able to design a clean room precisely to his specifications which included an entrance separate from that of the main laboratory in which modern DNA was sequenced (Pääbo, 2014, p.87).

Several other factors were important in successfully sequencing Neanderthal DNA from these ancient bone samples. The first was designing primers for PCR that were specific enough to only amplify non-human sequences (Krings et al., 1997). Another was the establishment of control amplification sequences. This included the parallel amplification of supposed Neanderthal sequences, a human sequence, and a blank sequence which served to determine whether there were any contaminants in the sample (Pääbo, 2014). Finally, Pääbo and his team also discovered that amplifying shorter strands of the fragile DNA yielded better results than attempting to sequence longer strands. The sequenced strands were roughly 100 base pairs long (Krings et al., 1997)

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These precautions and methods were created through trial and error of extracting DNA. The search at first focused only on mitochondrial DNA.

Mitochondrial DNA is ideal for ancient sequences because there are hundreds of copies in each cell, as opposed to only two copies on nuclear DNA. Because of this, mitochondrial DNA has a much higher chance of surviving the destructive environments in which bones are preserved than does nuclear DNA (Pääbo, 2014).

Mitochondrial DNA has two other traits that make it ideally suited for studying evolutionary relationships. First, it mutates at a much faster rate than nuclear DNA. Second, it is only passed down through the mother of an individual (OpenStax College, 2013, p.477). Because of this, the DNA does not go through meiosis or any of the normal patterns of genetic variation that nuclear DNA does. Mitochondrial DNA, then, does not vary except through mutation, which allows the precise analysis of evolutionary relationships (Jurmain et al, 2012). This allows geneticists to create evolutionary genealogies that are more accurate than those that may be created with nuclear DNA. Mitochondrial DNA has also yielded the concept of the “mitochondrial Eve,” which proposes that there is only one female Homo sapiens to whom all modern humans can trace their mitochondrial DNA (Pääbo, 2014, p. 14).

The successful sequencing of Neanderthal mitochondrial DNA was achieved in 1996 (Pääbo, 2014). The phylogenetic analysis resulting from comparisons of the Neanderthal sequence to those of humans and chimpanzees showed that Neanderthals diverged from the human lineage between 550,000 and 690,000 years ago (Krings et al, 1997). This divergence would have taken place prior to the “Mitochondrial Eve” of modern humans, meaning that Neanderthals did not

contribute to the mitochondrial DNA of modern humans (Krings et al, 1997). Paleoanthropologists and evolutionary biologists who upheld the multiregional model of human evolution were quite upset: these results disputed their belief that Neanderthals were a direct ancestor of modern humans. Another important find from the sequence comparison was that modern Europeans were no more closely related to Neanderthals than any other living human, implying that no gene flow had taken place between Neanderthals and early modern humans.

Prompted by the outcry from multiregionalists, Pääbo and others continued to work on the Neanderthal genome. A comparatively brief experiment in which Neanderthal mitochondrial DNA sequences were compared to the same sequences in early modern humans to determine whether there had been some gene flow between the Neanderthal and early human populations turned up nothing, and Pääbo decided to extend his work to sequencing the Neanderthal nuclear genome (Pääbo, 2014, p.98). Sequencing the full nuclear genome would quell the objections of multiregionalists whether they were proven right or wrong.

The nuclear genome was much more challenging to sequence. Because nuclear DNA has only two copies, it does not preserve as well. What little DNA was preserved could only be sequenced in short fragments, which meant that at least twenty grams of bone would be needed in order to sequence the entire three billion base pairs of the Neanderthal genome (Pääbo, 2014, p.128). The enormity of the nuclear sequence (mitochondrial DNA has only 16,500 base pair) would allow for a much more thorough analysis of the relationship between humans and

Neanderthals. This next phase of research also focused much more on whether humans and Neanderthals had interbred, and if so, to what extent.

The sequencing of the nuclear genome was accompanied by many more advances in sequencing and amplification such as shotgun sequencing. The new results showed a common ancestor between humans and Neanderthals at about 830,000 years ago, while the common ancestor for all modern humans clocked in at about 700,00 years ago (Pääbo, 2014, p.186). The analyses also showed that Neanderthals were about 2% more similar to non-Africans than to Africans, once again bringing to light the question of Neanderthal-human admixture (Pääbo, 2014, p.189).

Ultimately, Pääbo and other researchers came to the conclusion that there had been gene flow between modern humans and Neanderthals (Pääbo, 2014). These conclusions came from the extra 2% of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) that occur in all populations outside of Africa and are similar to the Neanderthal sequence. The archaeological record shows that early modern humans and Neanderthals occupied the same region of the Middle East for thousands of years, and contact was more than likely as there is uniform technology throughout the region for this time period (Pääbo, 2014).

These implications do not favor multiregionalists. Interbreeding may in fact be a manner in which early modern humans replaced Neanderthal populations in the Middle East and even Europe. Either way, what can no longer be denied, is that as Pääbo writes, "The Neanderthals live on in many of us today" (Pääbo, 2014, p.

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199). At some point Neanderthals and modern humans came in contact, and we carry that DNA as an “internal fossil,” a testament to those before us.

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The First Crusade: Pope Urban II and Jerusalem vs. Diplomatic Unification

Alexandra Wurglics

Pope Urban II (1088-1099) could not have realized the enormity of his decision to call for the First Crusade. What was initially conceived of as a single, penitential expedition ended up sparking a long series of Holy Wars that shaped the culture, people, and history of Europe and the Middle East. The origins of crusading, fighting in God's name, and the merging of feudal society with the Church, began to take shape in France in the middle of the 11th century during the time of Pope Urban's upbringing. Securing the papacy and becoming the head of the Roman Catholic Church, Urban wielded great power which he used to promote crusading as he called for members of the Church to join together in the First Crusade. His famous speech at the Council of Clermont not only proved his power as pope, but also sparked great interest in the Crusade, more than he expected.

Once he witnessed the enthusiasm of the Crusaders, Pope Urban II realized that the goals of the Crusade, specifically the reconquest of Jerusalem, could be achieved. Historians posit that as a result of this positive reception, the papacy developed additional goals for the Crusade including the stabilization and unification of diplomatic relations between the Eastern and Western Churches in order to make the Church a stronger force in the East. Some historians, such as Carl Erdmann and Hans Mayer, view Pope Urban's actions preceding the First Crusade as justification for this broader goal of unification, while others, such as H. E. J.

Cowdrey and Johnathan Riley-Smith, argue that Urban's speeches addressed the reconquest of Jerusalem as the Crusade's main objective. Whatever his motives, Pope Urban II's background, position as pope, and persuasive speeches created a climate of enthusiasm which helped persuade the Crusaders to take back Jerusalem.

Pope Urban II's Background

Pope Urban II's experiences and the events leading up to the official beginning of the First Crusade helped shape the motives and overall goals set by the papacy. Papal control was challenged during the 1080s when Archbishop Wibert of Ravenna named himself Pope Clement III (1080-1100) and challenged the Gregorian papacy. With two active popes, the Church's power was compromised, and maintaining control was difficult. Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085) was forced into exile to Salerno, Italy.¹ Clement remained the anti-pope during Urban II's entire reign, and he occupied Rome during the majority of Urban's pontificate. Urban, however, often traveled outside of Italy in order to secure his relationships with churches and communities. In this way, he kept connected to many areas across Europe and helped create stability and control for the Church and the papacy.

Because of his background prior to becoming pope, Urban had already formed his own ideas concerning religious warfare and reform. As a monk and prior of Cluny, Urban was exposed to Benedictine viewpoints concerning knighthood. He

¹ Robert Somerville, *Pope Urban II's Council of Piacenza* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1-2.

had the “deepest sympathy for the movement of Christian knighthood”² which eventually became a formidable force in the Crusades. Subsequent to his time as a monk, Urban became a cardinal and papal legate under Pope Gregory VII, and was a fervent supporter of Gregory’s reform agenda. Pope Urban II devoted his energy to promoting the Crusades as well as to the unification of the Church whose power was rapidly declining.

The spark that ignited these ideas was Emperor Alexius I’s (r.1081-1118) request at the Council of Piacenza in March, 1095. Emperor Alexius had taken an army east to Constantinople and the surrounding areas in order to reclaim land for the Christians and sought reinforcements from Pope Urban at the council. He “implored the pontiff and all the ‘faithful of Christ’ ... to provide assistance for the defense ‘of the holy church’ ... which the ‘pagans’ had devastated up to the walls of Constantinople.”³ Urban urged the men to promise God to aid in the fighting. Putting aside for a moment the question of whether Urban’s response was a spontaneous reaction or a premeditated act that was part of a much larger plan, the request at Piacenza constituted the beginning of the First Crusade.

The Council of Clermont and Urban’s Speech

The Council of Clermont held a few months after Piacenza in November, 1095, more directly introduced the idea of crusading to reclaim the Levant from “pagans” or people with religious beliefs other than Christian (mostly the Turks and

² Carl Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusading* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 307.

³ Robert Somerville, *Pope Urban II’s Council of Piacenza*, 15.

Persians during this Crusade).⁴ Pope Urban's now famous speech during the council would be reported by several eyewitnesses and subsequent chroniclers. It was responsible for calling crusaders to fight, and it established the goals of the Crusade. In the account of one eyewitness, Robert the Monk, Urban proclaimed and denounced the horrors of the pagans and their actions toward their fellow Christian brothers: "the race of Persians, a foreign people and a people rejected by God ... has invaded the lands of [the] Christians, depopulated them by slaughter and plunder and arson, kidnapped some of the Christians and ... put others to a wretched death, and has either overthrown the churches of God or turned them over to the rituals of their own religion."⁵ After explaining these cruel realities, he then called people to action, particularly the knights, using the phrase, "God wills it!" as justification for crusading,⁶ and explained the importance of Jerusalem as the "navel of the Earth" and a "land more fruitful than any other"⁷ that needed to be reclaimed for Christianity. Urban also reinforced the ideas that this enterprise was a pilgrimage and mission demanded by God, not commanded by men. With that, a penance was instituted for anyone who returned after serving in the fight, and this provided greater proof for the people that this was an act issued by God to do His work and to

⁴ Clermont, France was the city chosen for such an important council because Urban was French and wanted to recruit Frenchmen first; Johnathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 13. Because of his noble upbringing, he understood how to appeal to his own countrymen as well as to the knighthood. In Baldric of Dol's account of Urban's major speech at Clermont, Urban is recalled appealing to his audience's sense of knightly duties: "If ... you wish to be mindful of your souls, either lay down the girdle of ... knighthood, or advance boldly, as knights of Christ, and rush as quickly as you can to the defense of the Eastern Church," Baldric of Dol, *The First Crusade*, ed. Edward Peters (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 31.

⁵ Robert the Monk, *History of the First Crusade - Historia Iherosolimitana*, trans. Carol Sweetenham (Hants: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 79.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 81.

save His sacred land.⁸

The main quandary faced by present day historians is that many of the contemporary accounts of the Council of Clermont, and Urban's speech specifically, were not written by reliable eyewitnesses, but rather, were second hand accounts recorded after the First Crusade had ended. This issue with historiography leads to many variations in the record. The various authors had their own viewpoints and biases, particularly if they were writing the account after the First Crusade had concluded. For example, Archbishop Baldric of Dol wrote his account in 1108, after the conclusion of the Crusade, and does not focus on Jerusalem as much as the eyewitness account of Robert the Monk. Baldric mentions that the men will battle for Jerusalem, but he does not put emphasis on it.⁹ This might indicate that Jerusalem was not as important to the Crusaders as it was depicted before the actual battles began. Some sources, such as the account of Robert of Rheims, are much closer to eyewitness sources. He included references to Jerusalem as the "navel of the world" depicting the city in a very important light.¹⁰ Crusaders wearing crosses are also mentioned in Robert of Rheims' account just as in Robert the Monk's, but this fact it is not included in Baldric's writings. These variants lead readers and historians to question the validity of some sources, but while simultaneously allowing them to explore different viewpoints and perspectives of one main event. In this way, the documents as a whole become a great puzzle that has pieced together the struggles and doubts of the time.

⁸ Ibid., 82-83.

⁹ Guibert of Nogent, *The First Crusade*, 33-34.

¹⁰ Robert of Rheims, *The First Crusade*, 28.

Pope Urban knew that his speech at Clermont was going to be the backbone of the recruitment campaign, so he made sure to emphasize the proper motives and divine callings for going on Crusade. He commanded all bishops to give penance to Crusaders who went on the pilgrimage. According to Baldric, Urban said that “When [the Crusaders] have confessed the disgrace of their sins, ...grant them speedy pardon.”¹¹ In Guibert of Nogent’s account of the speech, Urban “commanded that if anyone ... after taking openly the vow [to go on the Crusade], should shrink from his good intent through base change of heart, ... he should be regarded as an outlaw forever, unless he repented and again undertook whatever of his pledge he had omitted.”¹² A Crusade was not a journey to be taken lightly, but rather a pilgrimage with a higher purpose. According to Robert of Rheims’s account, Urban declared that the Crusaders were to “make [their vows] to God ... and shall offer [themselves] to Him as a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God.”¹³ Specifically using biblical language, Urban attempted to convey to his listeners the true meaning and higher calling of the Crusades. As the papacy explicitly expressed, this war was a religious war commanded by God to do His work and to liberate the Holy Land for His people, the Christians.

Johnathan Riley-Smith notes that the Crusaders who went on this pilgrimage left for several reasons. Some went because they wanted their sins to be forgiven. Hans Mayer remarked that “the offer of indulgence must have had an irresistible attraction for those who did not doubt the Church’s teaching, who believed in the

¹¹ Baldric of Dol, *The First Crusade*, 32.

¹² Guibert of Nogent, *The First Crusade*, 37.

¹³ Robert of Rheims, *The First Crusade*, 29.

reality of penalties due to sin, or at least accepted the possibility of their existence.”¹⁴ The absolution of sins as a reward for going on a Crusade was a powerful attraction for many. Others went on a *peregrinatio religiosa*, a type of pilgrimage that did not include an official declaration of sins to a clergyman, but that was more of a personal pilgrimage. Still others became Crusaders in order to begin new lives in Jerusalem, the Christian religious capital of the world, while others were forced to leave due to family circumstances.¹⁵ At this time, land was scarce and fathers did not want to divide their land, resulting in only the first-born male marrying. The other males in the family could join the Crusade “to make themselves scarce.”¹⁶

In his speech, Pope Urban expressed the importance of Jerusalem. Besides referring to it as the “navel of the Earth”, Urban also commented that “Jerusalem was “[begging] and [craving] to be free, and [praying] endlessly for [Crusaders] to come to her aid. It is [their] help she particularly [sought] because God [had] granted [them] outstanding glory in war above all other nations. ... So [Crusaders should] seize this road to obtain the remission of sins” and take back Jerusalem.¹⁷ As a city with major religious landmarks such as the Church of the Holy Sepulcher and the Jewish Temple, Jerusalem became the epitome of God’s presence and the focal point of the Crusades.

¹⁴ Hans Eberhard Mayer, *The Crusades*, trans. John Gillingham (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 40.

¹⁵ Johnathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005) 11-12.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 19-20.

¹⁷ Robert the Monk, *History of the First Crusade*, 81.

What Urban may not have realized at the time of his oration was that he actually transformed the notion of a pilgrimage; this change ultimately helped attract different types of groups to the Crusade. Riley-Smith comments that Urban merged the two types of pilgrimages, the *peregrinatio religiosa* and the penitential pilgrimage, to form a pilgrimage that was voluntary yet based in absolution. In this way, Urban appealed not only to the volunteers who acted out of love for God, but also specifically to the knights and nobles who could neither find penance in ordinary lives nor leave their weapons to embark on a solo pilgrimage.¹⁸ At this time, men would lose status in society if they “[undertook] a severe penance which did not entail the abandonment of their profession of arms and the humiliating loss of status involved in pilgrimaging abroad as normal penitents, without weapons, equipment, and horses.”¹⁹ In this way, the Crusade became a war used to help nobles and knights – as well as the Church – by providing a seasoned, knowledgeable, and well-organized force to fight the Muslims in the East. However, historians have acknowledged that some knights may have participated in the Crusade for other reasons. According to Riley-Smith, some of the knights that Urban appealed to joined the pilgrimage because of ““honour and money,”” not religious reasons *per se*.²⁰ They were more concerned with their status in society as well as the benefits that the Crusade would have for them. The greed exhibited by the knights would become a prominent theme in several accounts written by Crusaders or men on the pilgrimage. Fulcher of Chartres, for example, explained that “[the

¹⁸ Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 13.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

²⁰ Riley-Smith, *The Idea of Crusading*, 41.

Crusaders] entered the homes of the citizens, seizing whatever they found in them... [and] whoever had entered the home first ... was to have ... whatever he had found in it. ... [M]any poor men became rich.”²¹

Although this new form of pilgrimage and Pope Urban’s affinity for the knightly class drew many knights into the Crusade, other groups – women, children, and the poor – joined as well. Many poor people were drawn to the prospect of starting a new life in the Holy Land. They had no intention of returning home.²² Other people may have joined the Crusade because they were greedy and wanted to keep the spoils procured while invading villages. Riley-Smith points out that the “early Crusades were little more than large-scale plundering expeditions” that “no doubt ... attracted violent individuals.”²³ This was definitely not the purpose of the Crusades, according to the papacy, and it was a concern at the Council of Clermont.

Less of a concern, but more of a surprise, were women Crusaders. Women were allowed to accompany their husbands or brothers who embarked on the Crusade (as long as they had special approval from the clergy), but they were put to work in the camps as nurses and cooks rather than on the battlefield.²⁴ Some, such as the wealthy noblewoman Emerias, felt called to go on Crusade and went to her local clergy for approval.²⁵ When she asked for her bishop’s blessing and for absolution, he suggested to her that instead of going to battle, she should open a

²¹ Fulcher of Chartres, *The First Crusade*, 92.

²² Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 18.

²³ *Ibid.*, 19.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁵ Riley-Smith, *The Idea of Crusading*, 35. As noted by Riley-Smith, there was no screening of crusaders at this time because of their sheer numbers. Urban relied on parish priests to not only recruit, but also to help determine who was fit to participate. All clergymen held some power in deciding who went on Crusade and if they received penance or not.

hospice to take care of the poor. This would substitute as her penance.²⁶ In this way, the clergy could select or dissuade members, especially women, from joining the fight.

Pope Urban II's call to the Crusade happened to coincide with a series of ergotism outbreaks. In the 1090s, France experienced several years of droughts, poor harvests, and shortages in food. Because of these circumstances, this disease, which was caused by eating moldy rye found in bread, was running rampant.²⁷ Known for leading to insanity and death, ergotism was feared by all, and many joined the Crusade to escape. Although this motive was clearly not religious, Urban himself foresaw it as a possible factor when he observed the effects of the disease in his travels through France.²⁸

One group that Urban was very specific about not allowing to embark on the Crusade was the clergy. In his speech at Clermont, Urban specifically said, "No priest or cleric irrespective of his rank shall be allowed on pilgrimage without the permission of his bishop, since it would be of little use to them if they were to go without such permission."²⁹ Of course, clergymen were needed at home to continue their pastoral duties, but Urban also explained that, "[the papacy does] not want those who have abandoned the world and have vowed themselves to spiritual welfare either to bear arms or to go on this journey; [the papacy went] so far as to forbid them to do so."³⁰ Urban, a monk himself, refused to let monks go on Crusade

²⁶ Riley-Smith, *The Idea of Crusading*, 35.

²⁷ Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 18.

²⁸ Riley-Smith, *The Idea of Crusading*, 35.

²⁹ Robert the Monk, *History of the First Crusade*, 82.

³⁰ Riley-Smith, *The Idea of Crusading*, 26.

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because taking such action would go against all of the vows that they had taken. The Crusade, a holy war as promoted by the papacy and Church, would not be a reason to break promises with God, but rather, to reaffirm old vows and foster new promises. Besides, clergymen were needed in their home parishes to give penances to Crusaders and help determine the best people to embark on the journey. The clergy was responsible for the laity; the laity would carry out the Crusade.

To help ensure that Crusaders were embarking on this pilgrimage for penitential or devotional reasons, Urban ordered all Crusaders to wear crosses around their necks or on their foreheads. In this way, they were not only declaring their intention to fight for the Church and for God, but they were also easily identifiable. Reportedly, Urban specified at Clermont that “Anyone who has a mind to undertake this holy pilgrimage, and enters into bargain with God, and devotes himself as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable, shall wear the sign of the Cross on his forehead or his chest. And conversely anyone who seeks to turn back having taken the vow shall place the cross on his back between his shoulders.”³¹ In this way, the papacy could ensure that people were embarking on the Crusade for religious reasons. Also, if they came back before their penance was completed, they returned in shame with the weight of the cross on their backs just as Jesus carried His own wooden cross with the burden of man’s sin.

With the tremendous response from knights, the poor, women, and regular laymen, it is estimated that there were around 127,000 recruits for the First Crusade. About 85,000 were involved in the fighting at some point during the

³¹ Robert the Monk, *History of the First Crusade*, 82.

pilgrimage. Around 7,000 are estimated to have been knights, while about 15,000 were thought to be poorer Crusaders. It is also notable that many people who took up the cross did not even leave for the Crusade. Of the men initially recruited, perhaps as many as 40,000 never even began the journey to Jerusalem.³²

Main Goal of the Crusades

Since the response for crusading was much greater than the papacy expected, it has been proposed that the papacy not only called for the reclamation of Jerusalem as a Christian city, but also wanted, more importantly, to unify the diplomatic relations between the Eastern Churches, thus strengthening the Church community. Carl Erdmann and Hans Mayer argue that the main goal of the Crusade was the unification of the Eastern Churches, while H.E. J. Cowdrey and Johnathan Riley-Smith argue the opposite – Jerusalem was, and forever will be, considered the reason for the First Crusade.

Basing his argument on Pope Urban II's actions leading up to the First Crusade, Erdmann goes back to the Council of Piacenza where he believed Urban's actions to help Emperor Alexius were deliberate and well thought out prior to the council. The decision to send troops to aid Alexius in the East was not made on a whim.³³ Erdmann argues that the months leading up to the Council of Clermont, in which Urban traveled in a "zigzag route" across France, actually "[corresponded] to the crusading plans that he solemnly announced at Clermont."³⁴ The call to take

³² Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 18.

³³ Erdmann, *Origin of the Idea of Crusading*, 325-327.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 328-329. It is important to note that Urban's travels to many smaller towns throughout France were extremely beneficial to the crusading movement. Most of the people that he visited had never come into contact with someone with so much authority, never mind a pope.

back Jerusalem was merely the motive used in his speech at Clermont to attract more people to fight. Erdmann sees brilliant intent in Urban's inclusion of crusading as a penitential act and pilgrimage in the Clermont speech.³⁵ In this way, Urban combined the idea of a pilgrimage with the idea of a holy war, creating the ultimate platform for enthusiastic crusaders to carry out the goals of the papacy. Jerusalem, in Erdmann's eyes, was a "recurring device" that was enhanced by "popular thinking" as the unification motive of the Crusades fell victim to "mass simplification."³⁶ People considered the reconquest of Jerusalem to be the real motive in this light.

Hans Mayer agrees with Erdmann that the First Crusade was primarily concerned with the diplomatic unification of the Eastern Churches, but he also takes Erdmann's "popular thinking" hypothesis one step further. Agreeing that Crusaders needed a "concrete goal," Mayer continues to say that the Crusaders, especially the poorer, less educated volunteers, transformed the goal of the Crusade into something that they could understand and cling to.³⁷ They did not fully grasp the concept and importance of the unification of the Latin and Greek Churches. They did, though, fully understand what Jerusalem was and what it symbolized. As Mayer describes it, "[Jerusalem] was a keyword which produced particular psychological reactions and conjured up particular eschatological notions."³⁸ It sparked many thoughts of biblical writings that depict Jerusalem as not only the holy place of Jesus'

When he preached, they clung to his every word. They were more inclined to listen to Urban and hear the call to the Crusade.

³⁵ Erdmann, *Origin of the Idea of Crusading*, 331.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 332.

³⁷ Mayer, *The Crusades*, 11.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.

preaching and death, but also a city of riches and wealth. These thoughts led the Crusaders to think that “they were marching directly to the city of eternal bliss” where they would be greeted by wealth and heavenly spirituality.³⁹ People were drawn to begin their pilgrimage with this view of Jerusalem in mind, not the idea of unification. Pope Urban’s talk of Jerusalem, even as a secondary motive, unintentionally took its place at the forefront of the First Crusade, while during this time, the papacy really had the diplomatic relations between the Eastern Churches in its sights.

Some historians disagree that helping the Eastern Churches was the main goal of the Crusades. Instead, they consider the idea of reclaiming Jerusalem and freeing the city of the pagans as the main objective of the First Crusade. Using Mayer’s argument to his advantage, H.E.J. Cowdrey points out that Jerusalem was such a powerful idea, it was impossible for no mention to be made of it as a goal of the Crusade and a tool for recruitment. As Cowdrey states, “because it was so powerful an idea, [Jerusalem] is unlikely not to have been at the heart of Urban’s preaching from the very start.”⁴⁰ It was a goal that could not be ignored, or if it was, it would have been foolish to do so as it was so magnanimous. In terms of Erdmann’s argument, Cowdrey suggests that his argument was extremely strong, to the point of dissuading historians from their own views, but Cowdrey proves, through several main points, that Jerusalem was the focal point of the Crusade.⁴¹

³⁹ Ibid., 12.

⁴⁰ H.E.J. Cowdrey, “Pope Urban II’s Preaching of the First Crusade,” *History* 65 (1980); repr. in *The Crusades: The Essential Readings*, ed. Thomas Madden (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 20.

⁴¹ Ibid., 20.

First, Cowdrey presents evidence from very early chronicles such as those written by Count Fulk le Rechin and Bernold of St. Blasten which show that Urban preached throughout France about Jerusalem, the Holy Sepulcher, and man's duty to remove the pagans. The charters from this time also depict the same events. Confirming the chronicles, the charters "testify to the centrality of Jerusalem and its military liberation in the monastic understanding of the Crusade."⁴² Lastly, Cowdrey also calls upon contemporary letters and Urban's own letters to strengthen his argument as they provide more evidence of the true goal of the Crusade. All of these forms of primary source evidence, which are lacking in number for Erdmann and Mayer's argument, contribute to Cowdrey's solid case that Jerusalem was always in Urban's mind from the onset of his campaign for the First Crusade.

Finally, Johnathan Riley-Smith, argues that the unification of the Eastern Churches as the focus of the First Crusade is not defensible because there are not enough reliable sources to confirm this thinking.⁴³ This argument is based mostly on an analysis of Urban's actions prior to his call for Crusade at Clermont. While the arguments are strong and convincing, they can never be as solid as those that contain primary source evidence. Even though many of the documents from this time, especially the accounts of the Council of Clermont, were written after the fact by clergymen or Crusaders, there was always talk of Jerusalem as the "navel of the

⁴² Ibid., 23.

⁴³ Riley-Smith, *Idea of Crusading*, 21-22. Riley-Smith also states that, "it is impossible to believe that a man like him, trained in the monastic life, could have mentioned Jerusalem without conjuring up images of Zion and the holy city," a blow to Mayer's argument; Riley-Smith, *Idea of Crusading*, 22.

Earth” and a “land more fruitful than any other.”⁴⁴ The Crusaders give historians a different perspective, one with the benefit of hindsight, about Urban’s speech. After living through the First Crusade and seeing the outcomes, would the unification of Eastern Churches not be included? There would have been some sign or mention of unification in the accounts of the Council and those thereafter. The strength in primary sources gives more credibility to the historians that argue that the reconquest of Jerusalem was the main focal point of the First Crusade.

The First Crusade, a holy war fought in the Levant from 1096-1099, began with Pope Urban II’s call to crusading at the Council of Clermont in November 1095. With this imperative to join the pilgrimage and to take back the Holy Land from the pagans, Pope Urban promised absolution of all sins to anyone who participated. Historians today debate as to whether the unexpected response from the people led the papacy to reform the goals of the First Crusade. Many claim that Pope Urban had diplomatic unification between the Greek and Latin churches in his mind during his speeches and actions leading up to the First Crusade, including the Council of Clermont, while other historians, with the support of several letters, charters, and chronicles from the time, argue that Urban’s main reason for calling the Crusade was to take back the Holy Land from the Turks. The First Crusade is one instance in which historians witness not only how the power of the pope can lead to a chain of wars spanning over hundreds of years, but also how the primary sources present a fascinating puzzle in trying to discern the motives and views of those participating in that First Crusade.

⁴⁴ Robert the Monk, *History of the First Crusade*, 81.

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Males and Male Bonding in *Antony and Cleopatra* and *Moby Dick*

Sarah O'Connor

Both William Shakespeare's play *Antony and Cleopatra* and Herman Melville's novel *Moby Dick* address the concept of masculinity. Both texts dwell on what it means "to be a man" and both of these works offer the reader the following conclusion: men cannot be defined simply by societal standards of "masculinity." Those standards often conclude that the greatest men are the ones who not only possess great physical strength and the ability to reason, but also lack weak "feminine" traits such as the craving for emotionally connective relationships and reliance on passion rather than reason to make decisions. In fact, both works toy with the idea of "hyper-masculinity" and arrive at the conclusion that men cannot exist solely in such a state. In *Antony and Cleopatra*, Shakespeare presents Antony as the most feminine of the male characters, yet this femininity does not weaken him but rather strengthens his character. Shakespeare uses the character Caesar to prove that though some men can come close, no man can remain in a hyper-masculine state and all men do have a "feminine" desire to form emotional bonds to other men. In the novel *Moby Dick*, the character Queequeg, who at first seems most masculine, is revealed to possess a more feminine side: this is shown through the bond he forms with Ishmael.

In *Antony and Cleopatra*, Antony falls madly in love with the Egyptian queen Cleopatra. Antony, one of the most powerful of the elite in Rome, is shirking his

duties to Rome in order to remain in Egypt and be with Cleopatra. From the beginning of the play, Shakespeare sets up a strong contrast between the Egyptian and the Roman way of life. Egypt is equated with femininity, as it is presented as a state which focuses on passion and pleasure. Rome, however, comes across as just the opposite, as demonstrated when Cleopatra comments that “a Roman thought hath struck” Antony when she wishes to express that he has suddenly become serious (I.ii.87). In Shakespeare’s Rome men mainly focus on fulfilling their duties and obligations; they live a strict and austere lifestyle. The contrast between these two states is exemplified when Roman and Egyptian feasts are compared. When Pompey hosts a gathering, he remarks that it “is not yet an Alexandrian feast,” as it is much calmer and less indulgent (II.vii.95). Even in celebration, the Romans’ main focus is to maintain control and to avoid the excess of the Egyptian festivities. Caesar remarks that Romans’ “greater business” such as their duty to the state “frowns at this levity” that is embraced so wholeheartedly by those in the East (II.vii.120-121).

Antony’s love for Cleopatra makes him, in a sense, Egyptian. He begins to love the lifestyle which enables him to embrace his femininity and admits that his “pleasure lies” in the East, which upsets the Romans who feel that he is neglecting his duties to the state (II.iv.39). Antony’s ability to welcome this lifestyle is what enables him to connect to Cleopatra: they spend time together as they “wander through the streets and note / The qualities of people” (I.i.54-55). This shows Antony’s desire to simply *be* with Cleopatra and connect with her. Wandering through the streets of Egypt shows how fully Antony appreciates and accepts this

culture. He dresses up with her and goes as far as cross-dressing with her. By embracing his femininity, he proves that he is comfortable with his manhood, and that he does not feel the urge to conform to the conventional standards held for men, especially Roman men. Cleopatra and Egypt bring out those qualities in Antony which enable him to stand out from his male peers, and provide readers with a greater range of ways to relate to him than the play's more monolithically "masculine" characters.

Though Antony's reliance on passion instead of reason causes many troubles for him, it is ultimately this sense of passion which proves to be most beneficial to him by the end of the play. This passion seemingly works against Antony when he is fighting in the Battle of Actium, and instead of remaining with his fleet when Cleopatra's boat flees, he follows after her in his boat and confuses his troops, causing them to lose the battle. While discussing this event with Cleopatra, he says that "my heart was to thy rudder tied by th' strings / And thou shouldst tow me after" (III.xi.56-57). By claiming that he acted with his heart and not his mind, Antony comments on the inseparable connection he has with Cleopatra. After this moment, Antony becomes increasingly more in touch with his femininity, and by the end of the play he seems to have completely compromised his masculinity. He attempts to commit suicide as a way of retaking charge and showing that he alone will choose his fate, yet he fails to die immediately. In order that his last desire to see Cleopatra can be fulfilled, Antony must be carried by her guards up to the monument where she is hiding.

At this point in the play, though placed in a completely feminized position, unable to even lift himself, Antony asks to be remembered by his “former fortunes” as a Roman (IV.xv.55). This request to be remembered for his masculine heroic acts serves as a stark contrast to the weak and womanly Antony being presented to the reader, causing the reading to wonder how Antony should actually be defined. When he dies, Caesar acknowledges that “the death of Antony / Is not a single doom; in the name lay / A moiety of the world” (V.i.17-19). Here Caesar acknowledges that Antony was in fact a man of great honor, and thus a great Roman. Caesar’s noting of the world’s loss shows that Antony’s hopes of being remembered as Roman will in fact come true. Yet, he will not *merely* be remembered as Roman. When the historical figure of Antony is thought of, his name is, more often than not, attached to Cleopatra’s. Antony is remembered both as a military leader and as a lover in history; he remains known for both his passion and his reason, as Shakespeare acknowledges when Caesar claims that “no grave upon the earth shall clip in it / A pair so famous” as Antony and Cleopatra (V.ii.358-361). Yet, Antony will not be remembered merely for this passion; he will also be remembered as a great Roman, a main player in the “glory” of Rome (V.ii.361). He exists as both masculine and feminine, and these qualities, together, make Antony one of Shakespeare’s most complex male characters.

From early on in the play Antony can be viewed in direct contrast to Caesar, who completely embodies the qualities of a Roman man. Caesar speaks in a militaristic fashion and always presents himself as a strong, competent leader who acts not with passion, but with reason. Though considered masculine, Caesar has

trouble connecting to other men, showing that this sense of “manliness” is isolating: no man can always maintain the hyper-masculine state of being which Caesar clings to throughout the text. Yet, even Caesar expresses the desire for a strong emotional connection to other men. Though he and Antony are able to settle a conflict through Antony’s agreement to marry Caesar’s sister Octavia, Caesar states: “For better might we / Have loved without this mean, if on both parts / This be not cherished” (III.ii.31-32). Caesar, by confessing this craving for male bonding, reveals that even he cannot remain in such a hyper-masculine state at all times. Shakespeare does make the point that even the most masculine of men cannot always be this way. He seems to say that men at some level will want to form an emotional relationship with those around them.

Similarly, in *Moby Dick*, Melville addresses the concept of masculinity and attempts to define what it means to be a “man.” He accomplishes this through the relationship of the characters Ishmael and Queequeg. Early in the novel, when Ishmael goes to the Spouter-Inn in Nantucket, he is told that there are not enough beds and he is asked whether or not he would have “objections to sharing a harpooneer’s blanket” (Melville 15). Ishmael is so uncomfortable with this idea that he decides he would prefer to sleep on a makeshift bed made out of a thin, hard bench rather than share a bed with another man. He comments that “no man prefers to sleep two in a bed” which proves just how hesitant he is with the idea of being so close to another man (Melville 17). Since his bed mate is not around and it is late, Ishmael presumes that the harpooner will not be coming back to the inn that night, and so he decides to sleep in the bed after all. Nevertheless, he does return, and

Ishmael is in deep distress about this “terrible bedfellow” whom he regards as a savage (Melville 23). The landlord reassures Ishmael that although the man, whose name is Queequeg, is a cannibal, he [Queequeg] would not harm Ishmael during the night. Ishmael evaluates this claim and decides that “for all his tattooings he was on the whole a clean, comely looking cannibal” and that it would be safe to sleep with him (Melville 26). At the end of this chapter, Ishmael admits that he “never slept better” (Melville 27).

From this point on in the novel, the reader sees an immediate bond form between Ishmael and Queequeg. In the next chapter, Ishmael says: “I found Queequeg’s arm thrown over me in the most loving and affectionate manner. You had almost thought I had been his wife” (Melville 28). This instantaneously formed relationship is incredibly significant, as Melville uses it as a tool to redefine what it means to be a “man.” Queequeg immediately is perceived as being “hyper-masculine.” His extreme physical strength and seemingly hard exterior make people instantly fearful of him. Therefore, by placing this “cannibal” in a domestic as well as a working relationship with Ishmael, Melville expresses the idea that even the most “masculine” of men can also have and express feminine attributes. Throughout the narrative, Melville consistently enhances Queequeg’s character with these feminine qualities to counteract his appearance as an incredibly powerful masculine figure. Melville illustrates that men cannot be defined simply as what society deems “masculine;” rather, men are the composite of many traits and can encompass many masculine and feminine roles simultaneously.

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Melville goes further than Shakespeare does in emphasizing the importance of male bonding as he continually compares these relationships to marriage. The ultimate example of this occurs when Ishmael and Queequeg are attached to each other with a monkey-rope and “for better or for worse” must rely on each other and have total faith in one another (Melville 349). Ishmael, who narrates the story, states that he and Queequeg were like a married couple, and goes as far as stating the pair “were wedded” during that short period of time they were physically connected by the monkey-rope. This direct comparison of a male to male relationship with a marriage between a man and a woman shows that the true nature of a male bond does, in many ways, embrace the feminine. The monkey-rope chapter also examines the necessity of this kind of trusting relationship; Queequeg and Ishmael must trust one another literally with their very lives in order to accomplish their jobs on the Pequod’s whaling expedition. This bond is both desirable and practical. The domestic relationship which Queequeg and Ishmael embrace enables them to do their job well in a most satisfying way.

Both *Antony and Cleopatra* and *Moby Dick* feature “hyper-masculine” characters such as Antony and Queequeg respectively, and then work against the idea that they can be defined unequivocally as “hyper-masculine” by society. This idea is further emphasized when both texts depict male bonding as an important part of men’s lives. In *Moby Dick*, Ishmael and Queequeg form a relationship which comes across as a marriage even as they share a bed; they cherish this sense of connection and attachment to each other. In *Antony and Cleopatra*, Caesar, the “epitome” of Roman masculinity, expresses a profound desire to connect with

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Antony without having to use his sister as a tool. He recognizes the importance of male bonding and points out that a bond of such sorts would be so much stronger than any other bond that Antony and he could form. In a way, this strong desire for friendship feminizes Caesar, and for that moment makes him a more sympathetic and relatable character. This idea, that even the “manliest” man cannot maintain this façade of strength and austerity at all times, deconstructs the stereotypical idea of masculinity. Both Shakespeare and Melville demonstrate that embracing femininity is beneficial and satisfying for men.

Though they make very similar points about the nature of being a man, *Antony and Cleopatra* and *Moby Dick* differ in how they address these ideas. Gender remains a more central focus throughout Shakespeare’s play, whereas in *Moby Dick*, Ishmael and Queequeg’s masculinity, though commented on in various chapters, does not always serve as a main focus of the text. This is not to disclaim the importance of gender in *Moby Dick*: Ishmael is telling his own story, so the fact that he showcases his relationship with Queequeg, and admits that this relationship is almost like a marriage, implies that he wants Queequeg to be remembered for his feminine and masculine qualities. In contrast, Antony did not want to be remembered as feminine, so he requested that he be remembered as Roman. Similar to Queequeg though, Antony ends up being remembered for both his feminine and masculine qualities. The dual nature of their personalities makes both Ishmael and Queequeg much more memorable and dynamic characters.

In conclusion, Shakespeare’s play *Antony and Cleopatra* and Melville’s novel *Moby Dick* examine what it truly means to be a man. In *Antony and Cleopatra*, Antony is criticized

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by Caesar and the other Romans for appearing weak and using passion rather than reason when he is thinking, but even Caesar, the most “hyper-masculine” of the men in the text, admits his admiration of Antony. In *Moby Dick*, Melville uses the characters Ishmael and Queequeg to emphasize the importance of male bonds. He relates their friendship to a marriage and comments on the benefits of men embracing this sort of domestic relationship. Both literary works support the idea that men cannot be simplistically defined: one cannot simply assign traits to a person because they are male or female. The most interesting and complex men in both texts are the ones who embody characteristics attributed to both genders.

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Dante's Slippery Slope

Curtis Dunn

In Dante's *Inferno*, the narrator/pilgrim describes his descent into the pits of Hell through nine circles, until he reaches Lucifer at the very center of the earth. Throughout the text, the Florentine poet uses similes, metaphors, and a multitude of other literary devices to paint a spectacular, albeit gruesome, description of the Christian Underworld. These tools maximize effect in a minimal space and provide numerous alternative layers to the text in addition to the surface action. One such simile appears in Canto XXIII, lines 37-51:

My leader in a moment snatched me up,
like a mother who, awakened by the hubbub
before she sees the flames that burn right near her,

snatches up her child and flees,
and, more concerned for him than for herself,
does not delay to put a shift on.

Down from the rim of that stony bank,
supine, he slid along the sloping rock
that forms one border of the next crevasse.

Never did water, as it nears the paddles,
rush down along the sluices
cut through earth to turn a millwheel

more swiftly than my master down that bank,
bearing me along clasped to his breast
as if I were his child, not his companion.

This comparison, really a double-simile, literally describes Dante's and Virgil's escape from the threatening demons who are chasing them, and also serves more abstract functions. One of the most important of these functions is the documentation, through poetry, of a shift in the relationship between the poet and his guide which occurs when the two are the closest they have been physically, mentally, and metaphorically. In its syntax and subtextual meaning, this selection above mirrors the overarching narrative, as these tercets enact the pair's descent further and further into Hell. Gorgeous imagery and suggestive rhetoric are opportunely placed for maximum result.

Dante and Virgil, having journeyed through seven layers of Hell, are now in the eighth ring — a place that houses those who had committed fraud while they were still on earth. Within this circle of fraud there are ten crevasses or pouches, and the above simile describes Virgil as he seizes Dante and carries him as they try to escape from the devils who are punishing those souls guilty of barratry, the crime that Dante was accused of by his enemies. This suffocatingly dark setting, one of the most physically terrifying and energetic in Hell thus far, helps to illustrate Dante's and Virgil's states of mind. The utter terror the former feels as he walks along a lake of tar leaves him vulnerable; he is an easy target for the wardens of this place. In Cantos XXI and XXII, the reader is introduced to this wretched landscape, while in Canto XXIII the reader witnesses the two great poets in flight. The first interaction the two poets experience with the Malebranche begins with Dante huddling behind a rock and ends with Barbariccia, one of the Malebranche, farting as he leads the pair to the "broken" sixth arch. As Hollander, the translator, notes, Virgil oddly

trusts Malacoda and his gang, while Dante is rightfully suspicious and fearful. Dante the poet makes a joke of this situation in Canto XXII: “On we went, escorted by ten demons. / What savage company! But, as they say, / ‘in church with saints, with guzzlers in the tavern” (13-15). Dante continues with the simile of dolphins to describe the way the damned expose themselves above the pitch then quickly hide again; this comparison doubles as an omen for Dante, for dolphins approaching a ship served as a sign to seamen that a storm was approaching (XXII.19-24). This sense of doom is far from unwarranted, for soon Graffiacane spots a lazy sinner and in no time has him in his grip. Dante wishes to speak with the soul from Navarre who stalls the demons from their torturous task, and who proves a mockery of the Malebranche when he tricks them and escapes their clutches. Farcically, two of the demons get stuck in the pitch and are burnt to a crisp. This is what spurs the Malebranche’s hot pursuit of Dante and Virgil as they and the reader head into Canto XXIII.

As Dante and Virgil continue on their path, our narrator lets his mind wander, leading him to an ominous premonition:

I thought, ‘It’s our fault they have been cheated,
and with such hurt and shame
I’m sure it must enrage them.

‘If rage is added to their malice,
they will pursue us still more cruelly
than the hound that sets his fangs into a hare.’
(XXIII.13-18)

Dante thinks that the time for action is in this moment and his master agrees, but before the latter could finish relating his plan, Dante “saw them coming, wings

outspreed, / closing in to catch [them]" (35-36); and so the reader is propelled into the aforementioned double-simile. Tumultuous action directs the energy forward as these two characters fend for their lives. The intense action of the poem then slows considerably once the poets have escaped.

Subsequently, when Dante and Virgil walk along the path as a pair of Friars, their minds wander until Dante finally speaks up. It is important to remember that it is probably too dark for Dante and Virgil to see anything except what is directly in front of them, and yet, both have a feeling that the Malebranche are so close that Dante thinks he can "almost hear them" (24). Virgil, instead of simply stating, "I agree, let's get out of here," takes his time to respond:

And he: 'If I were made of leaded glass
I could not reflect your outward likeness
in less time than I grasp the one inside you.

'Just now your thought commingled with my own,
alike in attitude and aspect,
so that of both I've formed a single plan.

'If the slope there to the right allows us
to make our way into the other ditch,
we shall escape the chase we both envision.'
(XXII. 25-33)

Of course, this is an epic poem, not an action film, and the action starts very slowly: Dante thinks about Aesop's fables, then the Malebranche, then implores his master to hide. Virgil immediately agrees and moves to execute his plan, but he is cut off by the pursuing demons. There is a gradual build in suspense until the Malebranche actually appear to Dante, inciting the swift and tumbling double simile (37-51). It is as if the literal action (sliding down the slope) mirrors the literary action (resolving the chase). The resolution relieves the poets of their fear immediately as they touch

the ground because the Malebranche, so enraged at being bamboozled, have no dominion over the sixth crevasse.

The first part of the above simile describes “a mother who, awakened by the hubbub / before she sees the flames that burn right near her, /snatches up her child and flees” (38-40). Although this image is significant for the development of character, it also has a more literal implication if analyzed further. Dante and Virgil are essentially blameless in the trickery played on the Malebranche; one could argue that they are no more to blame than the metaphorical mother who may have hypothetically left a candle burning overnight. It may have been Dante who wished to speak with Ciampolo the condemned barrator, and Virgil who enabled it, but they are not aware that the barrator is using the situation as a ploy to escape the demons’ clutches. Perhaps they should have been, considering Ciampolo’s sin which is the reason for his damnation. The poets’ intentions are pure, just as the mother’s was, even if it seems like cunning to the Malebranche. Virgil’s quick reaction (albeit slow explanation) is warranted only because there is no rationale to have them punished for their inadvertent deception, and he therefore must get both of them out of harm’s way at any cost.

Virgil acts as if he is responsible for the situation they find themselves in, “more concerned for [Dante] than for [himself]” (41). This admission of concern, though expressed through a simile, complicates the relationship between the two men, which up until this point has remained rooted in the position of teacher/pupil. Here, Virgil is taking responsibility for his earthly ward, perhaps unconsciously conceding that Dante had been correct mistrusting the Malebranche. Either way, it is

once again Virgil protecting Dante: Virgil, “his master,” who slides along the “sloping rock” with Dante “clasped to his breast” (44, 49-50). The reader, envisioning this scene, will see Virgil holding Dante while the former slides down a steep slope, his back serving as their luge.

This quiet transition to the next scene with not even a “thank you” from Dante perhaps speaks to the shift in the relationship of the two poets. Considering that Virgil is ageless in Hell and Dante is a middle-aged man who is very much alive, it is a very odd image to reconcile: that of Virgil bearing Dante close to his heart as if [Dante] were his child, not his companion” (51). At what point in the text did Dante become such a responsibility for Virgil? Of course the latter has always looked after him, but in this double-simile, the reader gets a glimpse of how much the teacher truly loves his pupil as a mother. As Hollander the translator points out:

Virgil’s customary paternal role here is resolved into a maternal one. That we should take this surprising change as meant positively is guaranteed by a later scene, just as Virgil has left the poem and returned to Limbo. At this moment of greatest pathos involving Dante’s love for his guide and teacher, Dante turns back to him as a frightened child runs to his mother (Purg. XXX.44), only to find him gone forever.
(430)

In this sense, Dante is pictured as Virgil’s son: Virgil’s role is paternal as Dante, in true medieval fashion, learns his trade, poetry, from his “father,” and also maternal, as this double simile further complicates the poets’ relationship. Dante had been so influenced by the elder poet that he envisions his entire journey through the pits of hell exclusively with him, only to find him gone forever later on in Purgatory when Beatrice, Dante’s beloved, takes over as Dante’s guide. In a less metaphorical sense, Dante loves and admires Virgil so much that he considers him much more than a

mentor. Even though Dante was suspicious of the Malebranche's intentions to serve as guide, an observation that Virgil ignored, Dante still fully trusts his guide who has not yet finished explaining their escape route. Perhaps he did not have to complete these plans considering that Virgil has just proclaimed: "Just now your thought commingled with my own, / alike in attitude and aspect, / so that of both I've formed a single plan" (28-30). Is this Virgil being other-worldly? Or does the poets' connection through poetry and admiration grant them some sort of telepathy? Perhaps the idea of such communication is pagan in its essence, but Dante does often mix Classical mythology with contemporary Christianity.

In any case, the beauty of these two poets being so intertwined artistically, mentally, and physically, adds to the suspense and thrill of this double-simile that documents their escape. Here, Virgil's response to Dante's danger is as automatic as that of a mother who "does not delay to put a shift on" (42). Just as the metaphorical woman reacts without any thought of shame or self, so does Virgil who holds Dante like a child, a somewhat surprising but not totally inappropriate gesture considering their relationship, as he slides down the slope swiftly as "never did water, / as it nears the paddles, / rush down along the sluices / cut through earth to turn a millwheel" (46-48). Dante paints an image for the reader, first of a great house fire (something that, as the Hollanders point out, was very common in medieval times) then of the water that rushes over a millwheel, all to describe how unabashedly Virgil grabs Dante and how quickly they rocket down the side of the crevasse. This double-simile strongly bolsters the immediate action of the text and also beautifully mirrors exactly what Dante and Virgil are doing throughout the entire story:

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
unflinchingly sliding down the layers of hell, unafraid, but focused on getting themselves through securely. Virgil clearly cares so much for Dante that he puts Dante's safety first while Dante illustrates this unbreakable bond they have formed through this powerful and effective double simile. Two words repeatedly used in this canto are truly suggestive: "come" and "figlio;" the former, loosely meaning "such as" sets up the simile, while the latter, meaning "son," completes it: Virgil rescues Dante — *come suo figlio*.

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298 LESS ERRONEOUS PICTURES.

True, one portrait may hit the mark much nearer than another, but none can hit it with any very considerable degree of exactness. So there is no earthly way of finding out precisely what the whale really looks like. And the only mode in which you can derive even a tolerable idea of his living contour, is by going a whaling yourself; but by so doing, you run no small risk of being eternally stove and sunk by him. Wherefore, it seems to me you had best not be too fastidious in your curiosity touching this Leviathan.

CHAPTER LVI.

OF THE LESS ERRONEOUS PICTURES OF WHALES, AND THE TRUE PICTURES OF WHALING SCENES.

In connexion with the monstrous pictures of whales, I am strongly tempted here to enter upon those still more monstrous stories of them which are to be found in certain books, both ancient and modern, especially in Pliny, Purchas, Hackluyt, Harris, Cuvier, &c. But I pass that matter by. I know of only four published outlines of the great Sperm Whale; Colnett's, Huggins's, Frederick Cuvier's, and Beale's. In the previous chapter Colnett and Cuvier have been referred to. Huggins's is far better than theirs; but, by great odds, Beale's is the best. All Beale's drawings of this whale are good, excepting the middle figure in the picture of three whales in various attitudes, capping his second chapter. His frontispiece, boats attacking Sperm Whales, though no doubt calculated to excite the civil scepticism of some parlor men, is admirably correct and life-like in its general effect. Some of the Sperm Whale drawings in J. Ross Browne are pretty correct in contour; but they are wretchedly engraved. That is not his fault though.