

Responsibility versus Accountability : Interventions by International Organisations

Draft paper-Not for Referencing

Dr Hakan Seckinelgin
Lecturer in International Social Policy
Department of Social Policy
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
Tel:+44(0)20 7955 6038

Responsibility versus Accountability : Interventions by International Organisations

*Pity would be no more,
If we did not make somebody Poor;
And Mercy no more could be,
If all were as happy as we;
William Blake, Human Abstract*

This paper explores the constraints on the development of global social policy as related to the relationship between two processes informing such policy discussions: the increased focus on people's social welfare issues by international policy actors and the advancement of rights discourse with particular focus on social and economic issues. In recent years the nature of international policies has been focusing more explicitly on social development and human needs. This in addition to the indirect impact of their large structural and economic policies in the past, suggest that the decisions by international agencies can be seen as global social policies. The role of international agencies as social policy actors, albeit at the global level, is influencing people's everyday lives within particular national territories. It is also producing a certain policy convergence (Drezner 2001). This has important implications for the way the relations between the international and national policies are considered conventionally (Yeates 2001). On the one hand it is possible to observe in many countries convergence in policy fields such as education, health, employment and their governance which have been traditionally seen as the mandate of national governments. On the other hand, the convergence highlights the growing similarities in policy frameworks in various policy fields used by major international actors. This dual process of convergence in policy application as well as in the policy making level informs the possibilities for global social policy (Deacon et al. 1997, George and Wilding 2002). International organisations in this convergence become the locus of policy processes for 'transnational distribution, supranational regulation and supranational and global provision' (Deacon et al. 1997:22, 57 and Deacon 2003). However, these roles in attributing *de facto* agency to the international actors in the field of social policy do not also set clear direct responsibility links with the people. In this there also seems to be a growing distrust to the international actor policies, as Onora O'Neill suggests 'the most common explanation for refusal to place trust is that it is a reasonable response to prior untrustworthiness or unreliability' (O'Neill 2002:12-16). Although in order to address this problem the reform agenda for the intergovernmental organisations has been an important topic and political concern (Nayyar 2000, Held 2004). This seems to focus mainly on re-thinking organisational governance. The nature of the relationship between policy makers and those targeted by them at present raises questions about the general nature of these organisations beyond their general governance considerations. While the existing international organisations have provided a certain global reach for policies, the rights discourse has provided the required theoretical horizon for the thinking about global social justice and social distribution (Pogge 2002). Nonetheless, these two processes are not entirely compatible. Universal social justice perspectives are undoubtedly frustrated by the conventional state-centric organisational nature of international agencies. The institutional characteristics of the latter present a paradox for global social policy related concerns. While international actor's decisions have impact on people, they

have limited responsibility to people within the international frameworks. These set out, for example, organisational accountability mechanisms in order to re-think governance, which are generally not linked to people's experiences.

In order to explore the impact of this tension I look at the general question: *Do international organisations and donors have responsibility to people?* In other words if international actors are prescribing policies that aim to influence people's lives to what extent also institutions hold responsibility for the outcomes of these policy prescriptions. The concern here is with the general sense of responsibility that goes beyond the organisational imperatives that set out particular accountability mechanisms. It assumes that there needs to be a responsibility link between policy makers and people who are impacted by their policies. Or, there has to be an obligation to respond on the side of the policy makers, in this case by the international ones, to the people's experiences, in particular when their living conditions are made worse, resulting from their prescribed policies.

In order to help understand this, I suggest a simple analogy that of the relationship between a doctor and her patient. If the prescription of a doctor, who is trying to solve her patient's problem, has a negative impact on the well-being of the patient a serious question of responsibility arises in relation to the professional competence of the doctor in dealing with the illness under consideration. While this responsibility relationship is based on deep moral considerations about the role of a doctor, it is also regulated through codes of conduct and monitored by professional bodies that set out accountability chains. These chains are based on the accepted social and professional links between a doctor and her patients. Also, the recognition of responsibility and the subsequent establishment of an accountability link between the two types of actors allows the patient to have active agency in engaging with the consequences of this relationship. In other words s/he becomes active in the social relation assumed in this context. Therefore, this analogy when applied to policy making, suggests that in the absence of such right to question the policy makers, the global justice perspectives are limited to the perceived provision of policies rather than thinking about policies in relation to the needs and demands of people as they are articulated by them. In this sense, the agency of people affected by international actors are central for thinking about global social policies (O'Neill 2004). This sort of understanding informs the existence of a social relationship underpinning the responsibility link between parties trying to engage with each other.

Note that the analogy, here, is not about considering developing countries as patients but about the professional licence assumed by the doctor in relation to solving an illness which then informs the question of responsibility between the two sets of actors. It also points out that the responsibility is related to actual people and to the way they experience the policy outcomes, independent of whatever might have been thought by the policy actors about the potential outcomes of a policy. This perspective allow us to look at the issue at two levels. The first level relates to the general moral responsibility assumed in a relationship where one side is influencing livelihood conditions of others. The second level relates more to the issue of competence with respect to the particular area of policy involvement.

The present work is trying to understand the nature of responsibility relationship between people and international actors. This looks at conditions for demanding responsibility but also at the form of available responses for these in the international realm. In the more common versions of accountability, the implicit demand is about some form of ethical relationship that recognises a certain socio-political linkage and thus a relationship based on responsibility between the policy

makers and the target groups for these policies. In trying to understand this complicated picture the paper reflects on the relationship between the demand for responsibility and its supply at present from a perspective of responsibility that takes people that are at the receiving end of the policies as the relevant actors. This unpacking questions the traditional distinction between the international actors and the national governments and the relationship between these and the people that are influenced by the policy outcomes. These relationships present a particularly important paradox within the development context in terms of the implications and consequences of international policy processes. This paradox can be seen, for example, in the fact that international financial organisations have a substantial role in policy making, that they seem to have limited liability in terms of the consequences of implementation of these policies. In this paper, I take the link between international monetary organisations and people and raise a few issues in relation to the assumptions underpinning the general framework of these relations.

Specifically the aim is to look at instances where a certain responsibility claim is made or cases where there is a persuasive reason to think about the responsibility of international institutions. By taking this step, the study locates the necessity of accountability into a context of relations and the process through which a policy outcome is created. The earlier question then arises as a result of this policy outcome within a specific set of relations. Here, there are two central issues: a) the question of responsibility as a moral problem and responsibility for particular outcomes and to particular people; b) by locating the need into a relational context and a particular outcome in that context, it begins to question the idea of accountability as a technical tool for evaluation which can be assessed and produced generically for policy frameworks. In this way the issue of responsibility can be looked at as a function of social phenomenon rather than a task that is set to be completed.

The following section looks at two instances where the impact of policies raise the issue of responsibility in relation to different policy arenas. In elaborating the relevant parties and according to whom the issue becomes central, the argument establishes the context of accountability. In the third section the argument looks at the justifications available to the international actors both limiting and demonstrating their responsibility in these instances. This allows analysis to engage with the paradox of global social policy.

International Policies and Their Outcomes

In this section case studies are analysed to highlight the problem of responsibility facing the global social policy. The section is divided into two parts following the analytical division on responsibility in the introduction. This aims to analyse responsibility as a function of social relations at two levels: a) as a general link between the policy makers and the people living with the outcomes of their policies and b) as a link between the people's experiences of policy outcomes and what is predicted of these experiences from the policy maker's perspective at the time of policy making. Attitudes towards the recognition of these links allow question of responsibility to be either demanded and responded to, or demanded and ignored. In this sense what can be seen as the paradox of responsibility, that is while international actors take decisions for the betterment of people's living conditions, they do not have responsibility for the actual people living with these policies, becomes an issue

referenced to international actors' recognition of above mentioned social links as relevant to themselves.

Malawi and Nicaragua are two countries where recently the living conditions of people have been worsened by a combination of factors such as climatic conditions, government policies and the general policy frameworks initiated by international actors. People's claims in these contexts can be taken to represent a generalised experience of people in relation to the policy prescriptions of international organisations in many areas. The case studies look at how far the social links inform the possibility of responsibility demands to be recognised and how they are a part of the decision makers cognitive realm. The first social link in relation to responsibility is analysed in the Malawian case, while the second one is analysed in the Nicaraguan case.

Malawi

News about a famine in Malawi sporadically appeared in the western media throughout 2002. It is in this context the responsibility issue is raised. This involves two interlinked issues, the most obvious questions the logic of the advice given to sell food stocks by the international actors prior to the famine, and the second questions the failure of government to control the remaining stock value, which increased well beyond the purchasing power of those in Malawi. We were told the famine had been compounded by the diseases such as cholera and the HIV/AIDS. Large numbers of people were in danger of starvation as Malawi had a deficit in its food stocks. It has suggested that the present famine is the worst experienced in the region for many years. Also, the combined effect of climatic change in rain patterns as well as the slow reaction of the government have exacerbated the problem. According to Raphael Tenthani, the government underestimated the impact of reduced levels of staple crop production in 2001.¹ The international response was slow in line with the government's acknowledgement of the problem. In February 2002, eventually a state of emergency was declared as the prediction for that year was even worse than the previous year. This prompted a response from relevant UN agencies and bilateral donors. However, it was also suggested that the mismanagement of the emergency food stocks played an important role. The selling of what appeared to be a crucial asset given the impending possibility of famine meant that immediate food supplies were not available to the masses and also dissuaded some international donors from being more forthcoming.

According to Ellard Malindi, the secretary for Agriculture in Malawian government, the selling off was related to the shelf life of the maize stocks. However another story has emerged from the research conducted by various groups. According to these, there had been a policy recommendation by the IMF to Malawi in relation to the utilisation of the Strategic Grain Reserve(SGR). The IMF advised the government to utilise the stock to service its debt.² This advise is seen by many as one of the central reasons for the famine. Although it is clear that advice to reduce SGR from 165000 MT to below 60000MT at the times of impending famine sounds rather rash, it seems that this shortage only added to a larger problem. This led to the above mentioned demand for a response, as the responsible actor, from the IMF. The Fund provided responses to this request through various channels.

Host Köhler, the Managing Director at the time, when asked directly during his appearance in front of the Treasury Select Committee of UK Parliament in 2002

about the attributed impact of IMF on the crisis in Malawi, robustly argued that the advice on the food stocks was given by the World Bank and the EU Commission (2002:12). In this area one of Köhler's responses is very interesting he said that 'the IMF is not the scapegoat for everything'. This response is interesting because it makes a distinction between advice and responsibility due to the implementation under advice from other international organisations. When it was pointed out to him that the Fund accepted that recommendation was based on wrong information Köhler argued that this area was not the Fund's responsibility and although the Fund was a part of advising process, it was not responsible for the implementation of the advice (2002: 13). Furthermore he welcomed the audit initiated by the Government of Malawi and added that it will help to understand who were the parties involved 'so that we have a clearer defined responsibility and, on this basis also, accountability'(2002:13). The emphasis placed here on difference between advice and its implementation is an important one. It suggests that the responsibility in the case of Malawi rests with the implementers which in turn implies that advice was not material to the implementation. This point, defended by Köhler, indicates a way of thinking in which one distinguishes the institutional status of the advising authority in influencing the implementation. Furthermore, the links between the particular advice and the conditions of the context for implementation are broken. By focusing narrowly on the issue of this particular advice the Fund appears to be ignoring its responsibility for a larger context of changes which they supported and promoted independent of their impact in the problems faced by the people in this instance.

The larger context within which people experienced the impact of policies seems to be missed out. Kwesi Owusu and Francis Ng'ambi suggest that the Malawi situation has been as a result of the policies promoted by the World Bank and the Fund. Therefore, there is a larger context for which the international actors have some responsibility for. As Malawi implemented a list of privatisations and liberalisations in its governance structure, the structure of food provision became fractured. This fracturing produced a problem in food distribution and in the availability of low priced staple foods. As the food market had been liberalised, the shortage of food supplies meant that 'food prices rose from MK4/kg at harvest time (June 2001) to MK40+/kg (January 2002)'.³ By looking at what is behind this price change, which effectively created the problem of access, one can understand the responsibility of international organisations in the production of famine.

Stephen Devereux provides an interesting analysis of this mechanism. In his analysis, the switch from ADMARC (agricultural marketing parastal) to the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) marks a shift from a subsidised market to a liberalised food market within which NFRA was supposed to work 'independently and on a cost-recovery basis'.⁴ The ideology behind this change is clearly related with the interests of IMF, the EU and other donors. The attempt is to reduce the state's expenditure by creating a market based procurement and cost-recovery system. Although ADMARC had been involved in marketing that is buying from the producer and providing to people at a subsidised levels, cost-recovery was not one of its main purposes. In order to build its grain reserves NFRA took out commercial loans and bought stocks from ADMARC which in turn was buying locally. The situation changed as the local harvest failed. In the absence of enough local production, ADMARC was unable to control prices and to distribute resources. Late in 2001, the government advised NFRA to import maize and to sell it to ADMARC at a subsidised level to control availability of food. This was an attempt to overcome the problem created in the open food market in which the government had introduced a cap on the price of maize to

limit potential for profiteering. This cap had meant that private business were not marketing their own stocks widely as the transport costs were far too high. However, in the absence of a cap their retail price was far too high for poor to have access to the maize. Therefore the government subsidised ADMARC to open local markets to provide a maize at a reduced price. In other words the government needed to intervene in to the liberalised food market and to an extent suspend it. This attempt was clearly intended to avert a state of ‘entitlement failure’.⁵ It also alerts the observer to the impact of changing market relations and institutional arrangements on people’s entitlements. Although availability of food is important, averting deprivation that leads to a famine also depends on distribution systems to which people have access. As argued by Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, the lack of resources might also be instrumental in the failure of distribution systems.⁶ Or from a different angle, distribution systems might naturally function against the poorest in such circumstances.

From this angle, while it is clear that the famine is not a mono-causal event in general, in the Malawian case the Fund still has certain responsibility. The advice given by the Fund and other donors on utilising SGR for servicing NFRA’s debts, incurred in creating food stocks, needs to be linked to the prior institutional re-organisation that created the vulnerability. It is important to question the logic of introducing a liberalised food distribution system that works on a cost recovery basis in the open market. The question here is about who is responsible for the liberalisation policies implemented that have created vulnerability among local people. The framework behind the advice which constitutes the source of large structural change by initiating liberalised food markets in Malawi and elsewhere has something to do with the famine. This framework however also limits the recognition of responsibility of the Fund in this context as is evident in the country report produced by IMF in 2002 for Malawi. This report provides an implicit evidence for this in terms of the way responsibility is considered in the Fund.

According to this report, the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy paper ‘recognises restoring and consolidating macroeconomic stability as the foundation for moving onto higher growth path to create a conducive environment for entrepreneurial activity, in particular in the critical agricultural sector. However, to accelerate growth, also structural obstacles to private sector development will have to be tackled, including by reducing high level of government intervention in the economy through parastatals; strengthening human resource development; and improving governance’ (2002:2). The infrastructural thinking implicit here informs the argument in the same report that the parastatal sector is recognised as a threat to the successful implementation of 2002/03 budget: ‘Government interventions in the food and other agricultural markets ultimately led to the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) and the agricultural Development and marketing Corporation (ADMARC) taking heavy recourse to budgetary financing, crowding out more productive spending’ (2002: 4). Expressing such considerations at the time of crisis was seen by commentators as insensitive. However, it also highlights that the fund is more concerned about the achievement of certain re-organisation that is seen as conducive for a market economy. Thus, it is possible to suggest that the main responsibility is focused to the achievement of this global market orientation. This is also evident in Kohler’s opening statement to the committee . In elaborating his views on financial stability he suggested that ‘[W]e need to combine ambition to prevent crisis with realism about the extent to which this is possible. A market economy draws its lifeblood from competition, which leads to a continues search for better

results, better products, and higher productivity. Some degree of overshooting and correction-and hence some risk of crises-will always be part of that process. But the objective must clearly be to work toward fewer and less severe crises'. (2002:4). These views are indicative of the implicit understanding that the international agency considers the problem faced by people relevant to its work only as a function of achieving particular economic rearrangement of relations. The organisation repeats, independent of the situation, its prescriptions that were material in creating the problems of food distribution. Furthermore, considering budgetary involvement of government as a problem, while the government was trying to avert the problem posed by the liberalised and cost recovery based orientation in the food distribution mechanism, demonstrates that the people's experiences on the basis of earlier prescription for this sector are ignored. Therefore, following Köhler's earlier suggestion, it is reasonable to assume that IMF considers its responsibility strictly in terms of the technical implementation of structural advice it gives that is referenced to an ideal global market rather than on the basis of the outcomes of these policies as experienced by people.

Nicaragua

Unlike Malawi, the fate of the Nicaraguan coffee producers has not occupied the media. Apart from a couple short news segments, the state of affairs in Nicaragua is not publicly discussed. It remains within the specialist domains of international agencies. Nonetheless, Nicaraguan situation provides insights about the second link, about the responsibility towards what can be predictably advised, which indicates that there is an issue of responsibility.

Nicola Carslaw reports that 'one-in-eight children is starving' in Nicaragua.⁷ According to her research, the impact of the declining global coffee market has been devastating to many people who rely solely on coffee production as a cash crop. In this group seasonal workers and dependent children are particularly hard hit. The problem is by and large related with the changing global market relations and needs for coffee in the last ten years. According to the International Coffee Association, 'prices on world markets, which averaged around 120 US cents/lb in the 1980s, are now around 50 cents, the lowest in real terms for 100 years'. In the last ten years while the retail sales of coffee has increased dramatically by more than 50% in exceeding US\$70 billion, the developing country producers income has decreased by about 50% to US\$5.5 billion.⁸ ICO estimates that total production in coffee year the 2001/02 (October-September) is 113 million bags (60-kg bags) while world consumption is just over 106 million bags. Considering the world stocks of some 40 million bags, the situation for developing country producers, for whom coffee is an export cash crop, is very serious indeed. The imbalance between production and demand is posing an important challenge for the livelihoods of developing countries since the value of the crop lessens, a complex set of entitlement failures is experienced by large groups of people. On the one hand, they cannot afford to allocate their own resources for their health, food and education. On the other, people experience access problems from the supply side of the policies as social service provision is decentralised, and privatised in places. For example, the World Food Programme in March 2002 reported that the depressed coffee market, combined with weather conditions, was causing around 30000 Hondurans to suffer from hunger.⁹ This is not an atypical scenario involving unemployment, decreased availability of

resources and utter vulnerability to diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS in coffee producing countries from Ethiopia to Brazil, to Vietnam, to Guatemala, to India. At the same time such problems also decrease the export revenues for governments. Therefore, as Jose Augusto Navarro, the Minister for Agriculture in Nicaragua stated, it is increasing the tension on governments who are caught between helping their communities and servicing their debts.¹⁰

In these cases the failure impacting people's lives is related to the impact of global market mechanisms responding to over supply and is related to coffee being one of the main sources of export revenue in coffee the producing countries. In turn, this over supply is related to over production that is also due to enhanced technology and more efficient crops. Clearly at the planning level these developments in crops taken from individual country's perspective should have produced positive results. However, considering each country and their combined efforts in applying the technological changes under the global market conditions, the international market has produced the rather depressing results for individual countries. In addition, the Nicaraguan situation was exacerbated by a combination of other factors: the problems 'in the oil markets, failure of some banks and the adverse effects on agriculture of "El Niño and El Niña led to a slowdown of real output growth" (World Bank 2001). As a result the economic activity has declined dramatically in Nicaragua. Consequently it is reasonable to assume that the above discussed social impact of decline in the coffee markets were to be more emphasized in people's everyday lives. The question here is related with how predictable these market conditions were.

The World Bank's Report on Nicaragua 'Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and Joint Assessment' (2001) provides a view on how the Nicaraguan government should be dealing with the situation. This includes a tighter fiscal management, more targeted privatization of public utility companies, rethinking of pension schemes, better structured public management (2001:45). It also points out that the country's vulnerability to international market fluctuations and extreme weather conditions while one of the major reasons of poverty, poverty is also due to the underemployment in the country. The poverty profile provides a complex picture. While report recognises the impact of the decline in the coffee market and the climatic conditions, one of the most important ways of overcoming the conditions of poverty is claimed to be broad-based economic growth and structural reform based in urban services, light industry and export zones. Also, the agricultural sector is seen as central for dealing with the problems, in this coffee and cotton are designated as the primary products. It is suggested that 'specific actions to agricultural expansion include rural infrastructure development, improvement of agricultural technology demand-driven funds for poor farmers (2001:xii). There is no doubt in the report that the focus of these restructuring policies is the poor who should benefit most from these changes. However, it is stated that 'authorities should 'focus a greater proportion of limited funds on the provision of utility services to poor' (2001:45). Given that the privatization of these utilities is seen as fiscally sensible, the provision to the poor will indeed be a very limited. The report talks about the poor as those who are most vulnerable in the country. However, it is not clear whether this category includes both those who are made vulnerable as a result of global market changes and those who are made vulnerable as a result of public sector reforms (2001: 15). The same report goes on to suggest that there are three important areas of economic growth: agriculture, textile and tourism sectors. It is suggested that the country needs to capitalise in these sectors by increasing 'training, technology and management transfers, supporting more rational use of resources and increasing the quality of the

final products' (2001:50). In order to help people, beyond the provision of public services, the document suggests that policies should be developed improving human capital and focus on communities own resources. The general benefits to the poor out of these discussions seems to be related with the overall projected impact of these structural changes in influencing the state of economy in the long term. However, this is a curious since it is already stated in the assessment of poverty that coffee and cotton production has collapsed due to the external reasons and tourism is vulnerable to the weather and political instability. This disjuncture between the prescription of policy and the reality experienced by people creates a problem in terms of what international policy makers are trying to achieve and hence what they feel responsible about.

In Nicaragua, this issue can be looked at more closely in relation to coffee production. Coffee as a product is an international commodity and has the potential to contribute to the development of a country. On these grounds, the introduction of coffee as a cash crop might make sense. However, considering that the same set of international actors have prescribed coffee production as a solution to the problems of poverty across regions and continents meant that the world coffee market was over supplied. As a result prices have been going down with important implications for people in individual countries that rely on mono-crop export for their livelihoods. In an idealised set of relations coffee could have been useful in so far as it's international market value remains favourable to the producers. The market value is going to be a function of supply and demand in the international transaction. Considering that any increase in production that is not supported by a matching increase in the demand for the product will lead it's price to decline, this clearly favours the consumer who get the same product at a cheaper price while the producer loses profitability from the product. Ideally it can be assumed that some producers can also shift their production focus, that is exit coffee market, to another product so that the coffee market can level of at some favourable level out all involved. Given the conditions of the producers in developing countries where they focus coffee production as a mono-crop to support their livelihoods the exit strategy is not readily available option. Therefore, they will try to increase production in order to be able to maintain their income which will in turn keep the market depressed with low international value. This rather simply put understanding of the way market functions suggests that coffee market has been working as it should be under the given conditions. Thus, it raises the question of why international organisations prescribe similar policies across many countries as is evident in many reports.

Although the impact of international market conditions are mentioned, the conditions of poverty are mostly analysed in reference to institutional and political conditions of Nicaragua during the 1970s and 80s. As a result the government was(is) pushed to initiate institutional and structural changes to deal with poverty which are assumed to benefit the vulnerable had the economy developed at the same pace (2004). In order words the structural changes can be feasible and sustainable only under certain economic conditions. This has two implications for such prescriptions, one, in the depressed economic conditions the institutional changes are contributing to the vulnerability of people; two it assumes that, independent of the international markets on which products are relying, the internal governance changes will create the right environment to deal with poverty which in fact seems to be caused partially because of over reliance on international markets in the first place. In this Nicaragua is taken to be abstract unit of analysis, decontextualised from global processes influencing it. Also, the underlying understanding considers the role of international

actors as external to all these processes whereby success of the prescription will be based on how far they are implemented rather than whether the prescriptions are sensible and correct given the conditions of poverty in this context. Therefore, it is reasonable to ask if international actors are responsible for the vulnerability of people, given that they have encouraged structural changes independent of the economic conditions of success for their advice, as advocated by these same actors, that are far from being satisfied. The major changes advised for Nicaragua to be able to deal with poverty and increase its living standards requires in general an overall economic recovery in several sectors that are linked with international processes such as coffee markets and oil prices. Most of the recommendations towards the restructuring of public services and social provision for the poor assume such an economic recovery. This then raises the issue of a failure according to their own standards. Standards which should have indicated the way the international markets might react in their prescribing similar policies across regions which together would frustrate the assumed positive impact of international markets on people's lives. However, the documents discussed in this section do not demonstrate any recognition of such responsibility, instead reflecting a certain confidence in the prescriptions for dealing with development and poverty.

In both case studies there are legitimate grounds for people to demand a response from international actors as their lives are adversely influenced by policies which are prescribed and implemented under the direction of these international actors. It is also clear from their insistence on similar prescriptions that the international organisations do not respond to these demands. This creates a major impasse for global social policy, since if policy makers are not considering people who are influenced by their policies as relevant actors, then what is the purpose of their involvement in producing policies which ultimately influence people's lives? Furthermore this situation also constructs people as passive targets for policies. In order to demand responsibility there has to be a generally agreed relationship among various actors that they are related to each other and that their relationship will have consequences for various parties in the context. It is this particular assumption which reveals the main constraint for global social policy actors within their assumed institutional settings: social policy and international relations. The institutional identities based on these boundaries inform the limits of responsibility in prescribing policies at the international level. In this the claim is not that international actors have no responsibility but rather that the limits of their assumed responsibility does not sit comfortably with the implementation field of these policies and their subsequent outcomes.

Limits of responsibility

Considering that in both cases the response from international organisations is based on keeping to their overall liberalisation and privatization advice for dealing with problems, people's actual vulnerability becomes subsumed under an aspirational possibility of solving poverty once a country becomes a full member of international markets. The limits of responsibility implicit in this relates to the nature and the characteristics of these organisations. While the IMF was created to maintain and control international capital flows by advising and controlling exchange rate fluctuations across countries, the World Bank was added to the Bretton Woods system for dealing with longer term investment for productivity in individual countries (You 2002, Eichengreen 1996). Although both organisations have moved out of their initial

mandates in relation to various economic spheres and at present deal with large social problems directly, or indirectly as a result of their economic policies, their identities as international organisations have remained intact. This is very much implicit in the reflections of the IMF managing Director Horst Köhler to the Treasury Select Committee of UK Parliament on in 2002. In his response to a committee querying the possibility of creating a more internally democratic organisation, Köhler argued that ‘we are in a candid dialogue. We are trying to listen. I am meeting and I am encouraging our staff to meet with parliaments too.... We need to have a kind of representation to work with global issues’ operation and therefore we need to have a representational system.... I would also like to underline that still we are a financial institution, and a financial institution means you need also to have someone who provides capital, and think there is a healthy element in the fact that the provision of capital and voting rights is , in a way combined, because this is also an element of efficiency, of accountability. ... If you would ask me, [Mr Mudie] , “One country, one vote?” I would not advise, at least for the foreseeable future, to go to this kind of scheme-because, again capital is needed and some one must be prepared to provide this capital’ (2002:10). Here, Kohler is directly elaborating the responsibility structure that informs the governance of the Fund and the way accountability is thought about in relation to the decision making process. By emphasising the Fund’s nature as financial institution the argument prioritises the interests of the capital providers over the customers. Here the Fund is not only considered to be an international organisation with state members as its constituents, but also a financial institution which has it’s own economic interests. The implied relationship between the large funders and other member states that are seen as clients also reflects the power relationship in structuring the organisations identity within the limits of international relations. Clearly as independent states many African states are members of the Fund but representationally this assumed theoretical state equality underpinning the state relations in international relations is subsumed under the actual power imbalances.

The same set of relations and discussions also frames the World Bank’s structure. Jeffrey A. Winters highlights the importance of the Bank’s *Articles of Agreement* in recognising particular relations underpinning its responsibilities. In this, he points out that: ‘Article III, section 5, paragraph c of the Bank’s charter’ is central as it states that ‘The bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purpose for which the loan was granted, with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic influences or considerations’ (World Bank 1993: 4 cited in Winters 2002:109). While, as Winters suggests, this statement allows the Bank to take action against any corruption that is misuse of its loans, it also suggests that that the Bank is mostly responsible for the achievement of a certain understanding of economic efficiency independent of the impact of these policies on people. Here, an additional characteristic is added to the equation in addition to international and financial characteristics. It is the self-declared non-political technocratic approach in pursuing its institutional interests. In other words the Bank is responsible for the achievement of its own prescriptions rather than for their impact on people (Wade 2003).

There are two important influences which are shaping the international actors’ dissociation from the context of people. Both are related with institutional incentives from various angles influencing the policy making process: one of these is the immanent institutional understanding of the identity of these actors and the other is the institutional understanding of what they do in the field of economics. At one level, as international organisations they relate to states as relevant parties. The

organisational self-characterization is very much in line with the prevailing thinking about the nature of actors who are the main participants in policy and decision making processes at the international level. Although many international organisations grant observer or participant status to non-governmental actors, the decision making process and negotiations leading to the final policy are still by and large under the mandate of the state actors and their foreign policy interests (Chabott 1999, Wendt 1999). Daphné Josselin and William Wallace observe that, although in the last 40 years the influence of non-state actors on international policy making process has increased through knowledge and advocacy networks, the state remains central to the international politics. They argue that ‘global campaigning is unlikely to bring positive results unless at least some state actors (and preferably those in the West) endorse the agenda of private organisations’ (2001:257). This understanding highlights a peculiarity of the international relations. International Relations discourse would only consider non-state actors as having some influence insofar as they are taking part in the discussions related to the systemic level. This, of course, means that the questions are largely related with states’ role and the functioning of the international state system and social relations within this system in the international fora.

Both the Bank and the Fund were created within this logic and consider their role from these lenses. Kohler’s earlier statement about the imperatives of particular voting rights provides a good evidence for this situation in terms of the responsibility concerns of the Fund. It emphasises that though states are equal as units, given their economic contributions there is an imbalance and as a proper economics based organisation the Fund’s relations and concerns reflect this imbalance. Furthermore while keeping to the international discourse on states to limit its responsibility to the members rather than people, it conditions this responsibility by relying on the financial nature of the institution. In other words by playing the economic imperative against international relations it justifies providing unequal voting rights among member states, following Stiglitz, this represents ‘the *collective interest* of a subset of the international community’ (2002). As argued by Johnathan R. Pincus this way of thinking also creates problems for the Bank. It is not always very easy for the Bank to decide ‘who its main clients really were: the government, which signed the loan agreement or the farmers, who were to be the project beneficiaries’ (Pincus 2002: 97). This situation has become even more emphasized with the increased non-governmental organisation activity and advocacy work, in particular involving the Bank’s complaints panel (Fox and Brown 1998). From the international relations’ angle, as a natural default, the system would not see NGOs as directly relevant actors to the social relations in the international social space (Josselin and Wallace 2001, Wendt 1999, and Boli et. al. 1999). In general this view frames the process and locations of NGOs within international politics at large. This dilemma is also evident in the Bank’s position located between the above mentioned *Article* and the implicit responsibility relations in it. The Bank as an international organisation continues to consider states as relevant parties to engage with independent of its changed rhetoric on knowledge and civil society under James Wolfensohn. It seems that civil society participation is usually considered in terms of making implementation of policies more efficient for the client governments (Seckinelgin 2002, Bergeron 2003). Although this is done under the claims of non-political aims whereby economic efficiency and effectiveness for policy outcomes is used as justification, referenced to economics thinking, as Pincus argues the assumption of non-political implementation of technical policies on economy is itself a political one (2002: 97).

That this thinking about Bank's role in technocratic terms allows the Bank, and also the Fund, to dissociate itself from the direct outcomes of its policies on people highlights another influence. A disciplinary perspective is evident in its 'perception of economic development in which success is driven by efficient markets supported by noninterventionist states' (Khan 2002: 165, Mosse 2004). Robert Hunter Wade argues that there is underlying theory 'on the notion of comparative advantage-that in an open economy resources will move to their most efficient uses. It further assumes that decreasing returns beyond a certain point additional inputs yield decreasing marginal returns. So when a high cost, high wage, high saving economy (A) interacts through free markets with a low cost, low wage, low saving economy (B), capital tends to move from A to B in search for higher returns, and labour from B to A. This is good for "world " poverty and inequality' (2004: 164). The influence of this set and its assumptions embedded in economics are very clear in the policies implemented and re-prescribed for Malawi and Nicaragua, where it was clear that people were already made vulnerable from previous policies based on these assumptions. The set of assumptions de-link economics and politics to focus on creating institutional changes to achieve the relations between what Wade considers to be countries A and B. These assumptions then allow these institutions to engage with what they see as the optimal institutional arrangements for achieving such market based success. As a result it is claimed that since they are not engaged in socio-political areas, the individual states are the right authority to deal with issues created in the field of socio-political relations underwriting poverty in many countries.

As discussed above, the Bank and the Fund, consider their responsibility for the creation of ideal economic conditions which will in some future date both improve people's lives and allow the Bank to pursue its own economic interests as an international financial institution. They are largely interested in returns for their main contributors. However, the reality on the ground seems to suggest that from the latter concern, that is its responsibility as an international financial institution, the Bank conditions the former concern to a particular economic performance and institutional change in governments such as: market liberalisation, cost-recovery based public services and debt-servicing. This will also mean that cost-recovery from country interventions will be at the forefront of their responsibility. In this way the idealised assumptions about how the economic and public management systems should work seem to have been prescribed as policy directions for countries as was demonstrated in the cases of Malawi and Nicaragua. The combination of these influences, both international relations and economics based imperatives, constructs a particular way of engaging with countries. The problems of poverty in each context are referenced to an identifiable state party, and then they are addressed in policy that are prescriptions based on explanations of problems 'of geography versus demography' (Mitchell 1995:129). Furthermore, these problems of poverty and its causes are by and large discussed within causal links that are limited to the territorial identity of these countries. In other words the impact of international processes and actors on the problems is not discussed. Timothy Mitchell argues that this is due to the fact that 'development economics takes for granted the nation-state as its object' (1995:147). He further suggests that this creates an image of a self-standing unit which can be compared with other such units. The implications of this situation is clear, the policy prescriptions, while being aware and acknowledging the impact of international economy, mostly focus on national-internal rearrangement of socio-political relations informing public and private sectors (Mitchell 1995:146). The overall methodological issue in understanding the problem and the subsequent solutions can be observed in

each case study. This invariably leads to a situation in which success or failure can only be attributed to the processes within the borders of a nation state. In addition international processes that are influencing the success or failure such as the coffee markets, or the advice to integrate into the market in the first place, as in the case of Nicaragua, are externalised.

While this approach is a part of the aspirational plan to deal with the poverty in each country by adjusting their institutional relations with the international markets, its socio-political implications generally create domestic problems. In other words as argued by some scholars, the Bank's policies together with the Fund's have entrenched the conditions of poverty in many countries (Chossudovsky 1997, Sassen 1998, Stiglitz 1999). Such problems are conveniently seen in the realm of governmental responsibility and left by the Bank to be dealt with by national governments. In this way the Bank and the Fund locate governments as the site of responsibility for the outcomes of the implementation of the policies while also considering the governments responsible to them in the way its loans are utilised and debt is served. In this, governments are put into a very difficult situation as responsible to their citizens and their well-being but also responsible to the Bank or the Fund to achieve certain goals. This situation was highlighted by Julius Nyerere when he complained bitterly of the IMF: 'They asked me to make a choice between paying the debts of Tanzania and feeding the people of Tanzania. For me, that is no moral choice; it is not even a practical choice' (cited in Hansard 1989).

Delimitations of the economics focus coupled with the claims of being non-political while claiming to be responsible to particular constituents in their financial relations can be seen as the organisational and methodological concerns for performing their international economic roles at a global level. However, such considerations can also be seen as informing their dissociation from actual people who are influenced by these policies. As suggested by Richard Titmuss, this, technocratic and economics based approach, can and does, 'lead to the abstraction of people from their social context' as a result of 'a theoretical attempt to isolate what cannot be isolated' (2001: 185). This presents us with a dual abstraction with economic interest implemented through a technocratic approach that abstracts people from their context as a generalised population, and the international institutions that are also abstracted from the implementation context of their policies. In this way international actors become disintegrated from the social changes initiated as a result of their own involvement.

Conclusion

So far I have argued that two processes international organisations as *de facto* policy makers and rights discourse, providing motivation and momentum for the discussions of global social policy contradict each other. It is also argued that this contradiction becomes evident in the questions of the responsibility of policy actors in relation to the outcomes of their policies as experienced by people. I used two cases as instances to note the contradiction between the actors of policy and the experiences of people. In this, there is a basic assumption that people who are targeted by policy should be seen as the claim bearing agents in relation to the policy makers and that there needs to be an obligation to respond to these claims. Furthermore, it is assumed that for global social policy, which is involved in distributive policies as well as issues of social justice, the first assumption matters a great deal. To differentiate global social

policies from mere international developmental aid there needs to be a recognition of people's agency in relation to the policy prescriptions and frameworks.

On these grounds, the responsibility is considered through two social conditions linking a policy maker and people who are influenced by her policies: a general social link assumed between the policy maker and people within the context of the policy, analogous to the doctor-patient relationship, and second, following the same analogy in relation to the responsibility arising from the foreseeability of outcomes in application of policies, the competence of a doctor in dealing with the disease includes assessment of adverse effects on the patient. The case studies are discussed to highlight how international actors fare in terms of responsibility in these areas. This has suggested that while international organisations clearly see themselves as responsible, their responsibility is considered to organisational and technical imperatives underpinning some general aspirations rather than in reference to the outcomes of their policies in relation to people.

This discussion can be criticised on the grounds that, to a great extent, it has not engaged with the existing accountability mechanisms within the international actors that are focused . Moreover, it can also be added that in response to some claims new mechanisms have been introduced, such as the Bank's Inspection panel. These are correct. However, the aim in this paper has been to unpack what is the understanding of responsibility allowing these internal mechanisms for these institutions to be established. As a corollary to this exploration of , analysis of what is assumed as social relations in that responsibility has been central.

The discussion has focused on the foundational constraints on thinking about responsibility in relation to people within the realm of international actors. As a result several constraints have been highlighted in the way policy makers' identities as organisations are formed. It is these identities and their implicit socialisation patterns that are informing the understanding of responsibilities they have in relation to the policies applied across the globe. This way of looking at the issue has also moved the discussion beyond limited technical accounts of available accountability mechanisms. Thinking about the understanding of social relations behind the existing accountability claims or mechanisms has pointed out that the social relations at the level of international actors do not take people as relevant addressees as a result of their organisational identities and imperatives. This then suggests that the claims to have accountability, by the fact of having procedures, implicitly asserts a reference point for establishing legitimacy for the work of international organisations while the social context informing these procedures is de-linked from actual people's experience. It legitimates introduction of policy prescriptions while allowing the policy makers' involvement to remain at an abstract level. In this manner, since people are not party to the responsibility chain, the accountability is employed, for instance, to bolster or assess the legitimacy of international organisations in their involvement with developing countries form their own imperatives. These are procedures by and large established to be accountable to their constituents which are largely as argued above state parties, that are contributing resources to these organisations. In other words they are based on assumed social relations at the international level where people do not take part.

All of this suggests that for international organisations to become responsible policy actors in the global social policy processes there needs to be a rethink of their understanding of their social context outside of their conventional box. This ought to include people's actual experiences of these organisations. It also means that the existing accountability procedures will have to be socialised in the same manner. This

can be criticized by suggesting that accountability is always relational and thus social. As pointed out above, the relationality I have in mind is of a different kind. The implicit relation that is assumed in the existing accounts of accountability is a reflection of an attempt to become legitimate in relation to a social context which does not relate to people and their understanding of the social. Furthermore, it reflects the perception of the provider's perspective of the relationship that requires responsibility between itself and the groups it is engaging with. Therefore, arguably this presents either utilitarian or consequentialist undertones in which a set of expected outcomes are targeted by the provider for its own or other side's benefit. The point of reference, nonetheless is still the perspective of the provider. The view I have presented suggests that the relationship needs to be considered in the context of action or policy outcomes. The issue of responsibility, and as a corollary accountability, arises on the basis of the target group's understanding of the situation independent of the consequentialist or utilitarian concerns of other agents. The social experience of living through a policy intervention institutes people as the right authority to raise questions about responsibility. The socialisation of accountability in this manner by turning to the people at the receiving end of policies, makes the debate less about technical and more about political debate. It positions the thinking into a responsibility framework before the establishment of particular tools of accountability as generic sterilised requirements. The responsibility as a moral concern moves the debate around and locates it into an ethical responsibility: looking at the conditions of such responsibility that cannot be ignored as a result of existing procedures or techniques of accountability. It poses normative questions about actors and the space within which the relations leading to moral dilemmas are located. As it is in this particular juncture the ethical, and indeed the political questions of to whom and why one needs to be responsible emerge. Therefore, the paper must be seen as an exploratory attempt to raise questions about the issue of responsibility as it has been practiced at present.

References:

- Boli, J. and Thomas, G. (eds).1999. *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875*. Stanford: Stanford University Press
- Bergeron, S. (2003) 'Challenging the World Bank's Narrative of Inclusion' in A. Kumar (ed.) *World Bank Literature*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.
- Deacon, B. with M. Hulse and P. Stubbs (1997) *Global social Policy: International organisations and the future of welfare*. London: Sage.
- Deacon, B. (2003) 'The Prospectus for Equitable Access to Social Provision in a Globalizing World' in A. Krizsán and V. Zentai (eds.) *Reshaping Globalization: Multilateral Dialogues and New Policy Initiatives*. Budapest: CEU Press.
- Devereux, S. (2002) *State of Disaster: Causes, Consequences & Policy Lessons from Malawi*. ActionAid Malawi.
- Dreze, J. and A. Sen (1989) *Hunger and Public Action*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Drezner, D. W. (2001) 'Globalization and Policy Convergence', *International Studies Review* vol. 3 No. 1 pp. 53-78.

Eichengreen, B. (1996) *Globalizing Capital: International Monetary System*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

International Monetary Fund (2002) *Malawi-2002 Article IV Consultation-Concluding Statement of the IMF Mission –May 14, 2002*.
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2002/051402.htm>

Josselin D. and W. Wallace (2001) 'Non-state Actors in World politics: The Lessons' in D. Josselin and W. Wallace (2001) *Non-State Actors in World Politics*. London: Palgrave.

Khan, M.H. (2002) 'Corruption and Governance in Early Capitalism: World Bank Strategies and Their Limitations' in J.R. Pincus and J. A. Winters (eds.) *Reinventing the World Bank*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca.

Mitchell, T. (1995) 'The Object of Development: America's Egypt' in J. Crush (ed.) *Power of Development*. London: Routledge.

Mosse, D. (2004), 'Social analysis as Product Development: Anthropologists at Work in the World Bank' in A. Kumar Giri, A. von Harksamp and O. Salemink (eds.) *The Religion of Development-The Development of Religion*. Delft: Eburon.

Nayyar, D. (ed.) (2002) *Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions*. OUP: Oxford.

Nyerere, J. (1989) cited in Hansard Column 655 -17 Mart.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ukparl_hl?DB=ukparl&STEMMER=en&WORDS=nyerere+&COLOUR=Red&STYLE=s&URL=/pa/cm198889/cmhansrd/1989-03-17/Debate-2.html#Debate-2_spnew0

O'Neill, O. (2004) *The Dark side of Human Rights- The Martin White Lecture 2004*. London: LSE.

(2002) *Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics*. Cambridge: CUP.

Owusu, K. and F. Ng'ambi (2002) *Structural Damage: The causes and consequences of Malawi's food crisis*. London: World Development Movement.

Oxfam (2002) *Mugged: Poverty in your coffee cup*. Oxford: Oxfam.

Pincus, J. R. (2002) 'State Simplification and Institution Building in a World Bank-Financed Development Project' in J.R. Pincus and J. A. Winters (eds.) *Reinventing the World Bank*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca.

- Pogge, T. (2002) *World poverty and Human Rights*. London: Polity.
- Seckinelgin, H. (2002) 'Civil Society as a Metaphor for Western Liberalism' in *Global Society*, Vol. 16, No.4 pp.357-76.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) *Globalization and Its Discontents*. London: The Penguin Press.
- (2002) 'Globalization and the Logic of International Collective Action: Re-examining the Bretton Woods Institutions' in Nayyar, D. (ed.) (2002) *Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions*. OUP: Oxford.
- Titmuss, R. (2001) 'Developing social policy in conditions of rapid change: The role of social welfare' in P. Alcock, H. Glennerster, A. Oakley and A. Sinfield (eds.) *Welfare and Wellbeing: Richard Titmuss's Contribution to Social Policy*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- United Kingdom Parliament (2002) *Memorandum Submitted by UKIMF-Examination of Witness* (Thursday 4 July 2002).
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmtreasy/uc868-iii/>
- Wade R.H. (2003) 'The World Bank and The Environment' in Boas and D. McNeill(eds.), *Global Institutions and development: Framing the World*. New York: Routledge.
- (2004) 'On the Causes of Increasing World Poverty and Inequality, or Why the Matthew Effect Prevails', *New Political Economy* Vol. 9 No.2 pp 163-88.
- Wendt, A. (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Winters, J. A. (2002) 'Criminal Debt' in J.R. Pincus and J. A. Winters (eds.) *Reinventing the World Bank*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca.
- World Bank (2001) *The Republic of Nicaragua Poverty Reduction paper and Joint IDA-IMF Staff Assessment* (August 24). Washington DC: World Bank.
- Yeates, N. (2001) *Globalization and Social Policy*. London: Sage.
- You, J.I. (2002) 'The Bretton Woods Institutions: Evolution, Reform, and Change' in D. Nayyar (ed.) *Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions*. OUP: Oxford

In the first instance the internal arrangement seems to flow while in the second case the assumption behind expected international market benefits are unfounded. Although clearly markets are correcting themselves by reducing the price the social outcomes of this market efficiency suggests that there is a problem in relation to linking socio-economically vulnerable communities directly with market and then assume that they will benefit from this unfettered access.

In other words while the social impact of the process is failure for the producers the same process can be seen as efficient from the perspective of markets.

Responding to the Claims

The limited responsibility assumed in these international organisational realms seems to be related with the abstract nature of the prescriptions to change large structural relations. The justification is provided by the fact that in theory these changes should create an ideal growth environment. In that sense the organisations defend themselves in relation to the ideas rather than actual outcomes. The problems generated at the implementation level are passed onto the implementing states and their ability or inability to initiate all their changes for expected transformation.

distinctions based on international national spaces. International policy the perspective of global social policy, the position of international actors can be seen as dealing with problems that are influencing the process of globalisation and by and large trying to manage globalisation so that people benefit from this process. Therefore, the policy prescriptions target those areas woulAnother way of looking at this can be by considering the role of international actors

According to Onara O'Neill

Structures of Thinking

Thus, the report creates few questions in relation to the actors who should be responsible from the present state of affairs in the coffee industry in the country which made many people vulnerable as their livelihoods were fixed to the particular understanding of market: is it only governments' responsibility and therefore structural change in the public management will remedy the situation; or is there a question about if the markets are volatile and unpredictable who is responsible in setting market orientations as targets which in turn makes people vulnerable to conditions that are not within their own control.

Why cannot government's intervene into these communities? The decreased income from export coffee is an important reason, coupled with the debt service requirements already over stretched governments are becoming highly troubled.

Then, the question is should cash crops, that are vulnerable to international markets, become one of the main sources of policy interventions in developing societies

Despite the arguments towards, the real problem rests with the ideology behind the creation of NFRA and its working which prompted IMF to ask repayment of debts. .

This relationship has created problem when the a market subsidies so that ADMARC was able to purchase. He outlines the organisational change as one which has become behind this situation could be explained as government leaving the control of food supplies to privatised

They argued that the liberalisation policies based on deregulation and privatisation have reduced the cooping systems within the country. Furthermore it is argued that selling of food stocks were imperative to maintain debt servicing obligations of the country which would amount to \$70 million in 2002. The IMF defended its position by arguing that 'The cause of food shortages in Malawi are complex, including lapses in the government's early warning systems, distortions in domestic markets, and mismanagement of food reserves'

Julius Nyerere complained bitterly of the IMF. He said : "They asked me to make a choice between paying the debts of Tanzania and feeding the people of Tanzania. For me, that is no moral choice ; it is not even a practical choice."

Hnasard column655 17 Mart 1989

¹ It is reported that Malawi had deficit of 400.000 tonnes of staple crops (2002).

² The debate on this is highly contentious as there are conflicting claims. See Devereux 2002.

³ Ibid. 1.

⁴ Ibid. 9.

⁵ A.Sen and J. Dreze p.23.

⁶ Ibid. 25-27

⁷ BBC Feb 10, 2003.

⁸ International Coffee Association www.ico.org

⁹ Dow Jones 'Lower Coffee Prices, Drought Leave 30000Hondurans Hungary'
25 March 2002.

¹⁰ As cited in Oxfam p.13.